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Abstract 
 
The aim of my dissertation is to provide insights into the rationale and impact of 
government investments. The first chapter introduces the topic, from a corporate 
finance perspective. The second chapter (Why Do Governments Lend?) focuses on the 
factors leading to the participation of state-owned lenders in the corporate loan market, 
both as providers of capital and as arrangers. The third chapter (Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investment, Passivity, and the Value of the Firm) examines the impact of sovereign 
wealth fund ownership on the performance of listed companies, with a focus on 
governance. The fourth chapter (Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt: 
Evidence from Government Investments in Publicly Traded Firms) explores the impact 
of government ownership on the cost of debt of publicly traded firms, in particular as it 
relates to the creation of implicit debt guarantees. 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
While existing literature posits and finds that state ownership is generally 
associated with operational inefficiency and wasteful political interference, government 
ownership of productive assets is remarkably persistent.
1
 Over the past decade, despite 
the worldwide success of state privatizations, governments have acquired more assets 
through stock purchases (USD 969 billion) than they have sold through share-issue 
privatizations and direct sales (USD  765 billion), and this trend is accelerating.
2
  
Gerschenkron (1962) explains this persistence by citing the need for 
governments to provide support to developing, or struggling, economies.  This concept 
is central to the “market-failure” rationale for government intervention (Atkinson and 
Stiglitz, 1980; Faccio, 2004). As no sector has historically assumed as much centrality 
in economic systems as the banking sector, government ownership is particularly 
widespread in banking, as documented by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2002). Hence, in Chapter 2, in order to investigate whether governments act to 
stimulate development and to support struggling economies through ownership of 
lending institutions, I analyze a sample of 148,511 corporate loans worth over USD 37 
trillion from 156 countries, initiated between 1980 and 2010. I find that the proportion 
of loans involving state-owned lenders is higher in countries with weak protection of 
property rights, in non-common law countries, and during banking crises. Further, the 
                                               
1 Both theoretical discussions and empirical evidence regarding government inefficiencies abound. 
Examples of theoretical literature include Friedman (1962) and Shleifer (1998). Examples of empirical 
evidence span from the privatization literature (Megginson and Netter, 2001 offer an early survey) to the 
“mixed ownership” literature (Eckel and Vermalean, 1986; Boardman and Vining, 1989) to a branch of 
empirical literature focusing on government ownership of banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 2002). 
 
2 Estimates of sales and purchases are based on data from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum M&A 
Database.  
2 
level of state-owned lender involvement (loan arranging and sole lending versus passive 
loan syndicate membership) escalates in the presence of weak protection of property 
rights and during banking crises. Also, the share of the loan retained by state-owned 
lenders increases in the presence of weak protection of property rights. Finally, I find 
that loans involving state-owned lenders display larger lending syndicates, longer 
maturities, less frequent collateralization, and lower spreads, with a discount of 
approximately 21 bps. Evidence of subsidization is stronger in the presence of weak 
protection of property rights. Overall, my findings are mostly consistent with the 
market-failure view. 
While persistent, government ownership of productive assets is taking a new 
shape. Rather than exclusively nurturing state-owned champions, governments are 
increasingly acquiring stakes – often minority stakes – in publicly traded companies. 
These investments are, often, in foreign firms. This rise in “state capitalism” is perfectly 
exemplified by the actions of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs): government-owned 
investment funds which tend to invest in foreign, publicly listed firms. In Chapter 3, 
using a sample of 802 investments by 18 SWFs through November 2009, we examine 
whether SWFs impact value as investors in listed companies.
3
 We find that SWFs tend 
to invest in large, levered, profitable growth firms, usually headquartered in a foreign 
country, and that have experienced significantly positive abnormal stock returns in the 
year before the investment is made. These investments usually take the form of direct 
purchases of newly-issued shares, and thus are financing events for target firms. We 
find that most of the funds investing internationally generally purchase sizeable but 
minority ownership stakes in target companies. While SWF investment announcements 
                                               
3 Chapter 3 is based on a working paper co-authored with Bernardo Bortolotti and William Megginson. 
3 
yield small but significantly positive stock returns, target firms experience much larger, 
significantly negative abnormal returns over the three years after investment. Despite 
buying large stakes through direct equity purchases, SWFs play little visible role in 
target firm corporate governance and rarely take seats on target firm boards. These 
results indicate that government investments in publicly traded equity are likely to 
create a value-destroying governance gap, particularly when the investments are in 
foreign firms. 
Having looked at the impact of government ownership on the cost of equity, we 
focus on the impact on the cost of corporate debt in Chapter 4.
4
 Government ownership 
might carry an implicit debt guarantee that reduces the chance of default and, hence, 
leads to a lower cost of debt. On the other hand, government ownership could lead to a 
higher cost of debt by providing an implicit debt guarantee that increases moral hazard 
for managers and by imposing social and political goals that reduce corporate 
profitability and thus increase default risk. Using a sample of 1,279 bonds issued by 215 
firms subject to changes in government share ownership from 43 countries over 1990-
2010, we find that government ownership is associated with lower spreads during the 
2008-2010 financial crisis, during banking crises, for highly-levered firms, and for non-
investment grade bonds. That is, in times of economic recession or firm distress, the 
dominant effect is the reduction in perceived default risk. Further, we find that the effect 
is specific to domestic government ownership, also consistent with the notion that the 
main channel of impact is the debt guarantee, and we document that the impact of 
                                               
4 Chapter 4 is based on a working paper co-authored with Ginka Borisova, Kate Holland and William 
Megginson.  
4 
government ownership differs by type of government entity. Outside of crises, 
government ownership generally leads to a higher cost of debt. 
In the aggregate, my dissertation offers insights into government ownership of 
corporations and lending institutions. The first contribution is descriptive, as I document 
the extent of government direct ownership and offer insights into its frequency, across 
time, geographical regions, and industrial sectors. Second, I provide evidence of the 
impact of government ownership on the behavior of lending institutions and on the 
value of equity and cost of debt of public corporations. The results here presented 
indicate that the impact of government ownership – and, by extension, its optimal level 
– depends on the strength of the underlying economy and of the legal system of the 
country in consideration. Also, substantial differences emerge between domestic and 
foreign government investment activities, revealing the different objectives underlying 
domestic versus cross-border sovereign investments. 
 
 
  
5 
Chapter 2: Why Do Governments Lend? Evidence from the Corporate Loan 
Market 
 
From Friedman (1962) to Shleifer (1998), post-war economists have denounced 
the inefficiencies and the lack of incentives associated with state ownership, concluding 
that “private ownership is the crucial source of incentives to innovate and become 
efficient” (Shleifer, 1998). Consistently, a vast and growing empirical literature finds 
that state ownership is generally associated with operational inefficiency and a peculiar 
brand of agency costs due to political interference.
5
 Yet, worldwide, state ownership of 
productive assets is remarkably persistent. Despite the global wave of state 
privatizations, over the past decade governments have acquired more assets than they 
have sold through share-issue privatizations and direct sales and this trend seems to be 
accelerating.
6
 This puzzle is often explained by the “market-failure hypothesis” 
(Gerschenkron, 1962; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980), which posits that state ownership is 
a response to market failures with the purpose of enabling projects the private sector is 
reluctant to sponsor.  
Conversely, the “commercial hypothesis” posits that state-owned firms are not 
                                               
5
 One stream of research focusing on the relative efficiency of the state versus private sector is the 
privatization literature, which generally finds that the efficiency of state-owned enterprises increases post-
privatization. Early publications are surveyed by Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell 
(2002). More recent evidence includes Sun and Tong (2003), Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2005), 
and Estrin, et al. (2009), among others. Empirical evidence of inefficiency in mixed-ownership 
enterprises is examined by Eckel and Vermaelen (1986) and Boardman and Vining (1989). Additional 
evidence of lower performance in state-owned firms is offered by Chen, Firth and Xu (2008). The impact 
of state ownership on the banking sector is the focus of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), 
Sapienza (2004), Dinç (2005) and Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007).  
 
6 See Borisova, Fotak, Holland and Megginson (2011) for more detail. The authors find that the Thomson 
Reuters SDC Platinum database contains approximately 5,900 government divestments worth USD 1.3 
trillion and about 4,100 government investments worth approximately USD 1.2 trillion since 1980 to the 
present. But, since 2000, the database records USD 725 billion in government divestments and USD 969 
billion in government investments. The trend is even more apparent after 2007 – since May 2007, 
governments have sold USD 157 billion of assets but purchased USD 470 billion. 
6 
fundamentally different from private-sector firms and operate with the same 
commercial objectives. The distinction between the two hypotheses is crucial in so far 
that, according to the commercial view, government and private sector activities tend to 
intensify, or decline, in unison, while, according to the market-failure view, government 
involvement substitutes for the private sector when the latter is inactive. In this paper, I 
explore lending by governments and state-owned entities and test whether the observed 
lending patterns are consistent with the empirical predictions of the commercial or the 
market-failure views.  
The financial sector is a particularly apt arena for testing the impact of state 
ownership. First, state ownership of banks around the world is pervasive and persistent. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002, henceforth “LLS”) find that the average 
state ownership of banks, around the world, is 41.6 percent in 1995 (the mid-point of 
my study). Second, the financial sector, being central to both the payment system and to 
corporate access to funding, affects all other economic activities.  
The work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997 and 1998, 
henceforth “LLSV”) highlights the importance of laws and institutions in the 
development of finance. The relevant finding is that weak institutions hamper the 
development of financial markets. Building on their insight, I investigate whether, in the 
presence of a market failure (weak protection of property rights and the resulting lack of 
development), governments lend more frequently, retain larger shares of loans, escalate 
their level of involvement (by, for example, arranging loans) and whether, under weak 
legal systems, government loans provide terms more favorable to borrowers than 
private-sector loans. 
7 
A second testing ground for the market-failure view is offered by banking crises. 
During banking crises, credit supply is constrained as the private sector is often 
reluctant to lend (Laeven and Valencia, 2010; Sudheer and Purnanandam, 2011). This 
can be viewed as a temporary market failure – and the testable implication of the 
market-failure view is that government lending activity should intensify during a 
banking crisis. Hence, I analyze government lending patterns and the terms of 
government loans during banking crises.
7
 
Further, within the market-failure view, government lenders provide credit to 
firms with otherwise restricted access to financial markets (unlisted, smaller, and riskier 
firms), to socially important industries (such as regulated industries: utilities, 
transportation, and telecoms) and, given its centrality in economic activity, to the 
financial sector. Accordingly, I test whether governments lend more frequently and 
more actively to such borrowers. 
Given that the market-failure view is predicated on the concept that 
governments seek to provide support to the domestic economy, the predicted lending 
patterns apply mostly to domestic lending activity. LLS (2002) similarly justify 
excluding foreign banks from their sample. Accordingly, I isolate loans by domestic and 
foreign government lenders, expecting to find domestic lending activity conforming to 
the market-failure view and foreign lending activity to be commercial in nature – where 
                                               
7 Market failures deriving from institutional weakness and banking crises might be due, in the first place, 
to the actions of governments. While it is plausible to presume that governments are responsible for those 
failures through legislative or regulatory activity, it is not clear why government lending activity – the 
focus of this analysis – should cause institutional weakness or induce a banking crisis. Also, government 
lending cannot, by definition, cause legal origin, used here as an exogenous proxy for strength of the legal 
environment. Further, the analysis here presented includes both domestic and foreign government 
lending, and foreign governments are an unlikely cause of domestic market failures. Finally, many of the 
state-owned lenders are owned by local or regional governments, rather than the central government, and 
thus are farther removed from the legislative process. 
8 
“commercial” implies lending patterns akin to those of private lenders. 
I analyze government lending patterns using corporate loan initiations included 
in the Thomson Reuters LPC Deal Scan database, augmented with borrower accounting 
data from Worldscope Global.
8
 As proxies for the quality of the legal system, I employ 
an index of the strength of propriety rights compiled by the Fraser Institute and 
identifiers of the legal origin of the borrower’s country.9 In robustness tests, I use, as an 
alternative metric of legal system strength, the “Investment Profile” score by the 
International Country Risk Guide.
 
 
I model the probability of government involvement, distinguishing between 
domestic and foreign government lending, in probit analysis. In contrast with the 
commercial view, results point to significant differences in lending patterns between 
state-owned and private-sector institutions. Consistent with the market-failure view, 
government lending accounts for a higher proportion of loans in countries with weak 
protection of property rights and in non-common law countries. While domestic 
government lending is more likely during a banking crisis, foreign government lending 
displays no such bias. Both domestic and foreign government lending favor regulated 
industries, though this result is, at least partially, subsumed by a size effect. 
Government lending also favors state-owned borrowers. Both domestic and foreign 
government lenders favor large firms but domestic government lending is further biased 
                                               
8 For the purpose of this investigation, I define as “state-owned” every firm and institution in which the 
government owns, directly or indirectly, an equity stake exceeding 50%. The data collection involved in 
tracking government ownership is described in Section 2.1. For brevity, I refer to government branches 
and institutions and state-owned firms as “government” and to lending by government branches and 
institutions and state-owned firms as “government lending”. I use the term “government loans” to 
indicate loans in which government lenders are either sole-lenders, arrangers or syndicate members. 
 
9 Legal origin has often been used as a proxy for the strength of property rights in prior literature, since 
LLSV (1998) documented that common-law (French civil-law) countries generally have the strongest 
(weakest) legal protections of investors. 
9 
towards firms with higher levels of idiosyncratic risk. Results are both statistically and 
economically significant. Holding other predictors at the mean, a decrease in protection 
of property rights from an index level of 8 (approximately the mean value for Germany) 
to 6 (approximately the mean value for Romania) roughly triples the probability of 
government lending, increasing the proportion of loans with government lenders from 1 
percent of all loans to 3 percent. Non-common law legal origin increases the proportion 
of loans with government lenders by 10 percentage points. A banking crisis increases 
the proportion of loans with government lenders by approximately 5 percentage points. 
In the dataset, lenders can assume three basic roles: passive syndicate members, 
loan arrangers, and single lenders (when the entire loan is provided by one lender). 
While syndicate membership involves the provision of credit, syndicate arranging 
involves the additional functions of negotiating with the borrower, reviewing its 
disclosures, funding the loan, and monitoring the loan agreement. Accordingly, 
arranging a loan is a higher-involvement task than simple syndicate membership and 
arrangers not only provide credit, but also facilitate access to funding markets. Sole 
lending implies the same level of involvement with the borrower as arranging, but the 
entire loan is retained by the single lender. Accordingly, within the market-failure view, 
government lenders should arrange loans or single-lend more frequently in the presence 
of weak protection of property rights and during banking crises. Within a multinomial-
logit framework, I investigate the determinants of government roles in lending and find 
that, conditional on government involvement, arranging and sole lending by 
governments intensify in the presence of weak protection of property rights and in non-
common law countries. This is consistent with a facilitating role of government lenders, 
10 
in so far as the arranging activity of state-owned banks provides access to credit 
supplied by both state-owned and private sector lenders. Also, consistent with the 
market-failure view, arranging activity intensifies during banking crises.  
I further investigate which factors determine the stake of the loan retained (not 
syndicated) by government lenders. Within the market-failure framework, governments 
should retain larger portions of loans in weak legal systems and during banking crises. 
Results based on a two-stage selection model (in which the first stage models 
government participation, while the second models the share of the loan retained) are 
partially supportive of the market-failure view. While state-owned lenders retain larger 
shares of loans in the presence of weak property rights, state-owned lenders, in 
particular when lending to domestic borrowers, retain larger shares of loans in common 
law countries. Banking crises do not impact the stake retained by government lenders. 
To examine the characteristics of government loans, I control for the selection 
bias in government lending by propensity-score matching. Comparing loan 
characteristics between government loans and the propensity-score matched sample, I 
document that government loans involve larger syndicates: the mean number of lenders 
for government loans is 16 versus 9 for the matched sample, which is consistent with 
the facilitating role of loan arranging. Government loans also have slightly longer 
maturities (54 versus 50 months) and are less frequently collateralized (only 17 percent 
of government loans are collateralized, versus 23 percent of matched private-sector 
loans). Most importantly, after controlling for country and borrower characteristics, 
government loans carry a 21 bps discount. These differences are, once more, conflicting 
with the commercial view of government lending, as government loans involve terms 
11 
more favorable to borrowers than do private loans. I further investigate how 
government lending differs between countries with weak and strong protection of 
property rights and find results consistent with the market-failure view. When the index 
of protection of property rights is above median, government loans involve larger 
syndicates and longer maturities, but other loan characteristics are not statistically 
different from those of private-sector loans. Conversely, in the presence of weak 
protection of property rights, government loans involve larger syndicates, longer 
maturities, less frequent collateralization, more frequent usage of covenants, and 
significant lower spreads, with a mean discount of 37 bps. This evidence indicates that 
governments subsidize loans to a larger extent the weaker the protection of property 
rights. Comparing characteristics of domestic and foreign government loans, I 
surprisingly find stronger evidence of loan subsidization by foreign governments: 
foreign government loans involve both more favorable contract terms and larger 
discounts than domestic government loans. I do not find a similar distinction when sub-
setting the dataset by legal origin or by banking crises. I further subset results by share 
of the loan retained by governments, finding that terms of loans are favorable to 
borrowers regardless of the size of the stake retained by the government; the implication 
is that government lending participation induces other syndicate members to lend at 
more favorable terms. Finally, I compare government and private-sector loans to the 
same borrower during the same year and do not find government loans to be 
substantially different: government loans have longer maturities and involve larger 
lending syndicates, but are otherwise similar to private loans. This suggests that 
government lending does not subsidize firms that already have access to financing 
12 
through private-sector channels.   
This study is the first multi-country loan-level analysis to focus on the reasons 
behind government lending. It contributes to the literature on government’s role in the 
economy first by showing that, contrary to the commercial view, lending patterns of 
state-owned institutions are different from those of private-sector banks. Second, 
evidence is consistent with the market-failure view, in so far that government lending 
substitutes for private-sector lending in the presence of weak property rights and during 
banking crises. Also, analysis of government lending indicates that state-owned banks 
not only provide credit, but facilitate access to private-sector credit markets by 
assuming the role of loan arrangers and thus attracting large syndicates. Third, in a 
broader sense, results indicate that state-ownership persistence is due, at least partially, 
to weak legal systems presumably leading to reluctant private-sector involvement in 
economic activity.
10
 Overall, the main implication is that state-owned banks, by 
providing credit when otherwise scarce and by facilitating access to private-sector 
lenders, relax financial constraints that are shown to hamper economic growth.
11
 
The finding that government lending is more frequent in the presence of weak 
protection of property rights is close, in spirit, to LLS (2002), who document, amongst 
other results, that state ownership of banks is more common in countries with weak 
                                               
10 While previous studies document that state ownership of banks is negatively related to the development 
of a private financial system, the implication of my evidence is that this relationship is driven by the 
weakness of the legal environment, which drives both lack of private activity (LLSV, 1997 and 1998) and 
the resulting government intervention.  
 
11 Previous research indicates that credit constraints hamper economic growth, in particular under the 
conditions considered in this paper: weak legal systems and banking crises. For example, Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2006) find that lack of credit impedes growth of small and medium enterprises in 
countries with weak protection of property rights. Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008) find that 
economic sectors that heavily depend on external financing lose approximately 1 percentage point of 
growth in each crisis year compared to less financially dependent sectors. Chava and Purnanandam 
(2011) find that profitability of firms dependent on bank financing suffers during a banking crisis. 
13 
legal systems. Yet, the analysis here presented differs in important ways. First, I base 
my analysis on lending activity, an outcome-based metric, rather than on bank 
ownership. Second, my findings are based on a more comprehensive analysis, in time 
(my sample covers the years 1980-2010, while LLS focus mainly on two years, 1970 
and 1995), geography (I include 156 countries, while LLS focus on 92) and coverage (I 
include all banks, while LLS focus on the ten largest banks from each country). Also, I 
include, and contrast, both domestic and foreign lending activity, while the latter is 
explicitly excluded by LLS. Third, and most important, my findings cannot be 
explained by simple state ownership of banks as (1) I control for government size in the 
economy in my analysis, (2) results apply to both domestic and foreign lending, and (3) 
I show that domestic government lending is stronger during banking crises, while LLS 
find a weak, negative association between banking crises and state ownership of banks. 
Finally, I investigate not only the frequency of government lending activity, but also 
lender role, shares retained, and loan characteristics. This leads to the finding that 
government lending is not only more frequent in the presence of weak protection of 
property rights, but the level of government involvement escalates, with government 
lenders more frequently arranging loans, thus attracting a larger number of private-
sector lenders, resulting in loans with longer maturities and lower spreads. The 
important and novel implication is that government activity substitutes for private-
sector lending when the latter is scarce.  
A second branch of the literature investigating state ownership of banks focuses 
on the agency costs associated with political lending.
12
 I contribute by showing that 
                                               
12 Existing literature provides strong evidence of political lending. DeBonis (1998) looks at Italian state-
owned banks and find that their lending is biased towards state-owned enterprises and local authorities. 
14 
lending patterns are also consistent with the market-failure view of governments, in that 
government lending is directly related to financial market lack of development and 
failure. The political and market-failure views of state ownership are each inconsistent 
with the commercial view, but not mutually exclusive.   
My research also adds to the literature on syndicated loans. In this respect, the 
closest works are Esty and Megginson (2003) and Bae and Goyal (2009), who 
investigate how the strength of creditor rights impacts the structure of bank loans and 
find that lenders react to weak creditor protection by adopting contracting structures 
aimed at mitigating risk.
13
 In this framework, my main contribution is to show that legal 
structure impacts syndicate composition and that government presence can ameliorate 
some of the problems related to legal-system weakness. Further, while state ownership 
is not the main focus of their analysis, Qian and Strahan (2007) anticipate some of the 
findings, as they document that state-owned banks own larger shares of syndicated 
loans in countries of Scandinavian or socialist legal origin and in countries with weak 
creditor rights. They also investigate whether the share of the loan owned by 
government banks has an impact on loan characteristics, but find no relationship – 
contrary to the results of my study – presumably due to the lack of controls for selection 
biases in government lending in their analysis.   
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops testable hypotheses. 
                                                                                                                                         
He further documents that state-owned banks are less profitable in their lending activities and suffer from 
a higher proportion of non-performing loans. Sapienza (2004) focuses on a sample of Italian banks and 
finds evidence of lending according to party affiliation. Dinç (2005) finds that state-owned banks increase 
lending during election years. Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that, in Pakistan, firms with politicians 
amongst directors receive larger loans from governments. 
 
13 The findings indicate that, in the presence of weak protection of property rights, loans are generally 
smaller, display shorter maturities, more diffused debt ownership and higher loan interest rates as 
compensation for the increased level of risk. 
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Section 2 describes the data sources and the dataset. Section 3 focuses on the empirical 
analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Hypotheses Development 
According to the “market-failure view” (Gerschenkron, 1962; Atkinson and 
Stiglitz, 1980) of state ownership, governments intervene in economic activity when the 
private sector is reluctant to participate. My empirical focus is on government lending 
activity and the first “market failure” I use as a testing ground is legal system weakness, 
which prevents the development of financial markets (LLSV 1997, 1998). The second 
set of market failures I investigate are banking crises, which lead to a reduction in the 
availability of credit (Laeven and Valencia, 2010; Sudheer and Purnanandam, 2011). A 
further implication of the market-failure view is that government lending should 
provide credit to firms which have limited or costly access to private-sector capital 
funding. As metrics for firm access to capital markets I consider firm size (larger firms 
typically have easier access to funding), public listing (listed firms have access to public 
equity markets and a higher level of transparency, which favors borrowing), and the 
number of loans from the private sector over the previous years – a direct measure of 
ease of access to private capital markets. Accordingly, my first testable hypothesis is 
that government lending will be more frequent (account for a larger proportion of loans) 
when property rights are weak (low property rights scores and non-common law legal 
origin), during banking crises, and to firms with less access to private-sector funding 
(smaller, unlisted firms with fewer private-sector loans). 
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A higher level of government involvement, aside from leading to more frequent 
lending, could also result into a more active role. In my analysis, lenders can assume 
three basic roles: passive syndicate members, loan arrangers, or sole lenders. Syndicate 
membership involves only the provision of credit, whereas syndicate arranging involves 
the additional functions of negotiating with the borrower, reviewing its disclosures, and 
monitoring the loan agreement. Accordingly, arranging a loan is a higher-involvement 
task than simple syndicate membership and leads not only to the provision of credit, but 
also to facilitating access to credit markets. Sole lending involves the same level of 
involvement with the borrower as arranging, but the entire loan is retained by the single 
lender. Accordingly, within the market-failure view, I expect that government lending 
will involve more arranging and sole lending in the presence of weak protection of 
property rights, during banking crises, and for borrowers with less access to private 
capital markets.  
Another measure of government’s involvement in lending is the share of the 
loan that is retained by the government lender (rather than syndicated to other lenders). 
Accordingly, within the market-failure view, I expect that government lenders will 
retain larger shares of loans in the presence of weak protection of property rights, 
during banking crises, and for borrowers with less access to private-sector capital 
markets. 
A market failure, either a weak legal system or a banking crisis, leads to 
reluctant lending by the private sector, and thus to loan terms less favorable to 
borrowers (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). As the market-failure view predicts 
governments will provide credit when the private sector is  reluctant to do so, the terms 
17 
of government loans should be more favorable to lenders (compared to the terms on 
private-sectors loans) in the presence of weak property rights or during a banking crisis. 
In particular, government loans, compared to private-sector loans, should be larger, 
have fewer covenants, be less frequently collateralized or senior, have longer maturities 
and lower spreads in the presence of weak property rights or during a banking crisis. 
The predictions of the market-failure view apply mostly to domestic government 
activity. Accordingly, my analysis distinguishes between domestic and foreign 
government lending, expecting results consistent with the market-failure for domestic, 
but not foreign, lenders.  
Conversely, the commercial view implies no difference between lending 
patterns by government and private institutions. 
 
2. Data Sources, Descriptive Statistics, and Univariate Analysis 
2.1. Data Sources 
The source of data analyzed in this study is the Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing 
Corporation Deal Scan database (“DealScan”). DealScan includes loans, high-yield 
bonds, and private placement transactions from around the world. The version of the 
database used here contains loans initiated between January 1980 and May 2010. The 
database includes information on loan pricing, contract details, terms and conditions, 
plus limited information on loan participants (borrower and lender identities and limited 
financials). The loans are organized by “package” and by “facility”. Each package 
represents a loosely-defined “deal” and may contain one or multiple facilities – on an 
average, there are approximately 1.5 loans in each package. All loans within the same 
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package share the same borrower, but the identity of the lender, the composition of the 
lending syndicate, type of loan, loan initiation date and other contract characteristics can 
all vary between loans from the same package.
14
 
I limit my analysis to loans identified as ‘364-Day Facility’, ‘Bridge Loan’, 
‘Term Loan’ of all types, ‘Revolver line’ of all maturities and ‘Other Loan’, thus 
excluding not only bonds and private placements, but also credit letters and guarantees. 
I further exclude loans whose status is ‘Cancelled’ or ‘Rumor’. Further, I exclude from 
my sample all loans for which data on the composition of the lending syndicate is 
missing and loans with conflicting information (for example, loans marked as single-
lender loans for which multiple lenders are listed).  
I first identify state ownership of both lenders and borrowers by using data from 
DealScan. The database identifies firms as being either majority (more than 50 percent) 
or minority (between 5 and 50 percent) state-owned. I focus on majority ownership, so 
use “government lender” to indicate any lender in which the government owns, directly 
or indirectly, more than 50 percent of equity and “government loans” to indicate any 
loans involving at least one “government lender” and “private loans” to ident ify loans 
with no government lenders. I extensively verify majority state ownership by validating 
the information in DealScan through external searches. I employ the datasets of state 
ownership utilized in Bortolotti, Fotak and Megginson (2011) and Borisova, Fotak, 
Holland and Megginson (2012) and integrate the data with company filings and news 
searches. I find that DealScan correctly identifies government majority ownership, as I 
find no instances of firms being identified as state-owned when that is not the case. On 
                                               
14 Carey and Hrycray (1999) and Chava and Roberts (2008) describe the database extensively. Some 
recent empirical studies using data from this database include Guner (2006), Qian and Strahan (2007), 
Sufi (2009), Bae and Goyal (2009) and Haselmann and Wachtel (2010).  
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the other hand, I identify instances of state-owned firms not being identified as such in 
DealScan and I correct such misclassifications.
15
 The final sample includes various 
types of government lenders: state-owned banks and other state-owned financial 
institutions, governmental institutions (such as ministries of economy, finance or 
commerce), supranational entities (such as the European Investment Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank), and, in rare cases, state-owned operating companies 
(such as Électricité de France S.A.).  
Accounting data for borrowing firms is obtained from the Thomson Financial 
Worldscope Global (“Worldscope”) database. As DealScan identifies firms only by 
name and ticker symbol, matching between DealScan and Worldscope is based on 
company names; due to differences in spelling, much of the matching is manual. Out of 
a total of 91,105 borrowers in the sample, I successfully match 16,766 firms between 
DealScan and Worldscope.
16
 To prevent possible endogeneity issues, I retrieve 
accounting data for the borrower as of December 31 of the year preceding loan 
initiation. This subset of loans with available accounting data is biased towards larger, 
publicly traded institutions, so I present results for both the larger sample and for the 
data subset including borrowers matched to Worldscope.  
Banking crises are identified by making use of the dataset described in Laeven 
                                               
15 With the large number of firms in the database some small classification error is still possible. In 
regards to the analysis here presented, this hypothetical classification error would lead to conservative 
results. If firms that truly are state-owned are not classified as such, differences between private and 
government loans would be more difficult to detect.  
 
16 By comparison, Bae and Goyal (2009) match 4,407 borrowers between the same two databases. Qian 
and Strahan (2007) engage in a similar exercise but do not reveal the exact number of matches – yet, their 
data description lists 4,322 loans for which they find borrower-level accounting data. Haselmann and 
Wachtel (2010) match approximately 7,000 firms between DealScan and Amadeus. 
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and Valencia (2010).
17
 The dataset lists banking crises across the world from 1970 to 
2009. Amongst other information, it identifies the country/years during which a banking 
crisis took place, based on two conditions: “(1) Significant signs of financial distress in 
the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, 
and bank liquidations); and (2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in 
response to significant losses in the banking system” (Laeven and Valencia, 2010).  
Data on the size of government and protection of creditor rights is from the 
Economic Freedom of the World survey by the Fraser Institute. This data is available at 
five-year interval between 1970 and 2000 and yearly thereafter. The most recent data 
available at the time of writing is from the 2010 edition of the survey, which includes 
data until 2008.
18
 In particular, I obtain two variables, described respectively as “Size of 
the Government: Expenditures, Taxes and Enterprises” (“Government Size”) and 
“Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights” (or “Property Rights”). Government 
Size ranges from one to ten, with higher scores indicating smaller government direct 
intervention in the economy, based on the metrics: (1) general government consumption 
spending as a percentage of total consumption, (2) transfers and subsidies as a 
percentage of GDP, (3) government enterprise and investments, and (4) top marginal 
tax rates. Property Rights is similarly coded on a one-to-ten scale, with higher scores 
indicating stronger protection of property rights, and is based on the criteria: (1) judicial 
independence, (2) impartial courts, (3) protection of property rights, (4) military 
interference in the role of law and the political process, (5) integrity of the legal system, 
                                               
17 Luc Laeven has made the dataset available at http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm 
 
18 For the years for which data is not available, I use data for the latest available year. So, for example, I 
use 1980 data for the years 1981 to 1984. Similarly, I use 2008 data for the years 2009 and 2010.  
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(6) legal enforcement of contracts, and (7) regulatory restrictions on the sale of real 
property.
19
  
As an alternative proxy for the level of development of the legal system, I 
employ the “Investment Profile” score published in the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG).
20
 The index is coded on a twelve-point scale (1-12) with higher scores 
indicating a more business-favorable legal environment. The index is based on three 
sub-components, measuring the risk of contract non-viability or expropriation, 
restrictions on profits repatriation, and payment delays. The index itself is available, 
yearly, from 1984 to 2008.
21
 While this index is not includes in the main analysis, due 
to its high level of correlation with the Property Rights score, it is employed in 
robustness tests and thus included in the descriptive analysis.  
Data on yearly GDP growth by country is from the World Bank website and 
information on legal origin is from a dataset made available by Andrei Shleifer.
22
  All 
variables measured in monetary units (such as loan size and firm’s total assets) are in 
USD, adjusted for inflation to 2011 by using the Consumer Price Index by the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. A summary of variable definitions and related sources are 
included in Table 1. 
                                               
19 The variables Government Size and Property Rights correspond to the indices labeled as ‘A1’ and ‘A2’. 
An older version of the Economic Freedom of the World dataset is discussed – and utilized for empirical 
analysis - by Easton and Walker (1997).  
 
20 ICRG data has been used in numerous previous financial studies, including Bae and Goyal (2009). 
 
21 I employ the index values for 1984 for the years 1980-1983 and the 2008 values for the years 2009 and 
2010. 
 
22 http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
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2.2. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for core variables are reported in Table 2. Panel A contains 
information on binary variables, while Panel B focuses on continuous variables. The 
descriptive statistics are based on the raw data; in the remained of the analysis, 
continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles.  
The dataset includes 148,511 unique loans to 91,105 distinct borrowers from 
156 countries, with a total value of USD 37 trillion (in ‘2011 USD’). The sample 
includes 15,807 distinct lenders. In terms of geographical distribution of borrowers, the 
overall dataset is biased towards common law countries (circa 71 percent of 
observations) and, in particular, towards loans to USA-headquartered borrowers (58 
percent).
23
  
The subset of the sample involving state-owned lenders includes 10,560 loans (7 
percent of the total number of loans). Of those loans, 4,819 (3 percent) involve domestic 
government lenders, and 6,455 loans (4 percent) involve foreign government lenders. 
This suggests that governments lend more frequently abroad than domestically. This 
result is unexpected, but should be interpreted with caution, as it could be driven by 
database coverage bias. The sample includes 279 distinct state-owned lenders. In terms 
of geographical distribution of borrowers, the government-loan data subset includes 
loans to borrowers to 129 countries. Countries with the highest number of loans 
involving state-owned lenders include China (2,382 loans, 22.56% of total number of 
                                               
23 As discussed in the robustness section, I find the empirical analysis robust to exclusion of loans to 
USA-headquartered borrowers.  
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loans in this sub-sample), USA (933 loans, 8.84%), South Korea (876, 8.30%), India 
(565, 5.35%) and Russia (463 loans, 4.38%).
24
  
The sample includes 18,628 loans (12.54% of the total number of loans) 
originated during a banking crisis. In 3,254 loans, the borrower has a state participation 
exceeding 5 percent ownership. The dataset is biased towards syndicated loans – only 
13,893 loans, or 9 percent of the sample, involve single lenders. The total number of 
packages is 104,245, indicating that there are approximately 1.4 loans per package in 
the final sample.  
 
2.3. Univariate Analysis 
As a first analysis of government lending patterns, I compute mean values of the 
variables of interest for four subsets of the sample: loans with no government lender 
involvement (“private loans”), loans in which at least one of the lender is state-owned 
(“government loans”), loans in which at least one of the lender is owned by the 
government of the country in which the borrower headquarters are located, and loans in 
which at least one of the lender is owned by the government NOT of the country in 
which the borrower headquarters are located (respectively, “domestic government 
loans” and “foreign government loans”). To test for differences in means between 
private loans and the government loan sub-samples, I use two different methodologies, 
depending on the nature of the data. Two-sample t-tests are used for continuous 
                                               
24 Results regarding geographical distribution of loans are untabulated for brevity, but available on 
request. As discussed in the robustness section, I find the empirical analysis robust to exclusion of loans 
to borrowers with headquarters in China. China, for the present definition, includes the territories of 
Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
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variables, with standard errors clustered at the loan package level.
25
 For binary 
variables, I use Pearson Chi-square tests with standard errors clustered at the loan 
package level. Results are presented in Table 3.  
Compared to private loans, government loans have lower spreads (138 bps for 
government loans vs. 213 bps for private loans),
26
  a higher number of lenders (13 vs. 
6), are more likely to be collateralized (13 vs. 8 percent), less likely to employ 
covenants (11 vs. 19 percent), less likely to involve a single lenders (6 vs. 10 percent), 
have longer maturities (66 vs. 51 months), are more likely to involve foreign lenders (83 
vs. 57 percent) and are generally larger (USD 307 million vs. USD 247 million).
27
 
Comparing loans by domestic lenders to those booked by foreign lenders, I find that the 
former have lower spreads, fewer lenders, less frequent collateralization and use of 
covenants, are less likely to be collateralized and to involve a single lender, have longer 
maturity, involve fewer foreign lenders and are significantly smaller.
 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, government loans tend to involve borrowers from 
countries with a smaller size of government. More in line with expectations, 
government loans provide credit more frequently to borrowers from countries that have 
weaker protection of creditor rights and with a less-favorable investment profile. While 
73 percent of loans with no government involvement are to borrowers from common 
                                               
25 Problems related to standard error clustering in finance panel data sets are discussed in Petersen (2009). 
The estimation methods employed to cluster standard errors here and in the remainder of the paper are 
described in Skinner, Holt and Smith (1989).  
 
26 The spreads here considered are ‘all in drawn’ spreads from DealScan, defined as “The amount the 
borrower pays (in basis points) over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down, including both the spread of the 
loan and any annual or facility fee paid” (data definition from an electronic file provided by Thomson 
Reuters with the database).   
 
27 Here and in the remainder of the paper, reported results are statistically significant at the 10% level or 
lower, unless otherwise specified.  
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law countries, only 44 percent of loans with government lenders are to borrowers from 
common law countries. Further, I find a negative correlation between government 
lending and banking crises, as 13 percent of loans with no government lenders are 
initiated during banking crises, but only 11 percent of government loans are; however, 
multivariate analysis, presented in the following sections, does not support this finding. 
Finally, mean GDP growth is higher during the initiation of loans with government 
involvement (5.2 vs. 2.8 percent). Compared to foreign government loans, domestic 
government loans are extended to borrowers from countries with smaller governments, 
stronger protection of creditor rights, stronger investment profile, and are less likely to 
be initiated in common law countries and during banking crises, but are associated with 
stronger GDP growth.  
Finally, in terms of borrower characteristics, both domestic and foreign 
government loans are associated with larger (higher total assets) and more profitable 
borrowers (higher ROA), and borrowers with lower Tobin Q scores. While borrowers of 
loans with domestic government lenders have generally lower leverage than borrowers 
of loans from private lenders, the opposite (higher leverage) is true for borrowers of 
loans with foreign government lenders.
28
  
Overall, contrary to the commercial view, univariate analysis indicates that 
government lending patterns different substantially from those of private institutions. 
Results further suggest that government lending is more frequent in the presence of 
                                               
28 The differences, while statistically significant, are marginal: mean debt-to-asset ratio is .65 for all-
private loans, .62 for loans with domestic government lenders and .68 for loans with foreign government 
lenders. 
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weak legal systems, but less frequent during banking crises, thus providing conflicting 
evidence for the market-failure view.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis of Government Lending Patterns 
3.1.  Determinants of Government Participation 
I employ probit analysis to investigate within a multivariate framework which 
factors affect the government decision to lend. The response is a binary variable equal 
to one if state-owned lenders are involved. As predictors, I use variables which are 
exogenous to government lending participation, including both country and borrower 
characteristics. As the market-failure view of state ownership predicts that government 
lending is more likely in the presence of weak creditor rights protection, I add a variable 
measuring the strength of property rights. Given the findings of LLSV (1997, 1998) 
linking legal origin to strength of creditor rights, I add a binary variable equal to one for 
borrowers headquartered in common law countries.
29
 Since the market-failure view 
predicts that governments provide credit when access to financing is otherwise 
restricted, I add a binary variable equal to one during banking crises. In a similar spirit, 
I add two measures of access to private lending markets – the number of private loans 
obtained by the borrower over the previous five years and a binary variable equal to one 
if the borrower is listed on a public exchange. As an additional control and to measure 
the strength of previous relationships with the government, I add the number of 
government loans obtained by the borrower over the previous five years. Also, since the 
                                               
29 The common law origin dummy variable and the variable measuring the strength of property rights are 
correlated, as property rights tend to be weaker in non-common law countries. To investigate whether 
multicollinearity is affecting parameter estimates, I re-estimate coefficients for the various models here 
presented by adding only one of those two variables at the time, finding parameter estimate to be robust.   
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market-failure view predicts possible industry biases, I add controls for regulated 
industries (SIC codes 4000-5000, including telecoms, transportation and utilities) and 
depository institutions (SIC codes 6000-6500). As an additional control for the ease of 
access to financing, I add a binary variable equal to one if the borrower is publicly 
traded. Given that government lending might focus on state-owned enterprises, I 
include a binary variable equal to one if the borrower has a share of state ownership 
exceeding five percent. As additional controls for country characteristics, I include 
variables measuring country GDP growth and an index of the size of the government in 
the economy. Since governments might be prone to provide credit for specific types of 
projects, I add fixed effects for loan purpose.
30
 As in the univariate analysis, I cluster 
standard errors at the loan package level.  
Results are presented in the first column of Table 4. Consistent with the market 
failure view, the proportion of loans with government lenders decreases in protection of 
creditor right and, consistently, is higher for non-common law countries. The positive 
coefficient on the crisis variable indicates that government lending is more likely during 
a banking crisis – yet, the probability of government lending is positively related to 
GDP growth. Government lending is more likely for both depository institutions and 
regulated industries. Finally, government lending is more likely for state-owned 
borrowers.  
In the third and fifth column of Table 4, I present results disaggregated by 
domestic and foreign government lenders. Most of the parameter estimates retain 
similar signs and levels of significance, but some differences are notable. Domestic 
                                               
30 DealScan identifies 39 different “loan purposes”. For brevity, I do not report coefficient estimates on 
the loan purpose dummy variables.  
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governments, unlike foreign governments, are less likely to lend to depository 
institutions. Foreign governments, in addition, do not display higher levels of lending 
during banking crises.  
To gain further insight into borrower characteristics related to government 
lending, I estimate alternative model specifications including accounting variables. I 
add firm size (total assets), firm leverage, ROA, a measure of liquidity (the quick ratio) 
and Tobin’s Q to the model, presuming that each of those could be related to the ease of 
obtaining financing. As accounting data is mostly unavailable for non-publicly traded 
firm – and, as most government borrowers are non-publicly traded – I remove from this 
model the two binary variables identifying publicly traded institutions and government 
borrowers. Also, I develop a measure of idiosyncratic risk by regressing the loan spread 
on country, borrower and loan characteristics and computing the residual from this 
model. This residual can be interpreted as an unexplained risk component and is 
therefore included as an explanatory variable in the model. Results presented in the 
second, fourth and sixth column of Table 4 indicate that government lenders target 
larger firms, both foreign and domestic. While overall government lending and foreign 
government lending appear to be negatively related to the borrower’s Tobin’s Q, the 
result is not statistically significant for domestic government lending. Domestic 
government lending is more likely for firms with higher idiosyncratic risk. Finally, the 
addition of accounting variables affects the coefficient estimate for the banking crisis 
binary variable (positive, but not statistically significant) and largely subsumes 
industrial biases, as only the negative coefficient estimate for domestic government 
lending remains statistically significant. The explanatory power of the probit models 
29 
fitted is quite strong, with the percentage of concordant predictions ranging between 81 
percent and 94 percent.
31
  
Economic interpretation of probit coefficients is non-intuitive, as the impact on 
the probability of the modeled event is conditional on the level of all predictors. 
Nonetheless, I attempt to assess the economic significance of the observed effects. 
Based on the coefficient estimates in the first column of Table 4, holding all other 
predictors at the mean level, an increase in protection of property rights from an index 
level of 6 (approximately the mean value for Romania) to 8 (approximately the mean 
value for Germany) decreases the probability of government lending by approximately 
2.16 percentage points, from 3.35 percent to 1.19 percent. Similarly, common law legal 
origin decreases the probability of government participation, at the mean, by 10 
percentage points. On the other hand, a banking crisis increases the probability of 
government participation by approximately 5 percentage points. 
Overall, results lead to rejecting the commercial view of government lending, as 
there are clear and systematic differences in the proportion of loans involving 
government lenders. Most of the findings are consistent with the market failure view, as 
the proportion of loans involving government lender increases in weak property rights, 
non-common law countries, during banking crises and to borrowers with few previous 
government loans. On the other side, the fact that government lenders seem to prefer 
larger borrowers is not supportive of the market failure view, as larger firms generally 
have easier access to funds.  
                                               
31 In probit analysis, to compute the proportion of concordant predictions, estimated coefficients are fitted 
in-sample to compute the probability of lending by a state-owned entity. An observation is “concordant” 
if the predicted probability of government lending is greater than (is smaller or equal than) 50 percent and 
the loan involves at least one state-owned lender (does not involve any state-owned lenders). 
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3.2.  Determinants of Government Role 
In the lending process as here described, the lender can assume three basic roles: 
“passive” syndicate member, arranger, or single lender. While syndicate membership 
involves a creditor role, syndicate arranging involves not only the provision of credit, 
but the additional functions of negotiating with the borrower, reviewing its disclosures 
and monitoring the loan agreement. Accordingly, arranging a loan is a higher-
involvement task than simple syndicate membership and facilitates access to other 
lenders. Similarly, sole lending involves the same level of involvement with the 
borrower as arranging, but the entire loan is retained by the single lender, at least at loan 
inception.
 32
 Within the market-failure view, the level of government involvement 
should escalate in environments with weak protection of creditor rights and, 
consistently, in non-common law countries. A similar prediction (more active 
involvement by government lenders) applies to banking crises. Finally, the market-
failure view implies more active government involvement for borrowers with restricted 
access to private credit (small, unlisted firms with few prior private-sector loans).  
To empirically test which factors determine the choice of lending role, I employ 
a multinomial-logit framework. In this, I include the same set of predictors used in 
Table 4 to examine the impact those have on the role of the government.
33
 As a base 
case, I use the government being a passive (non-arranging) syndicate member. Hence, 
reported parameter estimates should be interpreted as indicating which factors 
determine the government being an arranger, rather than a syndicate member and which 
                                               
32 The loan could be subsequently syndicated. Unfortunately, available data only allow identification of 
syndication at loan inception.  
 
33 I report results for the model “without accounting data”, as the sample “with accounting data” has too 
few observations for government single lenders to reliably estimate the multinomial logit parameters.  
31 
factors determine the government being a single lender, rather than a syndicate member.  
Models include controls for government size and GDP growth. 
For the sample of all government investors, results indicate that both arranging 
and sole lending are more likely in the presence of weak protection of property rights, 
consistently with the market-failure view. Somewhat surprisingly, these results are 
driven by foreign, rather than domestic, investors. Also consistent with the market-
failure view is the finding that arranging and sole lending are less likely in common law 
countries – which indicates a higher level of involvement in non-common law country 
loans. This finding applies to both domestic and foreign lenders (but the coefficient 
estimate is not statistically significant for foreign government arranging). Also 
consistent with the market-failure view, governments assume a more active lending role 
during a banking crisis. Both domestic and foreign governments are more likely to 
arrange loans during a crisis, indicating that government lenders might play a 
facilitating role, enabling firms not only to borrow from state institutions, but to access 
private-sector capital markets as well. Domestic government lenders are more likely to 
be single lenders during crises, but not foreign government lenders. 
Borrower characteristics also influence the level of government involvement. 
More active involvement of government lenders is observed for loans to state-owned 
borrowers, but the results are statistically significant only for the sample including all 
government lenders and for the arranger role of foreign lenders. Government lenders are 
more likely to arrange loans for borrowers with previous access to government loans 
and less likely to arrange loans for borrowers with previous private loans. Foreign 
governments are less likely to arrange loans for listed borrowers. 
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Overall, results are indicative of a more active role in the presence of market 
failures (weak property rights and banking crises). The implications are important. First, 
arranging implies a facilitating role, as it allows borrowers to access other, presumably 
private, lenders. Second, the escalating role of government lenders (their higher 
propensity to arrange loans) in the presence of market failures is indicative of the fact 
that results are not simply driven by state ownership of banks, which LLS (2002) have 
shows tends to be higher in weak property rights countries.  
 
3.3.  Share of the Loan Retained by Government Lenders 
Given that a large portion of the loans in the sample are syndicated, there are 
substantial differences in the share of the loan retained by lenders. I model the size of 
the stake retained by government lenders as a function of the same set of predictors 
used in the previously presented probit models (Table 4). To explore what factors drive 
the decision to retain a certain proportion of the loan, I use Heckman two-stage models 
(Heckman, 1979) to account for the selection bias – as government lending focuses on 
countries and firms with certain non-random characteristics. Accordingly, in the first 
stage, I model the probability of government lending as a probit – as done in Table 4. In 
the second stage, I employ the same set of predictors to investigate the factors 
determining the size of the loan retained by government lenders, after controlling for the 
selection bias (by adding the inverse Mill’s ratio). The first stage includes ‘loan 
purpose’ dummy variables, which are excluded from the second stage.34 As before, I 
distinguish between domestic and foreign governments. The models are estimated by 
                                               
34 A Sargan test (Sargan, 1958) indicates that loan purpose is correlated with government participation, 
but not with the proportion of the loan retained by the government.  
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maximum likelihood, with standard errors clustered at the package level and adjusted 
for the truncation of the dependent variable (bounded at 0 and 100).  
Results are presented in Table 6. Coefficient estimates indicate that government 
lenders retain larger shares of loans in the presence of weak property rights. But 
coefficient estimates vary in magnitude across models and economic significance is 
limited: after controlling for accounting data, for every one point increase in the metric 
of property rights (coded on a one-to-ten scale), government share of the loan decreases 
by 2 percentage points. Somewhat surprisingly, the analysis indicates that domestic 
government investors retain larger shares of loans in common law countries, but, once 
more, the magnitude of coefficient estimates varies across models and economic 
significance is limited: when controlling for accounting data, the share of loan retained 
by government lenders is 2 percentage points higher in common law countries. While 
results are only marginally significant, the effect seems opposite for foreign government 
lenders. During a banking crisis, domestic governments appear to retain a larger share 
of the loan (a sizable 30 percentage points more) but the result is not robust to inclusion 
of accounting variables.  
In terms of borrower characteristics, government lenders retain smaller stakes in 
loans to borrowers with previous private loans. Domestic governments retain 
significantly smaller stakes in loans to listed borrowers. Foreign governments retain 
smaller stakes in loans to larger firms and higher stakes in loans to borrowers with 
higher idiosyncratic risk. For both domestic and foreign government lenders, the size of 
the stake retained is inversely proportional to the borrower’s Tobin’s Q. 
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In this analysis of stakes, the strongest findings are those concerning property 
rights: consistent with the market-failure view, government lenders retain larger stakes 
of loans in the presence of weak property rights. On the other side, the results indicating 
that domestic government lenders retain smaller stakes of loans in common law 
countries are contrary to the predictions of the market failure view. Economic 
significance of the findings is limited.  
 
3.4.  Impact on Loan Characteristics – Propensity Score Matching 
To investigate how government loans differ from private-sector loans, I compare 
characteristics of loans with government lending to those from a propensity-score 
matched sample involving only private-sector loans.
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 Matching loans on the basis of 
pre-investment borrower and country characteristics is necessary because the analysis 
presented in the previous section clearly indicates that government lending is not 
random, but rather is systematically biased in terms of industry (more to regulated 
industry, less to depository institutions), firm characteristics (borrowers tend to be 
larger firms, with lower Tobin’s Q and higher levels of idiosyncratic risk) and country 
characteristics (government lending is less likely in common law countries and in 
general in countries with stronger protection of creditor rights; further, it tends to 
increase during banking crises). To control for these selection biases, I utilize the 
models “with accounting data” presented in Table 4 to estimate a predicted probability 
of government lending for each loan in my sample. I then match each government loan 
with the private loan with the closest predicted probability of government involvement. 
                                               
35 Propensity-score matching has been widely used in both the economics and finance literature. A recent 
example is Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010).  
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The rationale is to find the loan that is closest in terms of exogenous characteristics, 
thus effectively controlling for government selection bias. For each variable measuring 
loan characteristics, I compute means for the sample of government loans and compare 
those to means for the matched sample. Statistical significance of difference in means is 
tested by using paired t-tests with standard errors clustered at the package level. The 
findings are presented in Table 7. Panel A reports results for the overall sample. 
Government loans involve a higher number of lenders (the mean number of lenders for 
government loans is 16, while for private-sector loans it is 9), longer maturities (54 
versus 50 months), while a lower proportion of loans is collateralized (17 percent versus 
23 percent). Government loans also involve foreign lenders more frequently (in 92 
percent of cases, versus 81 percent).
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 Finally, government loans involve lower spreads 
(128 bps versus 149 bps, for an economically and statistically significant discount of 21 
bps). Differences in loan size, covenant usage and frequency of collateralization are not 
statistically significant. Overall, government loans appear to subsidize borrowers, as 
contract terms are more favorable (longer maturities, lower levels of collateralization) 
and loans are cheaper (lower spreads). The exception to this is that covenants are used 
more frequently. The finding that government loans involve a higher number of lenders 
indicates that government loans favor borrowers by facilitating access to a larger lender 
base. 
Panel B presents results for domestic government lenders. Loans by domestic 
governments involve more lenders, less frequent use of collateral and longer maturities, 
but government loans are smaller than matched private-sector ones (USD 439 million 
versus USD 580 million). Use of covenants is less frequent and loans are less likely to 
                                               
36 But the result is due to foreign government lenders, as seen in Panels B and C. 
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be senior. Finally, loans by domestic governments attract foreign lenders less often than 
the matched sample. Spreads are slightly higher on domestic government loans, by 
about 10 bps, than on matched private credits, but the result is not statistically 
significant.  
Panel C presents results for foreign government lenders. Foreign government 
loans also involve more lenders, but loans are generally larger and covenants are used 
more frequently. Similarly to domestic government loans, loans by foreign governments 
are less likely to be senior or collateralized. Spreads, however, are significantly lower 
than those originating from the matched sample (120 bps versus 153 bps). Overall, this 
set of results points to the somewhat surprising finding that foreign government loans 
are generally more favorable to borrowers than domestic government loans. 
According to the market-failure view, governments should lend at more 
favorable terms, compared to private-sector lenders, when property rights are weak, 
reflecting a reluctance to lend by private-sector lenders. To investigate this hypothesis, 
Panels D and E report results for loans given to borrowers from countries with property 
rights indices below and above medians in the year of loan initiation, respectively. 
Compared to the matched private-sector loan sample, government loans initiated in 
countries with weak property rights have more lenders, longer maturities, more frequent 
use of covenants but less frequent collateralization, a higher participation of foreign 
lenders and lower spreads, with a mean discount of 37 bps. In contrast, government 
loans initiated in strong property right protection countries involve more lenders, longer 
maturities, and greater participation of foreign lenders, but the other results are not 
statistically significant and the spread discount is only 5 bps. Overall, this set of results 
37 
is consistent with the hypothesis that governments subsidize loans more strongly in the 
presence of weak property rights.  
In unreported analysis, I also split the sample between loans to borrowers in 
common and non-common law countries and find no important differences. Similarly, 
government loans initiated during banking crises do not differ substantially from loans 
given during non-crisis periods. I further subset the sample by share of the loan retained 
by government lenders and find no substantial differences between subsamples. Overall, 
this analysis suggests that presence of government lenders induces private sector 
lenders to accept more borrower-friendly terms, especially in the presence of weak 
property rights. This is consistent with the idea that government participation provides a 
“political umbrella”, as discussed by Esty and Megginson (2003). 
 
3.5.  Impact on Loan Characteristics – Same Borrower and Year 
The above analysis focuses on comparing loan characteristics for government 
loans to a sample of private-sector loans matched on the basis of propensity scores. 
While propensity score matching controls for observable country and firm 
characteristics, a selection bias possibly persists, as previous results show that domestic 
government lending focuses on firms with high levels of idiosyncratic risk. To fully 
control for idiosyncratic firm risk factors, I compare government and private-sector 
loans extended to the same borrower, during the same year. While this analysis has the 
advantage of controlling for firm and country characteristics in the strongest sense, it 
suffers from a different bias – the sample is restricted to firms that have access to both 
private-sector and government lending. In so far as government lending focuses on 
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firms with restricted access to capital, the selection bias in this analysis should lead to a 
cautious interpretation of results.  
Results for the sample including both domestic and foreign government loans 
are presented in Table 8, Panel A. Compared to private-sector loans, government loans 
involve a larger number of lenders and longer maturities, more frequent usage of 
covenants and more frequent involvement of foreign lenders. Levels of seniority, 
frequency of collateralization and spreads do not appear statistically different.  
I disaggregate results for domestic and foreign government lenders in Panel B 
and Panel C of Table 8. For domestic government lending, loans appear to have larger 
syndicates (11 versus 6 lenders) and longer maturities (70 versus 64 months). Loan size 
is slightly larger, but the difference is not statistically significant. Covenants usage is 
actually more common for government loans than for the matched sample, while levels 
of seniority and frequency of collateralization are not statistically different. Spreads are 
higher for domestic government loans, by about 16 bps, but the result is also not 
statistically significant. Lending by domestic governments is associated with less 
frequent presence of foreign lenders. Foreign government lending is also associated 
with larger syndicates and longer maturities, but these loans are larger, involve more 
frequent use of covenants and higher levels of seniority. Foreign government loan 
spreads are lower, by about 5 bps, which is consistent with the higher usage of 
covenants and seniority of the loans (but not with longer maturities).  
Overall, results indicate that government loans extended to borrowers with 
access to private markets involve terms very similar to those of contemporaneous (same 
year) private loans to the same borrowers. 
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3.6.  Interpretation: the “Social” and “Political” Views  
A branch of the literature investigating state ownership of banks focuses on the 
distinction between a “social” and a “political” motivation for government intervent ion. 
According to the social view, state ownership arises as a response to the private sector’s 
reluctance to sponsor projects with high social benefits, but presumably low economic 
profitability, thus contributing to economic development and improving social welfare 
(Stiglitz, 1993). In contrast, the political view maintains that governments acquire 
control of productive assets in order to provide benefits to supporters in exchange for 
bribes or political support in the form of votes or contributions, leading to inefficient 
capital allocation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).
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 It is not my intention, in the present 
paper, to test the social and political motivations underpinning state ownership, as I do 
not directly explore welfare effects of government lending. Nonetheless, I briefly 
discuss in this section whether the evidence presented is consistent with the social and 
political views. Clearly, both social and political views of government lending are not 
consistent with the commercial view; on the other side, the social and political 
frameworks are not mutually exclusive and, while the market failure view would appear 
more directly related to the social view, it is not predicated on the same welfare-
enhancement predicted by the social view.  
The predictions of the social view in regards to the relationship between state 
ownership of banks and strength of legal protection of property rights are clear: 
governments are expected to step in when legal system are weak to fill the gap in credit 
availability due to lack of private sector lending. On the other hand, the predictions of 
                                               
37 Empirical studies finding support for this view include DeBonis (1998), Sapienza (2004), Dinc (2005) 
and Khwaja and Mian (2005). 
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the political view in regards to the relationship between state ownership of banks and 
strength of legal protection of property rights are mixed. LLS (2002) argue that both the 
social and the political view of state ownership imply stronger government presence 
being associated with weak property rights. They reason that, under the political view, 
governments will own larger shares of the banking sector in the presence of weak 
property rights because “the attraction of such political control of banks is presumably 
greatest in countries with underdeveloped financial systems and poorly protected 
property rights, because the government does not need to compete with the private 
sector as a source of funds” (LLS 2002). In contrast, Andrianova, Demetriades and 
Shortland (2010) discuss evidence that politicians are able to extract more benefits, in 
the form of donations and profitable directorships, from private banks, especially in the 
presence of weak legal systems. Accordingly, the finding that government lending 
activity is stronger in the presence of weak protection of property rights is consistent 
with the social view of state ownership and with the political view under the LLS 
(2002) interpretative framework, but is contrary to the political view as interpreted by 
Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland (2010). The social view similarly predicts that 
government should intensify lending during banking crises, but no such prediction is 
made by the political view. Accordingly, the finding that government lending intensifies 
around a banking crisis is consistent with the social, but not the political view. The 
findings are mixed in regards to borrower’s characteristics. Results indicate that 
governments tend to lend to firms with weak access to private credit markets (few 
private loans), which is consistent with the social view. On the other hand, governments 
favor, in lending, state-owned enterprises, which is consistent with both the social view 
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(if we assume that state-owned enterprises are indeed a means to finance socially 
beneficial projects, then lending to state-owned enterprises is socially beneficial as well) 
and the political view (as state-owned enterprises might be used as a conduit for 
political favors). Finally, the political view predicts strong loan subsidization by 
domestic governments, but findings actually indicate that spreads on domestic 
government loans are not significantly different from those on private-sector loans. 
In the aggregate, results presented here do not allow rejecting the political view, 
but the social view appears to more successfully explain the overall findings – and the 
social view is closely related to the market failure view. Nonetheless, as LLS (2002) 
discuss, empirical tests aimed at distinguishing between the social and political view 
should be based on measuring outcomes – ultimately, the best test is the link between 
government involvement and subsequent measures of economic prosperity, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
3.7.  Robustness Tests 
This section discusses additional robustness tests. Results are unreported but 
available upon request.  
In DealScan, loans are grouped into “packages,” wherein larger deals often 
include multiple loans. The multiple loans within a package share a common borrower, 
but the composition of the lending syndicate and loan terms often differ. The loans 
within a single package might be contemporaneous (for example, a lending syndicate 
offering a short-term loan and a revolving credit line at the same time) or might occur at 
different points in time, as in the case of a renegotiated credit line. In the dataset here 
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described, there are on average 1.4 loans per package. While loan and syndicate 
characteristics are not necessarily fixed within a package, some degree of correlation 
might exist. Further, borrower and country characteristics are clearly clustered at the 
package level. Accordingly, the assumption of independence, crucial in many of the 
statistical methodologies applied in this analysis, does not hold across loans originating 
from the same package. To alleviate this problem, most of the analysis so far presented 
clusters standard errors at the package level. As a further robustness test, I replicate all 
of the results presented above with a reduced sample, including only one loan per 
package. In particular, for each package I select the earliest loan (based on the loan 
initiation date) or, if multiple loans share the same “earliest” initiation date, the largest 
loan (measured as total loan value, in USD) amongst the contemporaneous ones. In 
unreported results, I find that using this reduced sample does not affect any of the 
findings presented in Tables 4, 5, 7 and 8. Results presented in Table 6 do not employ 
clustering, due to a lesser dependence problem, as the decision to retain a certain share 
of the loan is taken at the loan level, not at the package level.  
In the sample used here, loans are not only clustered at the package level, but 
they are also clustered at the borrower level, as borrowers are at times recipients of 
multiple loans. Hence, I re-estimate all parameters from the various models presented in 
Tables 4, 5, 7 and 8 by clustering standard errors at the borrower, rather than package, 
level. The main findings are unaffected.  
As an alternative to the Fraser Institute’s measure of protection of property 
rights, I use the “Investment Profile” score from the International Country Risk Guide 
and re-estimate all the results presented in Tables 4 to 8. Aside from differences in 
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parameter estimates magnitudes (largely due to differences in scaling of the two 
indices), all results and levels of statistical significance are unaffected.  
State ownership of the lender is defined in this paper as majority ownership, 
meaning direct or indirect control of over fifty percent of equity of the institution by 
governments or state-owned entities. Yet DealScan identifies minority state ownership 
as well, where “minority” is defined as exceeding five percent of equity. Making use of 
this data, I replicate this analysis by identifying government lenders in which state 
ownership, direct or indirect, exceeds five percent of equity. While signs and 
significance levels of the coefficient estimates presented in Tables 4 to 8 are unaffected, 
the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are somehow smaller. The weaker impact 
could be either due to weaker government interference or to more noise in the data – as 
discussed, the dataset used in the main analysis has been extensively validated and 
multiple errors have been corrected, while no such data validation was performed on the 
variable identifying minority state ownership.   
One of the metrics employed as a measure of access to external financing is the 
number of previous private loans obtained by a borrower over the past five years. This 
metric is biased (downwards) for the early years of the sample. To check for robustness 
against this bias, I replicate the analysis by excluding loans initiated during the first five 
years of the study period, 1980-1984. The findings presented in Tables 4 to 8 are 
unaffected. 
Due to both the size of the economy and reporting biases, DealScan is heavily 
biased towards loans originating from the United States. In order to check whether the 
main results are driven by this bias, I first add a binary variable identifying borrowers 
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with headquarters in the USA to the predictors in Tables 4 to 8 and find core results to 
be unaffected. As a second robustness check, I exclude loans to borrowers 
headquartered in the United States from the analysis. While the statistical significance 
of some of my results is somewhat reduced, likely due to the smaller sample size, 
coefficient estimates presented in Tables 4 to 8 are largely unaffected. That is not 
surprising, given that government loans are rare in the United States and mostly 
associated with foreign government lenders.  
Descriptive analysis also indicates that the subset of loans involving state-owned 
lenders includes a substantial portion (approximately one fifth by count) of loans to 
Chinese companies. Accordingly, I replicate tables 4 to 8 excluding loans to borrowers 
based in China. As in the above-described robustness check excluding USA-based 
borrowers, while the statistical significance of some results is somewhat reduced, likely 
due to the smaller sample size, coefficient estimates are largely unaffected. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 The empirical analysis in this study is structured as a test of the market-failure 
view of state ownership (state ownership is a response to a lack of private-sector 
involvement: Gerschenkron, 1962; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980), in contrast with the 
commercial view (state-owned institutions share the same commercial goals of the 
private sector). The “market failures” used  as testing grounds are weak legal systems, 
which have been found hampering the development of private financial markets (LLSV, 
1997 and 1998) and banking crises, which lead to a reduction in the availability of 
private credit (Laeven and Valencia, 2010; Sudheer and Purnanandam, 2011).  
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Probit model estimation reveals that government lending accounts for a higher 
proportion of all loans in countries with weak protection of ownership rights, in non-
common law countries, and during banking crises. In terms of borrower characteristics, 
results are mixed, as governments tend to lend to institutions that do not have previous 
private-sector loans (an indication of restricted access to capital) but also to larger firms 
(which should have easier access to funding).  
Multinomial logit modeling of the government role in lending indicates that both 
sole lending and loan arranging by government lenders are more likely in the presence 
of weak legal systems and during banking crises. This evidence indicates that, in the 
presence of market failures, government lenders not only provide credit, but facilitate 
borrower’s access to private credit markets as well. Analysis of the share of the loan 
retained by government lenders partially supports the market-failure view. While 
governments retain (rather than syndicate) larger shares of loans in the presence of 
weak protection of creditor rights, government lenders – in particular, domestic 
government lenders – retain larger shares of loans in common law counties. Banking 
crises do not significantly affect the share of the loan retained by government lenders. 
Government lenders further retain smaller loan shares to borrowers with previous 
private sector loans and domestic government lenders retain smaller stakes in loans to 
listed borrowers. 
When analyzing loan characteristics, I control for selection biases by employing 
propensity-score matching. Results indicate that government loans involve larger 
syndicates and longer maturities, are less frequently collateralized, and carry a 21 bps 
discount. Terms of government loans are especially borrower-friendly in the presence of 
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weak property rights. Surprisingly, foreign government lenders provide loans at a larger 
discount than domestic government lenders. Further analysis indicates that government 
subsidization does not apply to loans to borrowers that have access to private lending 
markets, which supports the view that government lending is not “crowding out” 
private-sector activity. 
Two sets of results open interesting avenues for future extensions. First, the 
unexpected finding that foreign government activity is consistent with the market-
failure view leads to question why do governments provide support to foreign markets 
and firms. One possible explanation is that this result is due to the activities of 
supranational lenders (such as the Inter-American Development Bank) or to those of 
“import-export” banks. I plan to further investigate the issue in future extensions. 
Second, the finding that government presence and arranging activity induces private-
sector syndicate members to accept more borrower-friendly loan terms is suggestive of 
a facilitating role of government lenders which warrants further investigation. 
This chapter contributes to the literature on state ownership by offering insights 
into the main motivation for government intervention in lending markets. Results 
strongly indicate that government lenders allocate loans differently than private lenders, 
in contrast with the commercial view of state ownership. Results are mostly consistent 
with the market-failure view of state ownership. The implications of (government) 
lending activity in the presence of weak legal systems or during banking crisis should 
not be underestimated. By providing credit when otherwise scarce and by facilitating 
borrower access to private-sector lenders, state-owned lenders relax financial 
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constraints that are shown to seriously hamper economic growth (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006; Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan, 2008). 
The practical implications are clear. Regardless of the causes of legal system 
weakness (and it is plausible that the government itself is to blame), government 
lending activity serves an important substitution role for reluctant private-sector 
lending. Yet, that should not be interpreted as implying that state ownership is welfare-
maximizing or otherwise desirable – previous research indicates that state ownership 
might lead to inefficiency and political distortions in fund allocations. Rather, results 
suggest that forcing privatizations in an environment lacking strong protection of 
property rights could exacerbate financial constraints for corporate borrowers.  
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Chapter 3: Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment, Passivity, and the Value of the 
Firm
38
 
    
Prompted by recent changes in the global distribution of production and wealth, 
a new class of investment funds owned and operated by sovereign governments is at the 
forefront of the rise of a novel form of “state capitalism”. This chapter examines 
investments by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in equity of publicly listed firms and, in 
particular, the impact of those investments on long-term firm performance.  
SWFs are a new and extremely important category of state-owned investor that 
has attracted significant attention from policy-makers, academics, and investors alike 
since they were assigned this vivid moniker by Andrew Rozanov (Rozanov, 2005). 
Several characteristics of SWF investing and organization make those funds especially 
interesting to financial economists. First of all, their sheer size: SWF assets under 
management are conservatively estimated at over USD 2 trillion in 2010, and are 
expected to grow to USD 7 trillion or more by 2015 (Jen and Andreopoulos, 2008; 
Kern, 2009). SWFs thus currently play a significant, though far from dominant, role in 
global finance and corporate governance, and this role will likely increase dramatically 
in the future. Furthermore, as state-owned entities, SWFs are organized and managed 
much differently than large private-sector investment funds and might possibly have 
different, social rather than purely economic, objectives. These goals, strictly linked to 
their nature as state-owned investment vehicles, could cause them to impact the 
behavior and performance of their investment targets. Finally, these fully government-
owned investment funds make large, risky, cross-border investments in politically 
                                               
38 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Bernardo Bortolotti and William Megginson. 
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sensitive industries, such as banking, telecommunications, and energy, and in politically 
sensitive investment categories such as commercial real estate and listed-firm equity. 
Existing empirical research on SWFs offers conflicting evidence about whether 
and how SWFs create value by investing in publicly traded companies. All of the 
studies that examine such SWF investments using event study techniques (Dewenter, 
Han, and Malatesta, 2010; Kotter and Lel, 2011; Knill, Lee, and Mauck, 2009; Karolyi 
and Liao, 2009) find significantly positive announcement period returns of between 
0.88% and 2.25%, suggesting that the market welcomes SWF as investors. However, 
the studies that examine long-term abnormal returns (Dewenter, et al, 2010; Kotter and 
Lel, 2011; Knill, Lee and Mauck, 2012; Bernstein, Lerner, and Schoar, 2009) generally 
document significantly negative median returns over six-month or one-year holding 
periods after SWF investment announcements, and insignificantly negative median 
abnormal returns over longer holding periods.
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 Unlike our analysis, however, none of 
these studies examine the direct financing role of SWFs, none employ multiple long-run 
return estimations and testing methodologies to check for the robustness of their 
findings, and none provide and test a theoretical framework to interpret the negative 
long-run returns for target firms after SWF investments. 
We employ an event-study methodology to examine the long-term stock return 
performance of SWF investment targets, then perform cross-sectional analysis on these 
abnormal returns to test five competing hypotheses explaining the impact of SWF 
investment on the performance of fund targets. We first hypothesize a possible positive 
impact due to monitoring: since SWFs are large, long-term institutional investors, they 
                                               
39 Only Fernandes (2009) claims to document dramatic improvements in target firm profitability and 
valuation after SWF investments. 
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might create value by providing corporate governance for target firms, as SWFs’ listed-
firm stock purchases typically are large enough to make the funds significant 
blockholders after investment. Several types of blockholders, especially hedge funds  
(Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Ferreira and Matos, 
2008; Ferreira, Massa and Matos, 2008; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009), have been 
empirically linked to significant improvements in target firm performance, but Chen, 
Harford, and Li (2007) show that not all blockholders directly impact corporate 
governance.  
We also hypothesize a possible positive impact due to reduced financial 
constrains. A large literature (see Stein, 2003 and Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2010) 
documents that financial constraints can prevent companies from making positive-NPV 
investments, so if SWFs make direct equity infusions into target firms they might help 
targets overcome funding constraints and create real economic value. On the other hand, 
there is also a widespread fear that SWFs will not act as strictly commercially-minded 
investors, seeking only the highest possible financial return, but will instead be forced 
to invest strategically by home-country governments seeking political influence or 
access to foreign technology. Accordingly, a negative impact of SWFs on firm 
performance could result from the imposition of political goals, diverting resources 
from shareholder value maximization. A large body of empirical research, summarized 
in Megginson and Netter (2001) and Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2009), 
suggests that governments are usually bad operating managers and that firm 
performance improves with privatization,
40
 while another stream of literature has 
                                               
40 A novel stream of literature focuses on privatizations, government ownership and cost of debt – see 
Borisova and Megginson (2011).  
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looked at ‘mixed ownership’ firms (Boardman and Vining, 1989; Shirley and Walsh, 
2000), generally finding that mixed ownership also has a negative impact on firm value. 
However, there has been little investigation of whether states can be value-creating 
investors. We formulate a Political Interference Hypothesis, predicting a negative 
impact on the long-term performance of target firms due to the imposition of political 
goals not consistent with shareholder value maximization.  
Alternatively, as foreign, state-owned investment funds, any posture that SWFs 
take other than being purely passive investors might generate political pressure or a 
regulatory backlash from recipient-country governments. Even when SWFs do take 
majority stakes--which Miracky, Dyer, Fisher, Goldner, Lagarde, and Piedrahita (2008) 
show occurs almost exclusively when SWFs invest in domestic companies--the funds 
rarely seem to challenge incumbent managers, as documented by Mehropouya, Huang 
and Barnett (2009). Woitdke (2002) documents similar behavior by public-sector 
pension funds in the United States. Even more, SWFs very rarely divest, thus not 
exercising the type of governance through threat of exit discussed by Parrino, Sias, and 
Starks (2003) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2009).  Thus, a negative impact on firm value 
could result if SWFs take a completely passive corporate governance stance, thereby 
helping to entrench managers and increase agency costs, as predicted by our 
Constrained Foreign State Investor Hypothesis. Finally, we also hypothesize that any 
abnormal performance observed could simply be due to the stock-picking abilities (or 
lack of) of the investing SWF and test what we deem the Stock-Picking Hypothesis. 
Using a sample of 802 investments in publicly traded companies made by 18 of 
the largest and most internationally active SWFs between May 1985 and November 
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2009, we first describe SWF investment patterns and then test what impact those 
investments have on the performance of target firms. We document that SWFs tend to 
invest in large, levered, profitable growth firms, usually headquartered in a foreign 
country, and that have experienced significantly positive abnormal stock returns in the 
year before the investment is made. These investments usually take the form of direct 
purchases of newly-issued shares, and thus are financing events for target firms. We 
find that most of the funds investing internationally generally purchase sizeable but 
minority ownership stakes in target companies, but at least one fund, Norway’s 
Government Pension Fund-Global, makes much smaller investments via open-market 
share purchases. With the exception of investments by Norway’s SWF, the stakes 
typically purchased are large enough to make SWFs influential blockholders in the 
investee companies, should they wish to participate in target firm governance, but we 
show that most SWFs do not demand or receive seats on a target firm’s board after 
investment or actively participate in governance in any public way other than voting 
their shares. This mirrors the survey findings presented in Mehropouya, Huang and 
Barnett (2009), who also show that SWFs rarely initiate shareholder petitions and when 
funds do vote they almost always support management.  
The stock prices of companies receiving SWF equity investments increase 
significantly though modestly (about 1.25%) upon this announcement, but abnormal 
returns on investee firm shares are significantly negative over six-month and one-, two-, 
and three-year holding periods after the investment. These long-term losses are far 
larger than the positive announcement period returns. Cross-sectional analysis of these 
abnormal returns finds that the performance of SWF investment targets is worse for 
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more passive funds, for foreign targets, and for targets headquartered in OECD 
countries, but is negatively related to the size of the stake acquired and to the size of the 
target firm. Of the five hypotheses we develop to explain SWF behavior and impact, the 
results of our cross-sectional analysis offer most support for the Constrained Foreign 
State Investor Hypothesis. 
This manuscript is structured as follows. Section 1 develops the five hypotheses 
predicting how SWFs will invest and what impact their investments will have on target 
firms. Section 2 describes the database of listed company targets we create for this 
study, and describes the investment patterns exhibited by SWFs and analyzes the types 
of listed firms in which SWFs choose to invest. Section 3 examines the long-term 
evidence of SWFs’ investment performance, using both event-study techniques and 
tests measuring accounting performance. In Section 4, we discuss further evidence of 
the passive role of SWFs. Finally, we summarize our conclusions in Section 5. 
 
1.  Development of Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses relating to SWF impact on target firm value focus on two 
channels of influence. First, a SWF can have a financial impact on target firm funding if 
it purchases newly issued securities from the firm itself or if it provides access to future 
financing. Access to future financing can take the form of follow-up investments or of 
valuable connections to other state-owned financial institutions. Second, s SWF can 
impact target firm values after an investment is made by choosing whether to take an 
active or passive role in firm governance. 
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In the following sections, we develop five hypotheses describing SWF 
investment objectives and impact, and after each one we specify the testable empirical 
predictions based on abnormal stock price returns and on cross-sectional relationship 
between abnormal returns and characteristics of the investing fund, the target firm, and 
the transaction. The predicted abnormal returns and cross-sectional relationships for 
each of the five hypotheses are summarized in Table 9. 
 
1.1. The Active Monitoring Hypothesis 
As noted above and described in more detail in Section 2, SWFs invest large 
sums and often become significant blockholders in target companies. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) hypothesize that large shareholders (blockholders) have the proper 
incentives to monitor portfolio firm managers and the capability to intervene decisively 
to punish or replace poorly performing executives. Empirical research (Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy and Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira, 
Massa and Matos, 2008 and Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009) shows that at least one 
class of large institutional investors, hedge funds, are often successful at improving 
governance of the firms in which they invest. Similarly, by purchasing large stakes in 
target firms, SWFs should have the power and incentive to monitor target firm 
managers and discipline under-performers (Edmans, 2009; Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 
2009).  
The Active Monitoring Hypothesis predicts that: (1) SWF investments in listed 
companies will generate positive excess stock returns for target companies; (2) 
abnormal returns will be lower for funds with a passive stance (for example, funds 
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buying small, non-controlling stakes); (3) abnormal returns will be lower for SWF 
investments in target firms headquartered in OECD countries than in developing 
countries, because OECD-based companies are likely to benefit less from monitoring, 
as existing laws offer better protection from managerial opportunism; (4) abnormal 
returns will be positively related to the stake size the SWF acquires in a target firm, as a 
larger stake facilitates monitoring; (5) abnormal returns will be higher for domestic than 
for foreign investments, since a fund is more likely to be able to exert influence over a 
company headquartered in its home country than abroad; (6) abnormal returns will be 
lower for highly levered firms, as prior literature shows that high leverage imposes 
discipline on managers, thus reducing the marginal value of additional monitoring; 
similarly, (7) abnormal returns will be higher for firms with high liquidity, as easy 
access to funds is more likely to lead to agency costs and, hence, more need for 
monitoring; and (8) abnormal returns will be higher if the SWF acquires seats on the 
board of directors, as that allows for more effective monitoring.     
 
1.2. The Reduced Financial Constraint Hypothesis 
 A large literature documents that many companies suffer from financial 
constraints that prevent them from accepting all available positive-NPV investments. As 
examples, Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001) find that financially constrained firms 
are subject to common shocks and, in a sample of manufacturing firms, they document 
lower stock returns over 1968-1997 for financially constrained firms; Stein (2003) 
documents that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is higher for a priori 
constrained firms; and Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) document that the 
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inability to borrow externally causes many firms to not pursue attractive investment 
opportunities during the credit crisis of 2008. SWFs may create value by making direct 
equity capital infusions into such financially constrained firms, thus allowing these 
companies to fund more economically valuable investments. By their nature, such 
financing deals tend to be both arms-length and episodic, not necessarily involving any 
ongoing fund involvement in target firms.
41
 
 The Reduced Financial Constraint Hypothesis predicts that: (1) SWF 
investments in listed companies will generate positive excess stock returns for target 
companies; (2) abnormal returns will be lower for SWF investments in target firms 
headquartered in OECD countries than in developing countries, since capital markets 
are more developed in the OECD and thus there is less need for (and payoff to) direct 
equity financing; (3) abnormal returns will be positively related to the size of the capital 
injection, if any; (4) abnormal returns will be lower for larger firms, as those are more 
likely to have alternative financing available; (5) abnormal returns will be higher for 
firms that have higher leverage, as those firms often face more difficulty obtaining 
additional financing; (6) abnormal returns will be lower for more liquid firms, as those 
firms are less likely to be financially constrained. 
 
1.3. The Political Interference Hypothesis 
As noted in the introduction, SWFs are often accused of acting as stalking 
horses for the governments that own them, and of trying to impose non-value-
maximizing objectives on target firms. These objectives could be purely political, as in 
                                               
41 SWF investments might also signal state backing for the companies in which they invest, and thus 
signal commitment to back the firm if it meets distress. This signal, in turn, might facilitate access to 
funding. 
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forcing the firm to trade with a home-country state owned enterprise or refraining from 
doing business with or in a country hostile to the fund’s government. Alternatively, the 
objectives could be strategic, such as pushing investment targets to take actions that are 
suboptimal from a wealth maximization perspective but further the goals of the state – 
like favoring the development of specific sectors or reducing unemployment through 
targeted investment. Alternatively, SWFs could simply use their large stake to tunnel 
(Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000; Atanasov, Black, Ciccotello, 
and Gyoshev, 2010; Jiang, Lee, and Yue, 2010) wealth out of the target company, 
harming the firm’s other shareholders. 
The Political Interference Hypothesis predicts that: (1) SWF investments in 
listed companies will generate negative excess stock returns for target companies; (2) 
abnormal returns will be lower for funds with a high level of governmental 
involvement, as government involvement is likely to lead to the imposition of political, 
rather than commercial, goals; (3) abnormal returns will be higher for Norway’s SWF, 
as it is explicitly managed at arm’s length from the government; (4) abnormal returns 
will be higher for SWF investments in target firms headquartered in OECD countries 
than in developing countries, since OECD-based companies have better legal protection 
against minority-shareholder expropriation; (5) abnormal returns will be lower for 
strategic targets, as those are more likely to have been acquired for political, rather than 
strictly commercial, purposes; (6) abnormal returns will be negatively related to the 
stake size the SWF acquires in a target firm, as a larger stake allows for greater 
influence; (7) abnormal returns will be lower for domestic than for foreign investments, 
since a fund will be more likely to successfully impose its own political goals on 
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domestic firms; (8) abnormal returns will be higher for investments in larger firms, as 
the additional visibility mitigates the fund’s ability to impose political goals; (9) 
abnormal returns will be higher for firms with higher leverage, as the presence of debt 
imposes constraints on the political goals of the SWF; (10) abnormal returns will be 
lower for more liquid firms, as the available resources facilitate the imposition of 
political goals; and (11) abnormal returns should be lower when a fund in fact acquires 
a board seat, as that facilitates the imposition of non-commercial objectives. 
 
1.4. The Constrained Foreign State Investor Hypothesis 
We conjecture that foreign investors, especially high profile ones such as state-
owned sovereign wealth funds, will refrain from taking an active corporate governance 
role in target companies in order not to generate political opposition or a regulatory 
backlash. In extant literature, there is scant empirical evidence that even privately-
owned blockholders are particularly effective monitors, and no evidence suggesting 
publicly-owned blockholders create value. Even institutional investors such as CalPERS 
(English, Smythe, and McNeill, 2004) with an avowed goal of improving corporate 
governance in portfolio companies have achieved only marginal and often fleeting 
success. Further, Greenwood and Schoar (2009) show that the perceived ability of 
hedge funds to create investment value is mostly due to their ability to pick likely 
takeover targets, or to put target firms “in play”. In addition, the monitoring role of 
foreign investors will be further reduced by their reluctance to divest, as the selling of a 
large block of shares could trigger political reactions and resentment amongst local 
management, regulators and market participants. Accordingly, we expect SWFs to act 
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like “Quiet Leviathans” and to be unlikely even to exercise the type of governance 
through threat of exit discussed by Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) and Admati and 
Pfleiderer (2009), or to withhold their votes as a sign of displeasure with current 
managers (Del Guercio, Seery, and Woitdke, 2008; Edmans, 2009), for fear of upsetting 
target firm governments and public opinion.  
The testable predictions of the Constrained Foreign State Investor Hypothesis 
are as follows: (1) SWF investments in listed companies will generate negative 
abnormal stock returns for target companies; (2) abnormal returns should be lower for 
funds known to adopt a passive governance stance; (3) abnormal returns will be higher 
for Norway’s investment targets, as Norway is unlikely to be constrained by foreign 
opposition; (4) abnormal returns will be lower for SWF investments in target firms 
headquartered in OECD countries than in developing countries, since investing in 
OECD-based companies will generate greater hostility from host governments; (5) 
abnormal returns will be negatively related to the stake size the SWF acquires in a 
target firm, as a larger stake creates a larger monitoring gap; (6) abnormal returns will 
be higher for domestic than for foreign investments, since a fund will have greater 
freedom to intervene in domestic targets; (7) abnormal returns will be lower for larger 
firms, as those are more visible and investment in those is more likely to attract scrutiny 
and opposition; and (8) abnormal returns will be lower for targets in which the SWF has 
acquired seats on the board of directors, as that creates a larger monitoring gap.   
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1.5. The Stock-Picking Hypothesis 
It is also possible that SWFs investment targets exhibit abnormal performance 
simply due to selective stock-picking, rather than to the influence of the SWFs on 
investment targets. Accordingly, we formulate a Stock-Picking Hypothesis. The key 
testable prediction of the Stock-Picking Hypothesis is that abnormal returns will be 
positively related to SWF age, as the stock-picking ability of the SWF improves as it 
develops expertise. 
 
1.6. Caveats and Limitations 
 We should acknowledge several important caveats and limitations to our 
hypotheses development. First, while we presented each hypothesis as unique and 
exclusive, this need not be the case in practice. Different funds can have differing 
objectives, or the same fund can pursue differing goals at different times. Nonetheless, 
we feel confident that our research will allow us to observe which of the hypothesized 
effects predominates, on average.  
Additionally, our lists of SWF behavioral models and of paths through which 
SWF investment might influence target firm value are necessarily incomplete. Also, 
since we examine only SWF investments in publicly traded stocks, which represent a 
fraction of most funds’ portfolios, we must acknowledge that the conclusions we draw 
about SWF behavior are based on a subset of funds’ investments. Accordingly, while 
our sample allows us to draw conclusions about the impact of SWF investments on 
publicly traded companies, it should not be interpreted as evidence of the performance 
of the overall SWF investment portfolios.  
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2. Data and Sample Description 
2.1. The Sample 
There is no consensus on what exactly constitutes a sovereign wealth fund. 
While SWFs are a heterogeneous group, most evolved from funds set up by 
governments whose revenue streams were dependent on the value of one underlying 
commodity and thus wished to diversify investments with the goal of stabilizing 
revenues. Accordingly, most SWFs have been established in countries that are rich in 
natural resources, with oil-related SWFs being the most common and most important. 
These include the funds sponsored by Arab Gulf countries, the ex-Soviet republics, 
Brunei, and Norway. The other important group of SWFs includes those that have been 
financed out of accumulated foreign currency reserves resulting from persistent and 
large net exports, especially the funds based in Singapore, Korea, China, and other East-
Asian exporters. Because definitions vary and because few funds have disclosed key 
organizational details, heterogeneous funds are often grouped into the SWF category, 
even though there are significant differences between funds with respect to 
organizational structure (separately-incorporated holding companies versus pure state 
ministries), investment objectives (preservation of wealth versus wealth diversification 
and growth), compensation policies and status of fund managers (incentivized 
professionals versus fixed-wage bureaucrats), and degree of financial transparency 
(Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global versus almost all others).  
Most definitions of “sovereign wealth fund” suggest these are state-owned 
investment funds (not operating companies) that make long-term domestic and 
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international investments in search of commercial returns.
42
 Some definitions are 
broader than this, as in Truman (2008), who defines a sovereign wealth fund as “a 
separate pool of government-owned or government-controlled financial assets that 
includes some international assets.” On the other hand, Balding (2008) shows that a 
more expansive definition encompassing government-run pension funds, development 
banks, and other investment vehicles would yield a truly impressive total value of 
“sovereign wealth.”43  
In this study, we employ the selection criteria presented in Miracky and 
Bortolotti (2009), which defines a SWF as: (1) an investment fund rather than an 
operating company; (2) that is wholly owned by a sovereign government, but organized 
separately from the central bank or finance ministry to protect it from excessive 
political influence; (3) that makes international and domestic investments in a variety of 
risky assets; (4) that is charged with seeking a commercial return; and (5) which is a 
wealth fund rather than a pension fund – meaning that the fund is not financed with 
contributions from pensioners and does not have a stream of liabilities committed to 
individual citizens. While this sounds clear-cut, ambiguities remain. Several funds 
headquartered in the United Arab Emirates are defined as SWFs, even though these are 
organized at the emirati rather than federal level, on the grounds that the emirates are 
                                               
42 In addition, most definitions exclude funds directly managed by central banks or finance ministries, as 
these often have very different priorities, such as currency stabilization, funding of specific development 
projects, or the development of specific economic sectors.  
 
43 In ongoing research (Bortolotti, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson, 2010) we have identified over 12,100 
investments, worth over USD 1.67 trillion, just in listed-firm stocks by state-owned investment 
companies, stabilization funds, commercial and development banks, pension funds, and state-owned 
enterprises. Add to this amount state purchases of government and corporate bonds, plus SWF holdings 
and foreign exchange reserves of roughly USD 8 trillion, and the total value of state-owned financial 
assets may already exceed USD 15 trillion. 
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the true decision-making administrative units.
44
 We also include Norway’s Government 
Pension Fund-Global, as the Norwegian government itself considers this a SWF and 
because it is financed through oil revenues rather than through contributions by 
pensioners. These criteria yield a sample of 33 sovereign wealth funds from 23 
countries; while we identify and list 33 entities that meet our definition of “sovereign 
wealth funds”, we find usable public equity investments for only 18 of those 33 funds. 
Table 10 presents our list of sovereign wealth funds, along with estimates of their size 
in early 2010, their inception dates, and the principal source of their funding. This table 
is based on a more comprehensive description of SWF organization, investment 
strategy, and mission presented in Barbary (2010). Table 10 shows total assets for all 
SWFs of USD 2.424 trillion, with oil and gas-financed SWFs managing total assets of 
USD 1.618 trillion and non-oil SWFs managing assets worth USD 805 billion. 
Mehropouya, Huang and Barnett (2009) presents a similar total asset value of USD 2.6 
trillion held by SWFs in September 2009.
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44  The sub-national UAE funds included are the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (the world’s second-
largest SWF), the Investment Corporation of Dubai (and its subsidiary Istithmar World), Mubadala 
Development Company, DIFC Investments (Company) LLC, the International Petroleum Investment 
Corporation (IPIC), and Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority. 
 
45 The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, which uses a more inclusive definition of SWFs and tracks 50 
funds, estimates their total size as USD 3.809 trillion as of December 2009 (see 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php). On the other hand, Greene (2009) cites studies showing that SWF 
assets under management shrank to around USD 3 trillion by late 2008 and that SWFs have not more than 
USD 1 trillion invested in global equities. Mehropouya, Huang and Barnett (2009) also estimates that 
SWFs have less than USD 1 trillion invested in international stocks. It has also been reported that some of 
the earlier estimates of current SWF size were overstated.  For example, a Wall Street Journal article 
from May 20, 2009 (Davis, 2009) reports that while earlier estimates of ADIA’s size put their assets 
under management at USD 875 billion, current ones put the figure at USD 282 billion. While part of the 
decline is due to lower oil prices and investment losses, most of the discrepancy is simply the result of the 
very limited public fact base on ADIA’s portfolio. To the surprise of many, ADIA actually published a 
36-page 2009 Review of fund operations on March 15, 2010, and this report disclosed much information 
about investment strategy and allocations (across asset classes and geographic regions). The report did 
not, however, disclose the most important unknown data item, total assets under management. 
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We draw our sample of SWF investments in two ways. First, we collect a 
preliminary sample of 1,347 sovereign wealth fund investments in listed firms made by 
any of the SWFs other than Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global (GPFG) from 
the Monitor-FEEM SWF Transaction Database. This database is organized by the 
Monitor Group and the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), and covers domestic 
and international investments made by funds between May 1985 and November 2009. 
This sample includes investments in listed equity, unlisted equity, commercial real 
estate, private equity funds and joint ventures in which one of the SWFs listed in Table 
10 (or one of its subsidiaries) is an investor. These observations were collected using 
multiple data sources. Information from five financial databases (Thomson One Banker, 
Bloomberg, the SDC Global New Issues database, the Zephyr M&A database, and 
Zawya.com) was integrated with data from fund websites and from various news 
sources.
46
 From this, we identify a set of 399 investments in firms with publicly-traded 
stock made by SWFs other than Norway’s GPFG. 
We employ a different methodology to collect a second sample of investments, 
those made by Norway’s GPFG. Since this fund, which is described and analyzed in 
Caner and Grennes (2009) and Ang, Goetzmann, and Schaefer (2009), almost always 
accumulates small stakes in listed companies through open market share purchases, its 
investments are rarely documented in the press and are almost never recorded as direct 
share acquisitions by SDC or Zephyr. We suspect this lack of easily-available 
information is why previous SWF empirical studies do not include material numbers of 
                                               
46 The sources include the Lexis-Nexis database and the archives of Financial Times, New York Times, 
Wall Street Journal, GulfNews, the Associated Press and Reuters. Detailed information about the 
Monitor-FEEM SWF Transaction Database is provided in Miracky and Bortolotti (2009), available at 
www.monitor.com and www.feem.it. This database is updated continuously and the managing parties 
publish annual reports on SWF investments. 
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observations for GPFG. The Norwegian fund does, however, post annual listing of all 
its equity holdings around the world, and investments in U.S.-listed stocks made by 
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), the asset management arm of the 
GPFG, are publicly disclosed on a quarterly basis beginning in the fourth quarter of 
2006. Using these disclosures, we generate a list of new NBIM investments in U.S.-
listed companies by tracking the annual investment lists and determining when NBIM 
makes an initial investment, which we define as an investment that did not appear in the 
previous year’s listing. We then follow NBIM’s holdings after the initial investment and 
record increases in their holdings as follow-on investments. We take the filing date – 
the day when NBIM files a Form 13F-HR with the U.S. SEC detailing its shareholdings 
in a listed firm – as the announcement date for performing event studies, since this is 
the date that the stock ownership information is first publicly disclosed. As a 
“completion date”, we use the last day of the quarter during which the transaction takes 
place. We find 160 initial and 243 follow-on investments by NBIM from December 31, 
2006 through September 30, 2009. Given our reliance on Form 13F-HR as a data 
source, we have this data only for U.S. listed firm investments by Norway’s GPFG 
(acting through NBIM). Combining the 403 Norwegian fund’s investments with the 399 
obtained from the Monitor-FEEM Database yields our final sample of 802 SWF 
investments in listed companies, collectively worth USD 181.6 billion.  
  
2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 11 details SWF investments by year from May 1985 through 
November 2009. Very few investments were made in any single year prior to 2001, and 
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2003 was the first year the total value of investments exceeded USD 1 billion. From that 
point onward, however, the number and total value of SWF investments surged – 
reaching a peak of 340 investments worth USD 61.3 billion during 2008. Although the 
number of investments drops sharply during the first eleven months of 2009, to 50 
deals, the total value only drops by about half, to USD 29.3 billion.  Clearly, SWFs 
invested a lot during the crisis, either because that was when political opposition to their 
investment was lowest, or because that was when financing was most needed to 
overcome binding financial constraints. 
Panel B of Table 11 describes the number and total value of investments made 
by individual SWFs. All the deals by the main fund and its subsidiaries are included in 
the main fund’s totals. While Norway’s GPFG makes by far the largest number of 
investments in listed stocks, these are on average quite small (USD 12 million) and the 
total value is a modest USD 4.76 billion. Because of our reliance on Forms 13F, all of 
Norway’s observations in our database involve investments in U.S. listed stocks after 
the third quarter of 2006, and four-fifths of these deals are made in the stocks of 
companies headquartered in the United States. The second most active SWF investor, 
Temasek Holdings, makes only one-third as many investments as Norway’s GPFG (132 
versus 403), but the total value of these deals is nine times as large, USD 42.4 billion, 
the largest of any SWF. Singapore’s Government Investment Corporation is the third 
most active stake acquirer both in number and value (79 investments, worth USD 22.6 
billion), while the China Investment Corporation ranks a mere seventh in terms of the 
number of investments (18), but second in overall value (USD 38.9 billion). Other 
active investors include Khazanah Nasional Berhad (32 transactions, worth USD 3.2 
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billion), Qatar Investment Authority (31 deals, worth USD 15.3 billion), Kuwait 
Investment Authority (19 investments, worth USD 13.2 billion), and Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority (18 transactions, worth USD 8.5 billion).  
Panel C of Table 11, which details the industrial distribution of SWF 
investments, shows that the SWFs we examine favor investing in companies in the 
financial industry over all others. The 137 investments in banking (78) and financial 
service (59) firms account for only one-sixth (16.6%) of all deals by number, but their 
combined value (USD 118.6 billion) represents almost two-thirds (65.3%) of the value 
of all acquisitions. This preference for financial investments is, however, a fairly recent 
phenomenon; sovereign funds allocated less than one-fifth of their investment funds to 
financial firms as recently as 2006, and allocated even smaller fractions to financial 
companies in previous years. Other industries attracting significant SWF investment are 
real estate development and services and REITs (7.9% of deals, 4.0% of value), oil and 
gas producers (4.1% of deals, 3.8% of value), chemicals (3.0% of deals, 3.2% of value) 
and general industrials (1.2% of deals, 3.2% of value). 
Panel D of Table 11 presents the geographic distribution of SWF investments 
(by target country). The United States is easily the most popular target nation for SWFs, 
both in terms of number and total value invested, with 53.1% of the number (426 of 
802) and 32.1% of the total value (USD 58.3 billion of USD 181.6 billion) of SWF 
investments being channeled to U.S.-headquartered companies. This includes 
investments by Norway’s GPFG, for which we have data only for U.S. listed 
investments, but the United States remains the most popular SWF target country even 
after excluding the 320 investments worth USD 4.0 billion made by GPFG in U.S. 
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headquartered firms. China is the second most popular target country in terms of both 
number and value, though most of the 43 deals worth USD 32.0 billion are domestic 
investments by the China Investment Corporation--including the USD 20 billion, 
December 2007 purchase of an equity stake in China Development Bank, which is the 
largest single investment in our database (Dickie, 2008). Singapore ranks third in 
number (39) but only sixth in value (USD 10.9 billion), whereas the United Kingdom 
ranks third in value (USD 20.9 billion) but only sixth in number (28). The majority of 
all deals (560, or 69.8%) and value (USD 120.2 billion, or 66.2%) of SWF investments 
are targeted at OECD-headquartered companies, and foreign (cross-border) investments 
represent 90.2% of the number and 77.8% of the value of all SWF deals.  
Finally, we examine how SWFs acquire the stakes they purchase in listed 
companies. We find that a majority of the investments that all SWFs (except Norway’s) 
make in publicly traded companies are privately-negotiated, primary share offerings 
rather than open market share purchases. All of Norway’s investments are open market 
purchases of small stakes in listed firms, but that fund is unique in this respect. 
Excluding Norway, we identify the method of investment for 129 transactions, and 91 
of these (70.5%) are direct purchases—and thus represent capital infusions for target 
firms—while only 38 (29.5%) are open market share purchases. In terms of purchase 
size, capital infusions are even more dominant, accounting for 88.2% of the USD 92.1 
billion worth of deals for which we can identify purchase method. To our knowledge, 
this method of acquiring equity stakes sets SWFs (and private equity investors, who 
have a fundamentally different investment objective) apart from other institutional 
investors; pension funds, hedge funds, mutual funds and other types of internationally 
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active institutional investors generally acquire stock through open-market purchases 
rather than by direct sales.  
 
2.3. Target Selection 
 We begin our empirical analyses by examining the types of firms that SWFs 
select for investment. To gain insights about how SWFs select targets, we first employ 
long-run return estimations to see if target firms generate significantly positive or 
negative abnormal returns during the year before SWF investment, which presumably 
encompasses the period when the funds make their stock selections. We then present 
descriptive statistics for these firms prior to SWF investments and compare their 
characteristics to industry median values. In particular, we test whether firms targeted 
for investment exhibit stock return performance that differs significantly from local 
market indices and from matched firms over various holding periods of up to one year 
before the investment is announced.  
Target firm and index returns come from Datastream, and we compute abnormal 
returns using all the long-run return estimation procedures and benchmarks described in 
section 3.2. However, we only report results versus the local index here in the interest of 
space and because all of the results obtained using other indices and matching 
methodologies are qualitatively similar. The first section of Table 12 presents buy-and-
hold abnormal returns for all target firms computed versus a local market index over 
one-year, six-month, three-months, one-month, one-week and one-day holding periods 
prior to the day that the SWF investment is announced (Day 0). The second part of 
Table 12 presents results excluding firms that were targeted by Norway’s GPFG. 
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The mean abnormal return over a one-year holding period is 17.09% for all 
target firms and 20.99% for non-Norway targets, and both are significant at the 1% 
level. The six-month, three-month and one-month mean abnormal returns are all 
positive and statistically significant at either the 5% or 1% level in both samples. 
Median abnormal returns, on the other side, are much closer to zero, with signs 
switching between positive and negative depending on the holding period selected. The 
nonparametric tests for significance are, with one exception, not statistically significant. 
These results demonstrate that SWFs purchase the stocks of firms that have performed 
well--extremely well, based on average abnormal returns--during the year prior to the 
funds’ investments. This perhaps suggests a tendency for funds to act as momentum 
investors, while the striking difference between very high mean returns and quite 
modest median abnormal returns might reveal a skewness preference in their stock 
selections. 
To gain another perspective on whether SWFs invest in troubled or prosperous 
target firms, we compute mean and median values of the pre-event sample’s accounting 
metrics of interest and compare these to industry mean and median values for the same 
country. The accounting metrics we use in this section, and other variables employed 
later in our empirical tests, are defined in Table 13. 
All variables and metrics are computed as of December 31 of the year prior to 
the SWF investment and mean, median, and industry-referential results are presented in 
Table 14. The median book value of equity of sample firms, USD 890 million, exceeds 
the industry median in 87% of the cases, and median market cap is about USD 2.3 
billion, which is greater than industry median 90% of the time. Total assets are a 
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median USD 2.8 billion, which exceeds the industry median in 88% of all cases, and 
target firms have somewhat higher leverage, with median debt to assets at 62%, greater 
than the industry median in 56% of all cases. Target firms in our sample also have 
higher valuations, with a median market-to-book ratio of 2.26, greater than industry 
medians in 66% of the cases, and are more profitable, with median return on assets of 
6.1%, which exceed industry medians 70% of the time. Median return on equity of 
targets is 15.23%, higher than industry medians 65% of the time. Median cash to total 
assets is 29.81%, greater than industry medians in 48.12% of the cases and median 
Quick Ratio is 1.03, greater than industry medians 47.95% of the time. All of these 
values are statistically significantly different from industry medians at the 1% level 
based on nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests (with the exception of the quick 
ratio results, significant at 5%). Overall, this analysis indicates that SWFs invest in 
large, highly levered, growing and profitable firms--likely, the most visible and high-
profile growth firms.  
 
3. Performance of Target Firms 
3.1. Announcement Period Event Study Results 
While the focus of our analysis is on the long-term impact of SWFs on 
investment targets, this section briefly analyzes the market’s reaction to announcement 
of SWF investments. We do so mainly to compare our sample to those analyzed in other 
empirical studies. We report short-term event study results in Table 15, where we 
present market adjusted abnormal returns obtained by using a local price index as a 
benchmark. As reported in Panel A, the mean excess return is 1.25% over the three-day 
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event window spanning days -1 to +1, where day 0 is the day the SWF investment is 
announced. While the median excess return is smaller (+0.17%), the number of positive 
abnormal returns exceeds the number of negative ones (368 to 320), so both parametric 
and nonparametric test statistics are highly significant.  
We further investigate short-term market reactions to SWF investments by 
excluding transactions by Norway’s GPFG. We do this for two reasons, as we want to 
both make sure that our results are not driven by one fund, which alone constitutes over 
half of our sample, and since we believe the Norwegian fund has governance 
characteristics that are likely to lead to a different market impact. In particular, GPFG 
has a higher level of transparency than any other fund, and has a reputation as a 
responsible and sophisticated investor. The fund also makes large numbers of very 
small investments. Panel B reports results obtained when excluding GPFG observations. 
The mean cumulative abnormal return is much larger, ranging from 2.14% on day 0 to 
2.91% over the three-day event window. In Panel C, we report results related to short-
term market reaction to announcements of acquisitions solely by GPFG. Comparing 
Panel A and Panel B suggests that announcements of investments by GPFG elicit 
almost no market response. Mean cumulative abnormal return estimates range from 
0.02% to 0.32%, while medians range from -2% to +2%, and only one of the twelve test 
statistics presented is statistically significant.  
In unreported results, we verify that our results are qualitatively similar when 
using a market model with a local market index benchmark or when employing 
matched-firm adjusted returns (as we describe in section 3.2). We also obtain similar 
results when employing either of two global market index benchmarks, the Datastream 
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and the MSCI total return world indices. Overall, our results clearly indicate that the 
market reaction to SWF investment announcement is positive.  
 Our results are in line with results documented in other, contemporaneous, 
studies. Dewenter, Han and Malatesta (2010), in a sample of 227 SWF investments, 
document significantly positive abnormal returns of 1.5%, while Kotter and Lel (2011) 
find, in a sample of 417 investments made by SWFs into 326 separate publicly traded 
companies, that SWF investments are associated with significantly positive 
announcement period abnormal returns averaging 2.2%. Knill, Lee and Mauck (2012) 
collect a sample of 232 SWF investment announcements and document a significantly 
positive announcement-period abnormal return of 1.43%. Karolyi and Liao (2009) find, 
for a sample of 181 SWF investments, positive and significant announcement period 
returns of 0.88%. Clearly, while the exact magnitude of the abnormal return differs 
across studies, all agree on a positive market reaction to investment announcements. 
Our results are of comparable magnitude to these other studies. 
 
3.2. Long-Term Event Study Results 
We report long-term event study results in Tables 16 and 17. In each case, we 
focus on four different event windows, respectively spanning six months, one year, two 
years, and three years after SWF investment. For robustness, we employ several 
different benchmarks in the event studies. In unreported results, we use two alternative 
global market indices: the MSCI World and the Datastream-supplied total return 
indices; we do not report results employing those benchmarks as they are very similar to 
those obtained by making use of local market indices, which we consider more 
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informative. The first set of reported results is computed using Datastream value-
weighted local total return indices as proxies for market performance, while the second 
set employs matched-firm methodologies, as advocated by Lyon, Barber and Tsai 
(1999). First, we match on country, exchange, size and book-to-market
47
 then, in an 
alternative approach, we match on country, exchange, industry and pre-event 
performance.
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For each benchmark, we compute buy-and-hold abnormal returns. For 
robustness, we also present monthly cumulative abnormal returns, although we note that 
the latter might be negatively biased. Finally, we also compute calendar-time portfolio 
abnormal returns as in Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974), to address possible 
correlations in CARs due to transactions being clustered in time. In all cases, we present 
results of two non-parametric tests for the significance of the abnormal return, the 
Generalized Sign (GS) test and the Wilcoxon Sign Rank (WSR) test. When testing buy-
and-hold abnormal return, we compute a bootstrapped, skewness-adjusted t-statistic as 
suggested by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) to correct for the skewness of long-horizon 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns. When testing cumulative abnormal returns, we employ 
the crude-dependence adjusted (CDA) t-statistic proposed by Brown and Warner 
(1985). When testing calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns, we compute a calendar-
time t-statistic.  
                                               
47 We take the unusual step of matching on both country of incorporation and primary listing exchange as 
we find that a portion of target firms in our sample are listed on foreign exchanges and have share prices 
quoted in foreign currency. We obtain headquarters’ location and listing exchanges for each firm/security 
from Datastream. We use Worldscope to obtain measures of firm size (aggregate market capitalization, 
WC08001), and market-to-book ratio (WC09704). 
 
48 As a proxy for industry we use the FTSE level-3 industry classification from Datastream. As a proxy 
for performance we obtain the raw stock market return computed as the change in the Datastream Total 
Return Index over the calendar year preceding the SWF investment.  
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In Panels A, B, and C of Table 16 we present buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
using local market adjusted or matched firm abnormal returns; we repeat the analysis 
with the same benchmarks excluding Norway’s investments in Panels D, E, and F of 
Table 16. Cumulative abnormal returns with the same sets of benchmarks are presented 
in Panels A, B, C, and D of Table 17 and cumulative abnormal returns excluding 
Norway are again presented in Table 17, Panels E, F, G, and H. Results in Table 16, 
Panel A, indicate that market adjusted buy-and-hold mean abnormal returns are 
insignificantly negative over all four holding periods examined (the six-month, one-
year, two-year and three-year windows) and range from -1.32% at one year to -4.61% 
over three years. Medians are substantially more negative, ranging from -3.13% at six 
months to -12.75% at three years and the first three holding periods are significantly 
negative at the 1% level according to the WSR test statistic, while the three-year 
holding period result is significantly negative at the 5% level. 
Results in Panel B are obtained by employing a size and book-to-market 
matching methodology and a buy-and-hold abnormal return estimation procedure. Mean 
abnormal returns are all negative and become steadily more so with holding period 
length, from -1.86% over six months to -21.88% over three years. The bootstrapped, 
skewness-adjusted t-test indicates statistical significance at the 10% level for the one-
year holding period and at the 5% level for the three-year holding period. Median 
abnormal returns are also consistently negative but exhibit a narrower spread between 
least and most negative, ranging from -2.75% over one year to -16.73% over three 
years. The two-year and three-year median abnormal returns are significantly negative 
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at the 5% level based on the GS test at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, based on the 
WSR test.  
Results in Panel C are obtained by employing industry and performance 
matches; mean abnormal returns become increasingly negative over the four holding 
periods, increasing from -3.74% for six months to -12.13% over three years, and 
bootstrapped, skewness adjusted t-statistics indicate significance at the six-months (5% 
level) and one-year (1% level) horizons. Median abnormal returns are all negative, with 
the WSR test statistics being statistically significant at the 10% level for the one-year 
and two-year holding periods. Results obtained excluding Norway are presented in 
Panels D, E, F, and G of Table 16. For the sake of brevity, we will not extensively 
discuss those results, as they are qualitatively similar. Means are somewhat smaller, but 
medians are generally more negative, and overall patterns are similar.  
 These consistently negative, and generally significant, long-run abnormal 
returns after SWF investments are very hard to reconcile with the positive 
announcement period abnormal returns. On the other hand, the long-run negative 
returns far exceed the positive short-run returns, so we conclude that the overall market 
impact of SWFs as investors is quite negative.  
Long term event study results using monthly cumulative abnormal returns, 
presented in Table 17, appear to differ substantially according to which benchmark is 
employed. Local market index adjusted returns, in Panel A, display negative mean 
abnormal returns over the six-months, but positive abnormal returns over the one-year, 
two-year and three-year holding periods while the CDA t-statistics are all statistically 
insignificant. The median abnormal return is negative at the six-month horizon and 
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positive over the other horizons, with the GS test statistics significant at the 1% level of 
two-years and at the 10% level over three-years and the WSR test statistic significant at 
the two-year horizon at the 1% level. Calendar-time abnormal returns are negative at all 
horizons and statistically significant at the 10% level at the one-year horizon.  
We also compute market-model abnormal returns and present these in Panel B. 
These abnormal returns, which adjust for the risk level of the target security, are 
consistently negative and strongly statistically significant, with means ranging from -
7.99% over six-months to -56.39% over three years. Medians show a similar pattern of 
negative abnormal returns, ranging from -3.97% over six-months to -40.35% over three-
years. Calendar time abnormal returns range from -11.05% over six-months to -59.62% 
over three-years. The extreme magnitude of the results, significantly greater than those 
obtained by using market-adjusted or even matched firm abnormal returns, does give us 
pause. We report the results, but note that, especially at long horizons, market model 
returns might be unreliable.
49
  
Results in Panel C are obtained using a size and book-to-market matching 
methodology. All mean, median and calendar-time abnormal returns are negative. The 
CDA t-statistics are all insignificant, the calendar time t-statistics are significant at the 
10% level at the one- and two-year horizons, the GS test statistics are significant at the 
5% level at the six-month, one-year and two-year horizons, while the WSR test 
statistics are significant at the 5% level over one- and two-year holding periods.  
Results in Panel D are obtained by employing industry and performance 
matches. All mean, median and calendar-time abnormal returns are negative, with the 
                                               
49 Given the positive abnormal performance of SWF investment targets over the one-year prior to the 
investment announcement previously documented, it is likely that market model parameter estimates are 
inducing a negative bias in our estimation of abnormal returns.  
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exception of the calendar-time abnormal return over the three-year holding period. The 
CDA t-statistics are all statistically insignificant, while the calendar time t-statistic is 
significant at the 10% level over the six-month holding period and at the 5% level over 
the one-year and two-year holding periods. The GS test statistic is statistically 
significant at the 5% level over the six-month, one-year and two-year holding periods 
while the WSR test statistic is statistically significant at the 5% level over the one-year 
and two-year holding periods.  
The same methodology is applied to results excluding Norway in Panels E-H of 
Table 16. Once more, for the sake of brevity, we do not discuss those results in detail, 
as they are very similar to those obtained when including Norwegian investments in our 
sample. We note, however, that most of the coefficient estimates are of slightly greater 
magnitude, but levels of significance are mostly unaffected due to the smaller sample 
sizes. 
Though the magnitude of the underperformance varies across models and 
benchmarks, evidence of the log-run underperformance itself is fairly consistent, at least 
up to the two-year post-investment horizon. While we recognize that the abnormal 
returns computed by using the market model differ greatly from those estimated using 
the matched-firm approach, both sets of results indicate some degree of 
underperformance. As previously noted, we put more faith in the results obtained by 
using the matched-firm approach, as do most recent papers employing long-run event 
study methods. We conclude that SWF investments underperform relative to local 
market indices and relative to matched firms, as predicted by the Political Interference 
and Constrained Foreign State Investor hypotheses.  
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3.3. Comparison with Previous Long-Term Findings  
Our long-term findings are consistent with Knill, Lee and Mauck (2012), who 
find negative one-year abnormal returns equal to -6.3%.  Kotter and Lel (2011) find 
negative and significant abnormal returns over the one-year holding period, negative but 
not statistically significant returns over holding periods up to three years and positive 
and statistically significant returns over the five-year holding period. We believe the 
difference between their results and ours to be driven both by their use of market 
adjustments and the use of a global market index. While we do not report, for brevity, 
our results against a global market index benchmark, we find that those, while negative, 
have a lower level of significance than results against local market indices; we find this 
result plausible, since a global market index will be a noisier proxy for market 
performance than a local market index. Second, as we report, market adjusted results 
offer a lower level of significance than abnormal returns computed by using estimation 
procedures that take into account firm-specific risk factors--market models or matched-
firm methodologies. Even in our analysis, market adjusted abnormal returns present the 
lowest level of statistical significance. As discussed by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), 
matched-firm approaches are better specified in long-term studies, especially when one 
of the matching criteria includes, as in one of our specifications, pre-event performance. 
In addition, Kotter and Lel (2011) use only one, nonparametric, test for statistical 
significance (the Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test), while we offer a wide range of test 
statistics, including the boostrapped, skewness-adjusted t-statistic that Lyon, Barber and 
Tsai (1999) advocate and the crude-dependency adjusted t-statistic by Brown and 
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Warner (1985). Finally, our sample is larger at the one-year and two-year horizons: 
Kotter and Lel have 279, 203 and 172 observations at the one-year, two-year and three-
year horizons, respectively, while we have, in the event studies against local market 
indices, 617, 366 and 165 observations. 
Dewenter, Han and Malatesta (2010) find that post-investment average long-run 
abnormal returns are insignificant and close to zero for holding periods up to five years, 
but median long-run abnormal returns are significantly negative over one year and 
consistently negative over all holding periods. The authors use local market indices as 
benchmarks and abnormal returns are computed with a market adjustment. As in the 
previous discussion of the results by Kotter and Lel (2011), we note that market-
adjusted returns have lower levels of significance, in our analysis, that market-model or 
matched-firm abnormal returns; we consider matched-firms abnormal returns to be 
suffering from the least misspecification problems. Second, a portion of the DHM 
dataset contains investments in subsidiaries of publicly traded firms. For those 
transactions, DHM use the abnormal return on the stock price of the publicly traded 
parent, while we exclude such transactions from our sample. It is plausible that the 
stock price reaction of the parent is weaker, thus making it harder to obtain statistically 
significant results. Third, we offer a wider range of alternative event-study 
methodology, varying benchmarks, abnormal return estimation procedures and different 
test statistics. Finally, we have a larger sample: while they have 178 observations for the 
one-year window and 127 for the three-year window, whereas we have, respectively, 
617 and 165. 
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3.4. Long Term Cross-Sectional Analysis 
We perform a series of cross-sectional regressions of six-month, one-year, two-
year and three-year abnormal returns. For each regression, only observations with 
available data for all explanatory variables are used. The final number of observations 
employed in each regression specification ranges from 294 to 23, as detailed in Table 
18.
50
 We use the local market index-adjusted abnormal return as a response variable.
51
 
The set of explanatory variables includes: a measure of government involvement in 
SWF operations (SWF Government Involvement), computed as one minus the score 
given by Truman (2008) to the level of managerial independence from the 
government;
52
 a measure of how passive the SWF is in its investments (SWF Passive 
Stance), obtained by adding the scores given by Truman (2008) on the presence of stake 
limits and on the ban on controlling stakes;
53
 a binary variable set equal to one if the 
investing fund is Norway (Norway), as we conjecture that Norway’s SWF differs 
significantly from its peers in terms of governance and transparency and could thus 
have a different impact on investment targets; a binary variable set equal to one if the 
                                               
50 While we present, for completeness, the results of cross-sectional analysis of three-year abnormal 
returns, we note that the sample size is quite small.  
 
51 In unreported robustness tests, we find that, if we use matched-firm abnormal returns as response 
variables, we obtain very similar coefficient estimates, but with somewhat lower levels of statistical 
significance, possibly due to slightly smaller sample sizes. We present results based on a cross-sectional 
analysis of local index-adjusted abnormal returns as that allows us to use the largest sample. 
 
52 Truman (2008) offers, for each fund, a score on a scale of zero to one, reflecting the level of 
independence of management from governmental interference (with 1 indicating full managerial 
independence); as we wish to measure the level of governmental involvement, we build a variable equal 
to one minus the score offered by Truman (2008) on this dimension. Accordingly, higher values on our 
variable indicate higher government involvement. 
 
53 Truman (2008) scores funds on the presence of stake size limits (with 0 indicating no limits and 1 
indicating strictly enforced limits) and on the avoidance of controlling stakes (with 0 indicating no 
avoidance and 1 indicating absolute avoidance). We add those two scores to obtain a proxy measure for 
how passive the fund tends to be in its investment strategy. Accordingly, higher levels of our proxy 
measure indicate a more passive stance. 
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target firm is headquartered in an OECD country (the variable is labeled OECD), as we 
observe that firms headquartered in OECD countries might have easier access to capital 
and better shareholder protection; a binary variable equal to one if the target is in the 
‘strategic’ industrial groups Aerospace and Defense, Energy, Utilities, Resources, or 
Telecoms and IT (Strategic Target); a variable measuring the age, in years, of the 
investing SWF at the time of the investment (SWF Age) to test for the presence of 
learning effects in stock-picking; a variable equal to the proportion of the stake acquired 
in a capital infusion or zero in the case of a secondary-market transaction (Capital 
Infusion); a variable measuring the size of the stake owned after the investment (Stake 
Owned), to test whether market reaction depends on the proportion of the firm that is 
under SWF control; a binary variable equal to one if the SWF investment is in a foreign 
company (Foreign Target); the market capitalization of the target firm (Market Value), 
the leverage (Leverage) of the target firm, proxied by debt-to-asset ratio, and its 
liquidity (Liquidity), proxied by the firm’s Quick Ratio, all three measured as of the end 
of the calendar year prior to the SWF investment; and a binary variable set equal to one 
if the SWF acquires one or more seats on the board of directors (BoD). Definitions of 
all variables are summarized in Table 13. Finally, we add a control variable measuring 
abnormal stock market returns over the one-year period preceding investment, to 
control for possible momentum or reversal effects. All our regressions are estimated 
with robust standard errors clustered by target firm, to mitigate potential econometric 
problems caused by multiple investments in the same target firms. 
 Results of the regressions are reported in Table 18. The level of government 
involvement is negatively related to long-term abnormal returns, but the result is 
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statistically significant, at the 5% level, only over the two-year holding period; we 
interpret this as weak evidence of a detrimental impact of government involvement in 
SWFs on target firm performance. The level of passivity of the investing fund is 
negatively related to abnormal returns, with results statistically significant at the 1% 
level for the six-month and two-year holding period, at the 10% level for the one-year 
holding period, and at the 5% level for the three-year holding period. We interpret this 
as evidence of a passive SWF role leading to deteriorating target firm performance. The 
OECD binary variable has negative coefficients, statistically significant at the 1% level 
at the six-month horizon and at the 10% level for the three-year horizon, which 
indicates lower abnormal returns for SWF investments in OECD targets. The binary 
variable identifying strategic targets has positive but not statistically significant 
coefficients, while the variable measuring the age of a SWF has negative coefficients, 
statistically significant at the 5% level for the two-year holding period. The variable 
measuring the size of the capital infusion has coefficients of different signs, none 
statistically significant. The size of the stake owned is negatively related to firm 
performance at all horizons, and the result is statistically significant at the 5% level for 
the two-year horizon, which we consider weak evidence of a negative relation between 
stake size and firm performance. The dummy variable indicating foreign targets has a 
positive coefficient for the six-month holding period and negative coefficients for the 
other periods, significant at the 10% level at the one-year horizon and at the 1% level at 
the two-year horizon; overall, this suggests worse performance for foreign targets. 
Target size is negatively related to firm performance at all horizons, but the result is 
statistically significant, at the 5% level, only for the two-year holding period. The 
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coefficients on the leverage and liquidity variables change signs at different horizons 
and none of the relationships are statistically significant. Finally, seats on boards of 
directors are negatively related to firm performance, with the results being statistically 
significant at the 5% level for the two-year window and at the 10% level for the three-
year window.  
 In an unreported robustness test, we exclude all observations the target of which 
is subject to additional SWF investments, keeping only the first of such transactions. 
We find our core results to be robust in this reduced sample, although some of the 
coefficients lose statistical significance, likely due to the smaller sample size.  
 
3.5. Interpretation of Findings 
Taken together, the evidence of a positive market reaction followed by negative 
long-term performance is puzzling. A similar pattern is documented by Hertzel, et al. 
(2002) regarding private placements of equity; for their sample of 619 publicly traded 
firms announcing private equity placements over the years 1980 to 1996, the market 
reacts positively, but the subsequent (three-year) stock price performance is negative. 
As do Hertzel, et al. (2002), we note that our results indicate that investors are 
overoptimistic about the prospects of target firms, but ultimately fail to fully explain the 
puzzle.  
 Our long-term event study results clearly point to long-term underperformance, 
thus ruling out the two hypotheses which predict a positive impact of SWFs on 
investment targets as being dominant (the Active Monitoring Hypothesis and the 
Reduced Financial Constraints Hypothesis). Further, cross-sectional results are not 
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consistent with the Stock-Picking Hypothesis, as the sign on the coefficient of the 
variable measuring the age of the SWF is negative, rather than positive as expected, 
which would be consistent with a learning effect. Also, characteristics of the SWF (the 
level of government involvement and how passive the fund is in its investments) and of 
the deal (size of the stake acquired, acquisition of seats on boards of directors) are 
significant in explaining the abnormal return, which is also not consistent with the 
Stock-Picking Hypothesis.  
 Similarly, the negative abnormal returns observed contradict the Active 
Monitoring Hypothesis. In addition, the negative relationship between the size of the 
stake owned and performance and the negative relationship between acquisition of 
board of director seats and performance are highly inconsistent with active monitoring. 
The negative abnormal returns are also not consistent with the Reduced Financial 
Constraints Hypothesis being dominant. Further, while the lower returns on OECD 
targets are consistent with this hypothesis, the lack of relationship between firm 
leverage and firm liquidity and abnormal performance is not consistent.  
 On the other hand, the negative abnormal returns are consistent with the 
predictions of the Political Interference and Constrained Foreign State Investor 
hypotheses. The negative relationship between the level of government involvement 
and firm performance is consistent with the Political Interference Hypothesis, while the 
negative relationship between fund passivity and target performance is consistent with 
the Constrained Foreign State Investor Hypothesis. Yet, we should note that statistical 
significance of the relationship between fund passivity and target performance is much 
higher and more robust across holding periods, thus favoring the Constrained Foreign 
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State Investor Hypothesis. The negative coefficient of the Stake variable is also 
consistent with both hypotheses, as is the one on board of director seats. 
The fact that investments by Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global 
(GPFG) exhibit stronger long-term performance than those by other SWFs deserves 
attention. GPFG is largely insulated from government interference, so the higher 
abnormal returns are consistent with the Political Interference Hypothesis. At the same 
time, Norway’s SWF is generally considered a passive investor and, hence, the higher 
abnormal return is not consistent with value-destruction at the hands of passive 
investors. Yet, this commonly held perception might be inaccurate. Reports abound of 
the managing arm of the fund, Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) 
attempting to impact the governance of the companies in which it invests. Well 
publicized cases include opposing Volkswagen plans to take over Porsche assets, 
blocking a takeover attempt at Constellation Energy by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire 
Hathaway and initiating governance changes at Sara Lee Corp.
54
 In addition, a recent 
report by Mehropouya, Huang and  Barnett (2009) finds that, contrary to public 
perceptions, GPFG “actively exercises its voting rights with a well-defined engagement 
strategy.” Accordingly, we maintain that the higher abnormal returns earned by GPFG 
investment targets is consistent with both the Political Interference and the Constrained 
Foreign State Investor hypotheses.  
We can determine which of the two surviving hypotheses receives the most 
empirical support from the regression analyses by summarizing how the hypotheses 
offer contradictory predictions regarding eight variables (see Table 9). First, the 
                                               
54 An analysis of the GPFG’s corporate governance (by Reuters), entitled “Norway SWF wages lone 
governance crusade,” is available at http://blogs.reuters.com/columns/2009/10/08/norway-swf-wages-
lone-governance-crusade/. 
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Political Interference Hypothesis predicts higher abnormal returns for foreign targets, as 
political interference is less likely with foreign targets, while the Constrained Foreign 
State Investor Hypothesis predicts lower returns on foreign targets since that is when 
SWFs are most constrained in their monitoring. Second, the Political Interference 
Hypothesis predicts higher returns for target firms headquartered in OECD countries, 
since political interference is less likely in OECD countries where shareholder 
protection tends to be better, while the Constrained Foreign State Investor Hypothesis 
predicts lower returns because opposition to SWFs is particularly strong in OECD 
countries. Third, the Political Interference Hypothesis predicts a positive relationship 
between firm size (measured by Market Value) and subsequent performance, as it is 
harder to impose non-commercial goals on larger and more visible firms, while the 
Constrained Foreign State Investor Hypothesis predicts a negative relationship since 
larger firms are more visible and hence opposition to investments by foreign state 
entities is more likely. Fourth, the Political Interference Hypothesis further predicts a 
negative coefficient on the variable identifying strategic targets, while no effects are 
predicted by the Constrained Foreign State Investor Hypothesis. Fifth, whereas the 
Political Interference Hypothesis predicts that greater fund-government involvement in 
SWF affairs will lead to poorer investment performance (thus a negative coefficient on 
SWF Government Involvement) the Constrained Foreign State Investor Hypothesis 
predicts that this will have no impact but, sixth, the hypotheses’ predictions are reversed 
regarding the impact of SWF passivity-as-policy (SWF Passive Stance).  Seventh and 
eighth, the Political Interference Hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on the 
variable measuring leverage and a negative coefficient on the variable measuring 
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liquidity, while the Constrained Foreign State Investor Hypothesis predicts no impact 
for either factor. 
he results from cross-sectional analysis of long-term abnormal returns therefore 
indicate that SWFs act as politically constrained state investors, at least in their foreign 
investments. SWFs appear to have an adverse effect on the quality of the governance of 
target firms, but that negative impact appears largely due to a passive stance that leads 
to a gap in monitoring the activities of the firm’s management. We discuss further 
evidence of the passive stance of SWFs in the following section.                   
 
4. Are SWFs Passive? 
To directly study the monitoring role—or lack thereof—exercised by SWFs, we 
collect board of director composition data for companies and examine whether 
sovereign funds acquire representation on target firm boards in the years after the initial 
fund investment. Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2010) perform a similar analysis, and 
Saigol (2009) presents anecdotal evidence that some funds are demanding board seats. 
We begin with the full dataset of 318 SWF investments, other than by Norway’s GPFG, 
for which full information on investment dates, amounts, and percent stakes acquired is 
available. We search for annual reports for the years following the SWF investment for 
all non-U.S. investee companies (from the target firm's website) and examine proxy 
statements from the SEC's EDGAR database for U.S. targets. We determine the 
composition of corporate boards for 198 companies, including director profiles, and 
record any director with an affiliation with an SWF or subsidiary as a representative of 
the fund who obtained their seat as a result of that fund's investment. The other 120 
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observations are unusable, because the investment was too recent to show up on 
statements on the target firm's website (30 cases), the investment was too early (usually 
before 2003) for an annual report to be listed on the target company's website (49 
cases), or because no board of director profiles are provided (41 cases). Amazingly, 
English language reports are available for all but three companies. We also obtain board 
of director data for 157 companies in which Norway’s GPFG made an initial investment 
between December 2006 and September 2009, yielding a usable sample of 355 
observations. These results are presented in Table 11. 
We find that funds acquire seats in only 53 companies, or in only 14.9% of all 
cases, though this percentage rises to 26.8% when the 157 targets of Norway’s fund are 
excluded—since the Norwegian fund always makes small investments and never 
receives a board seat. In 53 of the 198 non-Norwegian cases, the investing SWF 
obtained one or more board seats (usually only one), and another six companies were 
acquired by the SWF - which presumably obtained a controlling number of seats, 
bringing the total to 59 of 204 cases (28.9%) where funds obtained board 
representation. In 145 cases, the fund did not obtain board representation within two 
years of investment (71.1%). Table 11 details the observations and lists how 
frequently individual funds and their subsidiaries obtain board seats, and aggregates the 
data for funds and their subsidiaries. Khazanah and Temasek obtain board seats far 
more frequently than do other funds, whereas ADIA, Kuwait Investment Authority, and 
Qatar Investment Authority rarely if ever acquire board representation. Only 4 of the 37 
usable US investments by non-Norwegian funds are followed by board seat acquisitions 
and none of the twelve UK deals resulted in board seats. 
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Non-Norwegian SWFs are significantly more likely to acquire seats in domestic 
than in foreign companies (in 56.4% versus 19.5% of all cases), and are especially 
unlikely to acquire seats on a target company headquartered in an OECD country (7.4% 
of cases). Furthermore, when non-Norwegian funds do acquire board seats, they are 
more likely to nominate a representative from a fund subsidiary than from the main 
fund itself, and this propensity is strikingly higher when acquiring a seat on a foreign 
(especially OECD) company’s board. These results suggest that SWFs are reluctant to 
exercise effective corporate governance over their foreign investments, but are much 
more willing to do so domestically.
55
 This is strongly supported by (unreported) 
supplemental analysis that examines seat acquisitions just by the main SWFs, rather 
than by both the funds and their subsidiaries. The difference between these findings and 
those for subsidiaries are striking. Main funds obtain board seats in only 32 of the 150 
usable observations (21.3%), plus only 4 acquisitions (24.0% total), versus 22 board 
seat acquisitions and two acquisitions out of 53 usable SWF-subsidiary investments 
(41.5%). Subsidiaries are also much more likely to take seats in foreign deals than are 
the main funds. This suggests that SWFs deliberately and rationally choose to funnel 
controversial foreign investments through low-visibility subsidiaries rather than by 
investing directly using the main funds.  
Additional evidence of a passive role of SWFs is offered in an analysis of 
engagement and voting by SWFs presented in Mehropouya, Huang and  Barnett (2009), 
which finds “few cases in which SWFs held seats at their portfolio companies” and that 
                                               
55 There is at least one other, practical reason why SWFs do not demand board seats more frequently: lack 
of staff. Johnson and Slyngstad (2010) and Anderlini (2009) report that the largest and third largest 
SWFs, Norway’s Global Pension Fund- Global and China Investment Corporation, have only 250 and 
400 employees, respectively.  
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“the funds appear to stick to their claims that they are relatively passive investors”. The 
report also documents that “proxy votes discovered through our analysis were mostly 
cast for management” and that “no major case of shareholder resolutions introduced by 
the SWFs was discovered, with the exception of ESG (Environmental, Social and 
Governance) engagements of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global”. Rose 
(2008) discusses how SWFs avoid acquiring large, controlling stakes in the United 
States, especially in financial institutions, to avoid becoming “bank holding companies” 
and receiving additional oversight by the Federal Reserve. Kotter and Lel (2011) find 
that CEO turnover rates and accounting performance of SWF investment targets differ 
insignificantly between SWF target firms and a control group, concluding that SWFs 
are passive investors. Some SWFs commit themselves to a passive strategy, presumably 
in order to pre-empt political opposition to their investments. Examples include the 
China Investment Corporation, which in its 2009 annual report commits to a passive 
stance, and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority which sent a letter to Western financial 
regulators, in which the fund commits to never use its investments as a foreign policy 
tool.
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  The evidence described above most strongly supports the Constrained Foreign 
State Investor Hypothesis. As state-owned investment funds from largely non-
democratic countries, these funds are politically constrained from exercising effective 
                                               
56 A dissenting opinion regarding SWF governance assertiveness is offered by Dewenter, Han and 
Malatesta (2010) who analyze instances of monitoring, network transaction and governmental 
interference following SWF investments. Despite weak evidence obtained in cross-sectional analysis of 
abnormal returns, they conclude that SWFs are active investors and that their activities impact long term 
abnormal returns, yet they fail to explain how this active monitoring fails to lead to a positive impact on 
firm performance.  
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discipline of target firm managements--especially in the United States, Britain, and 
continental Europe, where expressed hostility to SWFs was intense during 2006-2008.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study presents an empirical analysis of SWF investment patterns and 
examines the impact of SWF investments on targeted firms. We list and describe the 
investment philosophies of the major funds, analyze their overall size, and discuss 
estimates of future growth. Using a broad sample of SWF investments in listed firm 
stocks we provide a comprehensive overview of SWF investment patterns by fund, by 
industry sector, and by geography. We present evidence on the mechanics of SWF 
investments, and measure the impact of SWFs on the subsequent performance of the 
listed companies in which they invest. We document that SWFs purchase, on average, 
sizable minority stakes in target companies. We also find that SWFs (except for 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global) generally buy equity stakes in listed 
companies by purchasing newly-issued stock directly from target companies in friendly 
transactions that exclude outside participation by existing shareholders. This feature of 
SWF investment suggests that funds become the allies of target-firm managers and are 
thus constrained from playing a meaningful disciplinary or monitoring role. In addition, 
these government-owned funds face significant political pressure from recipient 
countries to remain passive investors in cross-border deals.  
On average, the stocks of companies receiving SWF equity investments increase 
significantly over the three-day window surrounding the purchase announcement, 
suggesting that investors welcome SWFs as shareholders. Despite these positive 
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announcement-period reactions, SWF stock purchases are associated with much larger 
and significantly negative abnormal returns over the three years following the initial 
investment, and these results are robust to the use of multiple benchmarks and event 
study methodologies. Median abnormal returns and returns excluding Norway are 
consistently more negative than are mean abnormal returns. Funds only rarely acquire 
board of director seats after foreign investments, but are significantly more likely to 
acquire seats in domestic companies. Funds are especially unlikely to acquire seats on a 
target company headquartered in an OECD country. 
In cross-sectional analyses, the longer-term post-acquisition target performance 
is related to fund characteristics and to the SWF’s level of involvement. The 
performance of SWF investment targets is worse for more passive funds, for foreign 
targets, and for targets headquartered in an OECD country, but long-run returns are 
negatively related to the size of the stake acquired and to the size of the target firm. 
Firm performance also appears to deteriorate more when SWFs acquire seats on board 
of directors. These results are most consistent with the Constrained Foreign State 
Investor Hypothesis, which predicts that SWFs should be especially reluctant to 
“interfere” in target firm management by demanding high performance or by holding 
managers to account. The key question going forward is whether SWFs will continue to 
act as “Quiet Leviathans” in terms of corporate governance, or will instead adopt a 
more assertive stance commensurate with their true financial power.   
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Chapter 4: Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt
57
 
 
Governments and state-owned entities have been such active stock-market 
investors that they now own approximately one-fifth of global stock-market 
capitalization (Anonymous, 2010). After focusing on the impact of government 
investments – in particular, SWF investments – on the value of firm equity, we 
investigate the impact of this novel and growing form of government ownership on the 
cost of publicly traded debt of the firms in which governments invest.   
The rise in “state capitalism” that this phenomenon of government stock 
purchases both reflects and encompasses has been deeply controversial, especially when 
it involves share purchases by foreign state-owned investors such as sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs) (Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson, 2010; Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta, 
2010; Kotter and Lel, 2011) or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Karolyi and Liao, 2010; 
Karolyi and Taboada, 2011). The mass of published research examining the 
effectiveness of governments versus private investors as owners of business enterprises 
points to the superiority of the latter, and empirical evidence overwhelmingly 
documents that when governments privatize SOEs, performance tends to improve.
58
 All 
this suggests that states should be reducing their ownership of corporate equity, rather 
                                               
57 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Ginka Borisova, Kate Holland and William 
Megginson. 
 
58 The relative effectiveness of state versus private ownership is examined in Eckel and Vermaelen 
(1986), Boardman and Vining (1989), Kole and Mulherin (1997), Shleifer (1998), Chhibber and 
Majumdar (1999), Shirley and Walsh (2000), LaPorta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2001), Sapienza 
(2004), Dinç (2005), Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007), Chen, Firth, Xin, and Xu (2008), Chernykh 
(2008), Lin and Su (2008), Wolf (2009), Firth, Lin, and Zou (2010), Morck, Yavuz, and Yeung (2011), 
and Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Yuan (2011). Early privatization empirical studies are summarized in 
Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002), while more recent research includes Sun 
and Tong (2003), Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2004), Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2005), 
D’Souza, Megginson, and Nash (2005), Gupta (2005), Brown, Earle, Telegdy (2006, 2010), Wolf and 
Pollitt (2008), Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2009), Boubakri, Cosset, Guedhami, and Saffar 
(2011), and Denisova, Eller, Frye, and Zhuravskaya (2011). 
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than increasing it. Yet, this evidence is mostly based on an analysis of operating 
performance or of equity prices. The impact of government ownership on the value of 
firm debt is largely unexplored.
59
  
Despite governments in some ways resembling other large institutional 
investors, they often invest with different goals. While private investors are generally 
concerned with wealth maximization, several possible rationales for state ownership of 
listed equity have been put forth.
60
 Governments might purchase equity stakes to 
influence companies to pursue socially-desirable objectives, such as maintaining high 
levels of employment, or to subsidize industries considered vital to the nation’s political 
and military goals. These motivations suggest that governments are reluctant to allow a 
company in which they purchase stock to fail. Accordingly, investors come to expect 
that governments will likely honor the debt obligations of struggling government-owned 
firms, thus providing a sort of implicit debt guarantee (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 
2006; Brown and Dinç, 2011; Borisova and Megginson, 2011). Such a debt guarantee is 
likely to lower the perceived risk of default, leading to investors requiring lower risk 
premiums and, hence, to a lower cost of debt for the issuing firm.  
On the other side, Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo, and Park (1993) warn that this 
reluctance of governments to allow firms (especially financial institutions) to fail is 
likely to increase managerial moral hazard, as shareholders and managers enjoy the 
benefits of strong firm performance, while the government and, ultimately, the 
                                               
59 Borisova and Megginson (2011) offer a recent exception, as they investigate the closely related impact 
of privatizations on the firms’ cost of debt.  
 
60 An intriguing recent analysis of the motivations underlying the opposite phenomenon – determinants of 
governments’ desire to nationalize private (petroleum) assets – is presented in Guriev, Kolotilin, and 
Sonin (2009). 
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taxpayers share the costs of insolvency. Such moral hazard is further strengthened by a 
lower risk of a manager losing his/her job, as government-owned firms are less likely to 
be acquired in a takeover or be allowed to go bankrupt. This moral hazard problem is 
also exacerbated by a monitoring gap which is likely to be associated with government 
ownership, as shown, for example, by Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2010) for 
SWF investments – governments typically provide lower levels of monitoring than 
other private shareholders and the implicit guarantees they offer remove monitoring 
incentives for other stakeholders. In addition, government ownership might lead to the 
imposition of social and political priorities on investment targets, which could result in 
deviations from purely economic shareholder value maximization. Such deviations are 
likely to negatively impact firm performance and firm value, which in turn will lead to a 
higher probability of default and a higher cost of debt. In other words, the implicit debt 
guarantee has a direct effect on the cost of debt – by lowering the perceived risk of 
default, it lowers the required risk premium – but it also an indirect effect of increasing 
moral hazard and agency costs, which could lead to a higher risk of default.  
The net impact of government ownership on the cost of debt of a firm is thus a 
matter for empirical investigation. Our analysis aims to determine which of these effects 
dominates. Accordingly, we examine the link between government ownership and 
spreads (above benchmark yields) on publicly traded corporate bonds issued by firms in 
which governments and other state-owned investors purchase an ownership stake. Our 
sample consists of 1,279 bonds issued by 215 publicly traded companies from 43 
countries over 1990-2010.
61
  The correct measure of government ownership is crucial to 
our analysis and we manually collect stock ownership for all bond issuers in our sample 
                                               
61 Our focus on debt issued by publicly traded firms is driven by data availability constraints. 
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for each year between 1990 and 2010.  Our main analysis relies on panel regressions in 
which we model the spread on corporate bonds as a function of government ownership 
after controlling for other factors (both security- and firm-specific) which have been 
found in previous research to affect the cost of debt. We note that a government 
guarantee on the debt of investment targets is likely to be more valuable during times of 
economic hardship as defaults are, all else equal, more likely during crises or recessions 
(Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen, 2011; Santos, 2011). 
Accordingly, we distinguish between the recent financial crisis and previous ‘non-
crisis’ years. During non-crisis years, we find that firms with one or more government 
entities as a shareholder display significantly higher spreads, by 52 basis points (bp), on 
their bonds. During the recent financial crisis, however, government presence is 
associated with lower spreads, by 24 bp, and each percentage point increase in 
government stake ownership translates into a 1 bp decrease in the cost of debt. In 
robustness tests, we use an alternative metric of country-level distress constructed by 
Laeven and Valencia (2010), which identifies banking-sector distress over the period 
1970-2010 around the globe. Using this alternative proxy, we still find government 
ownership is associated with a significantly higher cost of debt (39 bp) during non-crisis 
years and a lower cost of debt (15 bp) during crisis years. Further, by employing a two-
stage selection model, we find that our core results are not affected by the inclusion of 
sample-selection bias controls. 
Past research has also documented that not all institutional investors are good 
monitors and that the monitoring is mostly – perhaps uniquely – provided by 
independent, long-term investors (Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, and Parrino, 2006; 
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Chen, Harford and Li, 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and 
Thomas, 2008; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009; Klein and Zur, 2009; Aggarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, and Matos, 2011; Chung and Zhang, 2011). Similarly, different government-
owned entities vary in terms of objectives and modus operandi. For example, 
government entities such as SOEs are likely to be more closely involved in the 
management of investment targets than are pure state actors, such as the central 
government or local/regional governments (Sapienza, 2004; Dinç, 2005; Brown and 
Dinç, 2005; Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007). State-owned investment vehicles such as 
pension funds and SWFs likely monitor target firm managements differently than do 
pure government entities or state-owned operating companies (Woidtke, 2002; 
Giannetti and Laeven, 2009; Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson, 2010; Jiang, Lee, and 
Yue, 2010). An activist stance by acquiring state entities could, therefore, either 
mitigate or amplify the adverse impact of government-induced moral hazard depending 
on the goals of the government entity. We find that the increase in cost of debt during 
non-crisis years is driven by the presence of local governments, SOEs with a mix of 
public and private ownership, government-owned financial institutions, and pension 
funds. However, during the crisis, local government and mixed SOE ownership helps 
lower the cost of debt in target firms. When focusing on the size of the stake owned, we 
find that large stakes held by SWFs and other government-owned financial institutions 
increase the cost of debt in non-crisis years. In the crisis period, larger holdings by 
central governments and by mixed SOEs lead to a lower cost of debt. Overall, our 
evidence is consistent with the idea that direct government involvement – whether 
central or regional – provides the strongest implicit debt guarantees, due to political 
99 
goals (often inconsistent with firm default) and “deep pockets”, thereby helping lower 
the cost of debt during crisis periods. Conversely, the increase in the cost of debt is 
primarily linked to financial arms of the government (e.g., SWFs, pension funds), 
whose investing objectives are often commercial and, as such, do not lead to a similar 
implied debt guarantee.   
We further note that implicit government guarantees are likely to be strongest 
for domestic targets, as the default of a foreign investment target is less likely to carry 
the political stigma associated with domestic failures of state-owned companies. For 
example, social and political goals are less likely to be imposed on foreign targets, as 
employment maximization is unlikely to be a goal imposed by a foreign-government 
owner. Additionally, recent empirical studies show that local investors are better able to 
overcome informational asymmetries than are more distant investors (Baik, Kang, and 
Kim, 2010; Almazan, de Motta, Titman, and Uysal, 2010). On the other hand, even 
more empirical evidence points to the superiority of foreign institutional and corporate 
investors as monitors of investee-firm managements, which could lead to higher firm 
valuations and thus a reduced cost of debt (Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Brown, Earle, 
Telegdy, 2006 and 2010; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Clearly, we should expect different 
types of government entities to impact the cost of debt of investee firms in materially 
different ways. Accordingly, by separately analyzing the impact of domestic and 
foreign government ownership, we find that the implicit debt guarantee documented 
during the recent financial crisis is specific to domestic government presence. Foreign 
government ownership, however, is associated with an increase in the cost of debt 
100 
during the non-crisis years, equal to about 1 bp for each percentage point of stake 
owned.  
We note that government guarantees might be more valuable the more likely the 
firm is to default. Accordingly, we have allowed for a different impact of government 
ownership on the cost of corporate debt during financial and banking crises (with the 
implicit assumption that firm default risk increases during times of economic hardship), 
showing that the value of a government debt guarantee is greater during times of 
economy-wide distress. In additional analysis, we focus on a firm-specific measure of 
distress, by investigating the impact of government ownership on the cost of debt for a 
sample of firms issuing high-risk (non-investment grade) bonds. In this sample of non-
investment grade bonds we observe patterns similar to our main results – domestic 
(foreign) government ownership during crisis (non-crisis) years is associated with a 
lower (higher) cost of debt. The effects we document are strong. For non-investment 
grade bonds, domestic government presence leads to a significant discount of 72 bp 
over the entire sample and of 133 bp during the crisis years. Foreign government 
presence, on the other hand, is associated with significant increases in the cost of debt 
of 143 bp over crisis years and 209 bp over non-crisis years.  
On balance, these results suggest that private investors believe that stock 
ownership by most domestic government categories can improve the creditworthiness 
of corporate bond issuers by providing an implicit bond payment guarantee that 
becomes especially valuable during a financial crisis. Evidence on the impact of the cost 
of debt of government ownership has been investigated recently by Borisova and 
Megginson (2011). Our research differs from their analysis in several ways, most 
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importantly in that they examine privatizations – the reduction of state control in firms – 
while we look at the government as an investor. Our analysis further indicates that the 
relationship between government ownership and cost of corporate debt is dramatically 
affected by firm-specific and economy-wide distress, differences between types of 
government acquirers and, finally, by the distinction between domestic and foreign 
government ownership. Our final sample spans 43 countries, and includes firms from 
North America and Asia, while Borisova and Megginson (2011) focus solely on 
domestic government ownership of European firms.  
This study is structured as follows. Section 1 develops the hypotheses. Section 2 
describes data sources, sample construction, and variable definitions and offers 
descriptive statistics and univariate tests. Section 3 discusses the methodology, panel 
regressions, and the associated model estimation results. Section 4 focuses on 
robustness tests, while Section 5 concludes.  
 
1. Hypothesis Development 
Governments, as acquirers, differ from private entities in multiple ways. Most 
importantly, government ownership carries an implicit – and, sometimes, explicit – 
guarantee on the debt of the firm, as it is unlikely that a firm with state ownership will 
be allowed to default on its debt. This unwillingness of governments to allow firms to 
default is due to three main reasons. First of all, there are political goals, such as low 
unemployment, which are not consistent with the loss of jobs frequently associated with 
the default of a firm. Second, government ownership is often motivated by the desire to 
maintain key industries providing crucial services to the country; accordingly, 
102 
governments are not keen on allowing such strategic holdings to default. Finally, 
politicians do not wish to be associated with a failed investment and will thus pressure 
or steer the government to rescue an insolvent government-owned firm. Consistent with 
this reasoning, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) find that politically connected 
firms are more likely to be recipients of government bailouts, while Brown and Dinç 
(2005) show evidence that defaults of government-owned banks are less common than 
defaults of privately owned banks. Consequently, debt holders likely perceive a reduced 
probability of default as governments will back the debt of the firm. Since government 
guarantees extend directly to the debt of the firm, we might expect that state ownership 
would lower the debt pricing for target firms.  
However, Borisova and Megginson (2011) show that the relationship between 
government ownership stake and debt pricing is non-monotonic, and several factors 
resulting from state presence could raise the firms’ cost of debt financing. First, as 
discussed by Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo, and Park (1993), the implicit government 
guarantee allows shareholders and managers to benefit from strong firm performance, 
while public funds are used to keep firms afloat during difficult periods. Consequently, 
we expect managers to increase levels of risk taking, which in turn is likely to increase 
the cost of debt of the government-owned firm.  
Second, the moral hazard problem might be reinforced by a monitoring gap that 
occurs because the government is unable, or unwilling, to supervise management. Since 
bondholders expect governments to rescue distressed firms, their own incentives to 
monitor the actions of management decrease (Anonymous, 1998). Further, government 
employees might simply not have the skills or technical knowledge necessary for proper 
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monitoring, due to either political appointments or other inefficiencies in the 
government employment sector. Borisova, Brockman, Salas, and Zagorchev (2012) find 
a lower quality of corporate governance in publicly traded firms partially owned by the 
government when compared to firms free from state ownership. Governments might be 
reluctant to actively impact the governance of firms in which they invest for fear of 
public opposition and backlash by media and regulators, especially if the investment 
target is located abroad. Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2010) accordingly propose 
the “Constrained Foreign Government Investor Hypothesis” and show evidence that 
SWFs create a “governance gap” that leads to value destruction, largely due to their 
desire not to stir opposition. Eckel and Vermaelen (1986) also point to the fact that 
government ownership might decrease the probability of a takeover, hence reducing the 
disciplining effect associated with the threat of a takeover. 
Third, government investment vehicles might be affected by political pressures, 
thus leading them to pursue goals other than wealth maximization. State entities might 
want to maximize employment, favor domestic investments, acquire foreign 
technologies and, as Shleifer (1998) suggests, pursue political goals and increase 
government officials’ personal income. Kahan and Rock (2010) discuss how, despite 
nominal fiduciary duties, governments can impose their own goals on a firm more 
easily than private controlling shareholders. Well-known cases of government 
ownership directing the benefits to their political supporters or simply appeasing the 
groups that had power to overthrow the existing government highlight inefficiencies in 
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state ownership.
62
 All of these factors are likely to lower the risk-adjusted performance 
of government-owned firms, and as Crabbe and Fabozzi (2001) document, firm 
profitability is closely linked to the firm’s ability to repay borrowed funds.  
Between implicit debt guarantees and the moral hazard and political goals linked 
to state owners, the net impact of government ownership on the cost of debt of target 
firms is a matter of empirical investigation. We simply hypothesize that government 
ownership does have an impact on the cost of debt of investment targets, positing: 
H1: Government ownership impacts the cost of debt of investment targets. 
We test the above hypothesis by investigating whether the cost of debt of firms 
with government entities amongst their shareholders is different from the cost of debt of 
a sample containing the same firms during years without government ownership. We 
also note that the impact that government ownership has on firm behavior could 
plausibly be conditioned by the size of the government owned stake. Governments 
might be more protective of firms in which they own larger stakes, thus reinforcing the 
implicit debt guarantee previously mentioned, or, similarly, state owners may have a 
stronger impact on the governance and behavior of firms in which they hold larger 
stakes. Accordingly, in subsequent analysis, we examine the relationship between 
firms’ cost of debt and the size of the stake owned by government investors. The value 
of a debt guarantee, implicit or clearly stated, increases in the likelihood of distress or 
bankruptcy of the borrower. Therefore, if government ownership provides a debt 
guarantee, its value is likely to increase in times of distress. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
                                               
62 Refer to Shleifer (1998) for examples. Some instances include post World War II British government 
sponsoring of coal mines due to the miner union power to overthrow current government and the 
Philippines running a state-owned power utility that shuts off electricity seven days a week. 
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H2: The impact of government ownership on the cost of debt of investment 
targets differs during recessions and periods of market-wide financial distress. 
As a first test of the above hypothesis, we make use of the recent financial crisis 
(spanning the years 2008, 2009, and 2010). This event, affecting virtually the entire 
global economy, is an appropriate testing ground as it constitutes an exogenous shock in 
most domestic economies. Using both interaction variables and data subsets, we 
investigate whether the impact of government ownership on the cost of firms’ debt 
differs during the recent financial crisis. For robustness, we replicate our analysis by 
focusing on a broader set of financial crises – the banking crises described by Laeven 
and Valencia (2010).  
Using similar reasoning regarding the importance of an implicit government 
guarantee during times of overall market distress, we investigate whether this guarantee 
would also be more valuable in the presence of firm-specific distress when access to 
capital markets is constrained and defaults are more likely. We thus examine the 
influence of government ownership on the cost of non-investment-grade bonds and 
highly-levered firms, which we use as proxies for firm-specific distress, and theorize the 
following:  
H3: The impact of government ownership on the cost of debt of investment 
targets differs during periods of firm-specific distress.  
Past research has documented that not all institutional investors are good 
monitors and that the best monitoring is provided by independent, long-term investors 
(Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). Government-owned entities similarly differ in terms of 
objectives and modus operandi. Some classes of government entities are more likely to 
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be closely involved in the management and monitoring of their acquisition targets. An 
activist stance by the acquiring entities could mitigate the adverse impact of 
government-induced moral hazard. Similarly, the strength of the implicit debt guarantee 
differs according to the nature of the government entity holding the investment stake, in 
turn leading to different impacts on the cost of debt.  
H4: The impact of government ownership on the cost of debt of investment 
targets differs according to the type of government investment vehicle.  
 Accordingly, we investigate whether different classes of government-owned 
acquirers (central government, local government, SWFs, SOEs, mixed SOEs, public 
pension funds, and government financial institutions) have different impacts on the cost 
of debt of investment targets.
63
 In particular, we expect government acquirers that are 
more closely associated with the political goals of government (such as central 
governments) to take on the role of “protectors” and to provide the strongest debt 
guarantees. Entities with a more independent nature (such as government-owned 
pension funds and SWFs) should more closely follow the behavior of other institutional 
investors. They are less likely to suffer from the political distortions that lead to 
government support of distressed firms and less able to rescue defaulting portfolio 
holdings.  
                                               
63 The classification is based on the identity of the government-owned shareholder (the investor). The 
‘central government’ group is comprised by non-independent branches of the central (national) 
government, such as ministries (most often, ministries of finance) and national treasuries. ‘Local/regional 
government’ refers to non-independent branches of sub-national governments (most often, municipalities 
and townships). ‘Pension funds’ refers to government-owned pension funds, while for ‘Sovereign Wealth 
Funds’ we follow the descriptions given by Thomson ONE Banker and the SWF Institute. ‘Government 
financial institutions’ includes financial institutions owned by governments and consists primarily of 
central and development banks. The ‘full SOE’ category includes all enterprises fully owned by the 
government, while ‘mixed SOE’ includes all enterprises in which the government retains partial 
ownership or some level of control (for example, through ‘golden shares’).  
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Government guarantees are strongest for domestic targets, as the default of a 
foreign investment target is less likely to carry the political stigma associated with 
domestic failures of state-owned companies. Also, active involvement of a foreign 
government in a domestic target can be met with significant public opposition, so 
governments may sometimes choose to be passive investors, especially in their foreign 
holdings. This reduced monitoring can lead to increased risk taking, reduced firm 
efficiency and, therefore, a higher cost of debt. This analysis suggests a lower cost of 
debt for domestic investments due to greater debt guarantees and the reduced 
monitoring role of foreign governments. On the other hand, government involvement 
could lead to the higher cost of debt for domestic entities as those investments typically 
pursue not only shareholder value maximization, but also other political and social 
goals. Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2010) document that social and political goals 
are less likely to be imposed on foreign targets, as foreign acquisitions tend to be largely 
driven by economic rationale. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H5: The impact of government ownership on the cost of debt of investment 
targets will differ for domestic firms.  
 
2. Sample Description 
We collect a sample of government investments from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. As an initial screen, we 
include all investments by entities whose ultimate parent is flagged as ‘government’ 
over the years 1980-2010 – that is, investments by governments, government agencies 
and firms which are, directly or indirectly, majority-owned by governments. This initial 
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search yields a total of 2,517 completed government investment transactions involving 
1,953 unique target firms. We further rely on SDC to collect additional information 
about the deals, such as announcement and completion dates, the proportion of shares 
acquired for each deal, the proportion of shares held by the acquirer after the deal, the 
nation of the acquirer, and the nation and primary SIC code of the target. This sample is 
restricted to government investments in publicly traded firms, so that we can obtain 
audited accounting data for the investment targets.  
We use the SDC New Issues database to identify target firms based on CUSIP 
identifiers with publicly traded “plain vanilla” bonds outstanding over the period 1990-
2010.
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 Following Borisova and Megginson (2011), we only use straight bonds with 
fixed coupons as the spreads of debt securities with additional features are more 
sensitive to sovereign bond yield fluctuations (Duffee, 1998). Based on the 1,953 
unique CUSIPs from our government investment sample, SDC returns 7,804 straight 
bonds from 388 issuers. The retrieval of bond spread and rating data requires bond 
ISINs, and SDC provides ISINs for 2,977 bonds. Of the remaining bonds without 
identifiers, we record ISINs for 945 additional securities manually found in Datastream, 
yielding a combined total of 3,922 bonds.   
Data for these bonds are obtained from Datastream. We retrieve interpolated 
spreads relative to a currency-matched benchmark of government bonds, as defined by 
Datastream. We also use this database to retrieve time-varying Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) ratings for the bond issues. Bond yield data and historical credit ratings are 
                                               
64 Our bond data period begins in 1990 since bond credit spreads are generally unavailable before this 
time. We recognize government investments starting in 1980 as these data are available and allow us to 
find a greater sample of firms where the state is present and for which we can subsequently find bond 
data. 
109 
recorded as of the Wednesday closer to November 15 of each year (i.e., the third 
Wednesday of each November). We use data as of Wednesday to avoid end-of-week or 
beginning-of-week distortions in market data. For similar reasons, we use a target date 
of November 15 to avoid end-of-year effects. We retrieve 10,124 bond-year spreads for 
our sample, and 6,854 of these (from 1,554 bonds and 278 firms) are found with 
accompanying yearly S&P ratings. To eliminate outliers in the credit spread data, we 
truncate the top and bottom 1% of spreads. It is worth noting that our use of a 
November sampling point means that spread observations for 2008 are all after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 14, and thus after the 2008 financial crisis 
truly began. 
Crucial to our analysis are accurate, time-varying values of government 
ownership, both in the aggregate and for various categories of state investing entities. 
Therefore, we further augment our dataset by using numerous sources to verify and 
track government ownership over time in the target assets. For each of our 215 target 
firms, we manually collect ownership for each year between 1990 and 2010. SDC 
provides the starting point for this collection via the investments that form our sample, 
as well as sales by the same acquirer-target pair in order to capture decreases in stakes. 
We then locate our sample firms in the Thomson ONE Banker ownership module, track 
holdings of all institutional shareholders across our sample period as of the end of the 
calendar year, and classify each reported shareholder into various government investing 
categories (or as non-government investors). When not available in this database, 
ownership amounts and investor identifications are found using company annual 
reports, filings, and business descriptions. These data are provided by Thomson ONE 
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Banker; entities’ websites, press releases, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR); the Canadian 
Securities Administrators’ System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval 
(SEDAR), Privatization Barometer, the World Bank privatization database, and Lexis-
Nexis. 
To perform our analysis, historical accounting data for the bond-issuing firm are 
also required. We search for relevant financial data using Worldscope and are able to 
collect necessary measures for a final dataset of 215 firms. These firms are targets of 
289 government purchases, and have 1,279 sample bonds outstanding that meet our 
selection criteria, thus yielding 5,126 bond-year observations. 
 
2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
We provide a first insight into the composition of our sample by analyzing the 
government investment transactions included in the final dataset. The sample includes a 
total of 289 government purchase transactions, valued at USD 334 billion. Core 
descriptive information is presented in multiple panels in Table 20. Panel A breaks 
down government investments by year of announcement. Approximately half of our 
sample (55% by transaction value, for a total of USD 188 billion) spans the crisis years 
2008-2010, allowing for a comparison between the recent financial crisis and previous 
years. 
Panel B details government investments by stake ownership. Investments worth 
USD 175 billion, 52% of our sample by deal value, involve non-controlling ownership 
(less than 50%). Investments worth USD 109 billion, 33% of our sample, involve 
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controlling, but not full, ownership. Finally, investments for USD 51 billion, 15% of our 
sample, involve full government ownership.   
Panel C describes the country of origin of the acquiring government. 30% of our 
sample by deal value (USD 99 billion), but only about 4% by the number of 
transactions, originates from the United Kingdom. The list of governments leading in 
total value of acquisitions includes Singapore (11%), the United Arab Emirates (9%), 
the Russian Federation (7%), Germany (7%), and the Netherlands (6%). 
Panel D describes the transaction sample in terms of country of incorporation of 
the target. The top nation is again the United Kingdom, with 36% of all deal value 
(USD 120 billion), likely due to the British government rescuing the domestic financial 
industry during the recent crisis. The other top target nations by total value are the 
United States (13% of the sample), Germany (8%), the Russian Federation (7%), and 
the Netherlands (6%).  
Panel E describes our sample in term of target industry. Target firms are 
classified according to one-digit US SIC codes. The leading target industry is SIC code 
6, ‘Finance, Insurance and Real Estate’, comprising 98 deals worth USD 174 billion 
(52% of the sample, by deal value). The utility sector, SIC code 4, ‘Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services,’ attracts the second largest 
number (86) and value (USD 97 billion) of state investments. No other industrial sector 
attracts more than seven percent of total investment.  
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2.2. Variables 
Our main analysis is based on panel regressions, with yield spreads as response 
variables and proxies for the cost of debt. The variables used in this analysis are 
described in Table 21.  
 Descriptive statistics relevant to the main variables are included in Table 22. 
The presence and level of government investment in target firms serve as our primary 
explanatory factors of interest. Govt presence is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if 
there is any government ownership in the firm during a specific calendar year, and 0 
otherwise; we also collect levels of state ownership represented as a percentage of a 
firm’s shares. As presented in Table 22, out of a total of 5,126 bond-years, 3,148 (61%) 
involve the presence of government. Mean government ownership is 13.67% for the 
overall sample and 22.26% for the sample of bond-years in which government is 
present as a shareholder.  
We account for foreign governments investing in our target firms, as this type of 
state ownership could yield different effects on the cost of debt of target firms. Foreign 
government ownership consists of 1,358 observations (bond-years), which is 26% of the 
overall sample and 43% of the sample with state ownership. Also, because the recent 
financial crisis has spurred large waves of government intervention, we also include a 
financial crisis indicator taking a value of one when credit spreads are measured in the 
period 2008-2010 and find that 1,834 of the observations (36% of the overall sample) 
span the financial crisis period. 
To further explore how government involvement can affect debt pricing, we 
disaggregate state ownership into different investing entities. Specifically, government 
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owners are split into seven categories, identified by the following variables: Central 
govt, consisting of the national government and its treasuries and ministries (comprising 
581 bond-year observations and 18% of the sample with government ownership); Govt 
financial institution, comprised of central banks, government development banks, and 
other state financial institutions (212 observations; 7% of the state ownership sample); 
Local/regional govt, a state owner representing a state, city, or region (77 observations; 
2% of the state ownership sample); Pension fund, a government-run pension fund (784 
observations; 25% of the state ownership sample); Mixed SOE, a partially government-
controlled enterprise that has some non-government ownership (1,649 observations; 
53% of the state ownership sample); Full SOE, state-owned enterprises (913 
observations; 29% of the state ownership sample); and SWF, sovereign wealth funds 
(897 observations; 28% of the state ownership sample).    
As a first control variable, we include S&P credit ratings obtained from 
Datastream. We form an ordinal scale with the best credit quality assigned the highest 
number, and we use the natural logarithm of credit rating to account for possible 
nonlinearity. The expected sign of the coefficient on the credit rating is negative – the 
higher the credit rating, the lower the spread. The median credit rating in our sample 
corresponds to an S&P rating of “A-”.  
The number of days to maturity is also included in our models, with an expected 
positive coefficient due to more uncertainty over the lifetime of the bond. Average time 
to maturity in our sample is about 2800 days, or about 7.7 years. We also control for the 
bond’s age, defined as the number of days between the issue date and the date on which 
the spread was collected; average bond age in our sample is 1644 days, or 
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approximately 4.5 years. Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst (2005) document the age of 
the bond as one of the most important determinants of bond market liquidity. We expect 
a negative relation between bond age and credit spreads, as in Borisova and Megginson 
(2011), since as the bond’s maturity date approaches there is less uncertainty associated 
with its coupon and par value payments.  
Banks and other financial institutions are often treated separately in empirical 
analysis, as their capital structures are typically different from those of other firms and 
because they generally enjoy higher levels of government support in case of distress. 
We accordingly define an indicator variable identifying banking firms based on the 
firm’s industry classification, name, and business description, and we expect this 
variable to be negatively associated with firms’ cost of debt. Over one-fourth of all 
target firm observations (1,300 of 5,126 total firm-years observations) are for 
investments in commercial banks.   
We further include controls for firm leverage (computed as total assets minus 
equity, divided by equity) to serve as a proxy for the probability of default. Including 
firm leverage as a control variable also allows us to account for the impact of 
deleveraging associated with capital injections. We expect firms with higher leverage to 
have a higher cost of debt, as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and 
Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005).  We also include the market-to-book ratio 
(with an average of 1.86) and size (proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets, with 
a mean of 10.96), as both have been shown by Fama and French (1993) to explain 
variation in bond returns. Larger firms are generally considered safer, at least partially 
due to increased asset diversification; hence, we expect a negative relationship between 
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firm size and cost of debt. Market-to-book is generally viewed as a proxy for the growth 
prospects of the company, so we expect higher growth opportunities to be associated 
with more ease of debt repayment, and, hence, a lower cost of debt. Finally, we include 
return-on-equity (with a mean of 7.47%), which Crabbe and Fabozzi (2001) document 
being associated with ease of debt repayment. Accordingly, we expect return-on-equity 
to be negatively associated with the cost of debt. Further, we obtain collateral and 
instrument types from Bloomberg, as those could also have an impact on bond pricing. 
We consider twenty-six different types of collateral and instrument types. 
Our sample also includes transactions related to government bailouts, and we 
account for these rescues in an attempt to isolate their effect on bond spreads. Bailouts 
are identified using SDC deal synopses, as well as reports from the press and company 
financial statements. We identify 479 bond observations (9% of our sample) from 27 
firms related to bailouts for the full sample, with the bulk of these occurring during the 
2008-2010 period (472 bond-years of 26 firms). We exclude these observations 
whenever performing regression analysis for the crisis period or employing a financial 
crisis binary variable.   
 
2.3. Mean Differences Tests 
Before presenting our main, panel-based analysis, we offer a first look at the 
data though tests for differences in means presented in Table 23. In our analysis, we 
compute mean spreads for various bond-year data subsets: with and without 
government ownership, distinguishing between domestic and foreign government 
ownership, for the crisis and non-crisis sub-periods, and isolating issuers that belong to 
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the banking sector. Given that each firm in our sample can have multiple bond 
observations, the distribution of spreads is possibly clustered at the firm level. As 
discussed by Peterson (2009), clustering of observations can lead to problems in the 
estimation of standard errors. Accordingly, we employ a standard error estimation 
methodology adjusted for clustering (at the firm level) as described by Skinner, Holt 
and Smith (1989). We then employ the clustered standard-error estimates to compute 
two-sample t-test for mean differences between data subsets.  
 For the earlier years of the sample period (1990-2007), bond spreads of firms 
with government ownership are significantly higher than those without government 
ownership (167 bp vs. 146 bp). However, during the 2008-2010 financial crisis we find 
significantly lower spreads in bond-years with government presence (with a mean 
spread of 311 bp) than in those without government presence (396 bp).
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  We interpret 
these univariate results as indicative of the importance of the implicit government 
guarantee during times of financial distress.   
We also compare government ownership by the relation of the investing 
government to its target firm. Firms are grouped based on whether the majority of their 
government ownership is held by a domestic state entity or a foreign one. Firms with a 
majority of domestic government ownership have a lower mean spread (147 bp) than 
firms with a majority of foreign government ownership (270 bp) over the period 1990-
2007. But, during the 2008-2010 crisis, firms with domestic government ownership 
have a cost of debt (314 bp) not statistically different from those with foreign 
government ownership (307 bp).  
                                               
65 Here and in the remainder of the paper, discussed results are statistically significant at the 10% level or 
lower, unless otherwise indicated.  
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Our last set of reported univariate results indicates that banking firms have 
significantly lower average bond spreads than non-banking firms when government 
owners are present. However, for the subsample without state ownership, we find that a 
significant difference does exist in the pre-crisis years but disappears during the crisis 
years of 2008-2010, indicating the relatively greater importance of state guarantees for 
banks in this period. Governments likely recognize the importance of backing troubled 
financial institutions: 65% of our bank observations are from bailed-out firms, 
compared to only 7% of our non-bank observations. 
The univariate analysis suggests that government ownership, while generally 
associated with a higher cost of debt, leads to a reduction in cost of debt during times of 
economic distress. These results are consistent with the increased value of an implicit 
government debt guarantee when default is, unconditionally, more likely. Such an effect 
appears to be most important for banking firms during a period of financial crisis. Our 
panel regressions in the next section allow us to further examine the association 
between government ownership and debt pricing and to clarify which state entities 
could have the strongest effect on the cost of debt.   
 
3. Panel Regressions 
3.1. Methodology 
We employ regression analysis to test the effect of government ownership on a 
target company’s cost of debt, measured by its bonds’ credit spreads. To control for 
heteroskedasticity and account for time-series dependence, firm-clustered standard 
errors are also employed, as suggested by Petersen (2009). Year fixed effects are also 
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used in all regressions. Similar to Borisova and Megginson (2011), the preliminary 
model is as follows: 
yit = ς + βXit + γrit + vt + εit, 
where yit represents the credit spread, ς is an intercept term, β is a set of coefficients, 
and Xit is a matrix of explanatory variables. γ is a scalar coefficient, rit is the credit 
rating, vt  (t = 1...20) represents the yearly fixed effects, and εit is a classical error term. 
The indices i and t refer, respectively, to bonds and years. 
The explanatory variables include control factors, as described in Section 2.2, 
and variables of interest related to government ownership. Depending on the specific 
model being tested, we employ either binary variables identifying bond-years with 
government shareholders or continuous variables measuring the size of the stake owned 
by the government, expressed as a percentage. In additional specifications, we identify 
the presence or stake owned by specific categories of government shareholders. Further, 
to allow for the different impact of government ownership on the cost of debt during 
times of distress, we add interactions between the government-ownership variables and 
metrics of economy or firm distress. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we evaluate the 
cost of debt for the same firm in years with and without government ownership and we 
also lag government ownership values (e.g., December 2006 ownership is matched with 
bond spreads in November 2007), as in Borisova, Brockman, Salas, and Zagorchev 
(2012). 
All models in the analysis use an orthogonalized value of credit rating to control 
for the impact of other independent variables on its assigned value. Liu and Thakor 
(1984) present a detailed discussion of the residual transformation procedure, and more 
(1) 
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recently, other works have also used it for the credit rating of bonds (Datta, Iskandar-
Datta, and Patel, 1999; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005; Borisova and Megginson, 
2011). 
 
3.2.  Government Ownership and Cost of Debt by Investor Categories 
We apply the model described in the previous section and present results 
regarding the effect of government ownership on the cost of debt in Table 24. In Panel 
A, our main explanatory variable of interest, government ownership, is expressed as a 
binary variable, equal to 1 in the year of interest, if the bond is issued by a firm for 
which at least one shareholder is a government or government-owned entity. In Panel B, 
the explanatory variable of interest is the size of the firms’ stake held by all 
government-owned shareholders during the year of interest. In Model 1, we consider 
overall government ownership, which is broken down by government acquirer type in 
the models to follow: sovereign wealth funds (SWF) in Model 2; central government in 
Model 3; local and regional government in Model 4; full state owned enterprises (full 
SOE) in Model 5; mixed state owned enterprise (mixed SOE) in Model 6; government 
owned pension funds in Model 7 and government financial institutions in Model 8.  
We evaluate the data over the full 1990-2010 period and add a variable 
identifying the 2008-2010 financial crisis period and interactions between the Financial 
Crisis binary variable and the government ownership metrics. By focusing on the years 
2008-2010, during which most worldwide markets were affected by a global financial 
crisis, we make use of this exogenous shock to firms, allowing us to measure the 
differential impact of government ownership with limited concerns of reverse causality.  
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The results in Table 24, Panel A indicate that the presence of government 
ownership is associated with a higher cost of debt, with a spread increase of 
approximately 52 bp during non-crisis years. But during the recent financial crisis, the 
presence of government ownership is associated with a decrease in the cost of debt of 
approximately 24 bp. This means that government ownership is associated with a 52 bp 
increase in the cost of debt, but the interaction between the financial crisis and 
government presence leads to a decrease in the cost of debt equal to 76 bp; the full 
impact is given by the sum of the estimated coefficients. In Models 2 to 8, we observe 
that the increase in the cost of debt during the non-crisis years is due to government 
financial institutions (with an increase in spread equal to 132 bp), local/regional 
governments (87 bp), pension funds (71 bp), and mixed SOEs (39 bp), in order of 
magnitude. On the other side, the lower cost of debt during the financial crisis is driven 
by mixed SOEs and local/regional governments, each associated with a discount of 
approximately 48 bp.  
The Table 24, Panel B results show that the stake of government ownership does 
not appear to impact the cost of debt in a statistically significant manner prior to the 
2008 crisis, but each percentage point of government ownership is related to 1 bp 
decrease in the cost of debt during the financial crisis. When disaggregating results by 
government investor types, we find that shareholding amounts by SWFs or other 
government-owned financial institutions are associated with an increase in the cost of 
debt, while the discount during the financial crisis is mostly due to holdings of central 
governments and mixed SOEs. This is consistent with the “investor” nature of SWF and 
financial institutions and “protector” nature of the central government and some of its 
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most efficient SOEs.
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 Government financial institutions, pension funds, and SWFs, in 
particular, are typically motivated by economic goals for their investments. Central 
governments, on the other hand, pursue economy-wide stabilization goals, especially 
during the crisis times.  
Overall, our first set of results is consistent with the idea that government 
shareholding increases the cost of debt during regular, non-crisis years but decreases the 
cost of debt of portfolio holdings during the recent financial crisis. We find this 
decreasing effect most strikingly when considering the overall presence of state 
ownership, as well as when looking at the existence of local government and mixed 
SOE ownership. This result is largely consistent with governments introducing 
inefficiencies and the pernicious effects of moral hazard but offering, at the same time, 
implicit debt guarantees that become extremely valuable during times of distress. To 
further investigate the plausibility of those implicit debt guarantees, we investigate 
distinctions between domestic and foreign government ownership in the following 
section.  
 
3.3. Domestic versus Foreign Government Ownership 
We hypothesize that domestic and foreign government investments are 
motivated by different sets of priorities. Our expectation is that the desire to maintain 
high levels of employment and political concerns about market failures are likely to 
strengthen the implicit debt guarantees offered by government shareholders on their 
                                               
66 Dinc and Gupta (2011) show that profitable firms are likely to be privatized early.  The mixed SOE 
firms have the benefit of not only being more profitable and efficient prior to the time when a part of the 
ownership is allocated to private investors, but also later on due to the higher efficiency of partially 
private ownership. 
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domestic portfolio holdings. We also expect a weaker implicit debt guarantee to be 
provided by foreign government ownership since government influence in foreign 
markets is likely to be weaker. Additionally, investments by foreign governments are 
more likely to be commercially-oriented (motivated by profit seeking) and thus are less 
likely to involve the creation of implicit debt guarantees. Accordingly, we expect the 
previously-documented results to appear stronger for the subsets of domestic and 
foreign government ownership. We expect the domestic implicit government guarantee, 
as opposed to the foreign one, to play a larger and more positive role in influencing the 
cost of debt of their targets, especially during the financial crisis.  
 Results for the effect of domestic versus foreign government ownership on the 
cost of debt are presented in Table 25. Our main explanatory variable of interest, 
government ownership, is expressed as presence (binary variable) in Panel A and as a 
stake (percentage) in Panel B. In Model 1, we present results for domestic government 
ownership over the full 1990-2010 period; in Model 2, for foreign government 
ownership over 1990-2010; in Model 3, for domestic government ownership over 1990-
2007; in Model 4, for foreign government ownership over 1990-2007; in Model 5, for 
domestic government ownership over 2008-2010; and in Model 6, for foreign 
government ownership over 2008-2010.  
 Table 25, Panel A reveals that the presence of a domestic government 
shareholder significantly decreases in the cost of debt of its portfolio-holdings by 
approximately 56 bp during the recent financial crisis. No similar pattern is associated 
with foreign government presence, as the latter is always associated with a statistically 
insignificant increase in the cost of debt. During the non-crisis period neither foreign 
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nor domestic government ownership has a statistically significant impact on the cost of 
debt of portfolio-holdings. 
 Table 25, Panel B reveals similar results. A larger stake owned by a domestic 
government shareholder is associated with a lower the cost of debt, but the effect is 
statistically significant only during the recent financial crisis. The result is, however, 
economically important, as the cost of debt tends to decrease by 1 bp for every 
percentage point of domestic government ownership. On the other hand, a stake owned 
by a foreign government is positively associated with the cost of debt, but the effect is 
statistically significant only during the non-crisis years. The effect is, again, 
economically significant, with the cost of debt increasing by 1.25 bp for every 
percentage point in foreign government ownership.  
 Overall, the distinction between domestic and foreign government ownership 
and between crisis and non-crisis years reveals that the impact of government 
ownership on the cost of debt can vary, and that a pooled analysis risks obfuscating 
important nuances. In particular, our more detailed analysis indicates that domestic 
government ownership decreases the cost of debt of firms during crisis years, while 
foreign government ownership increases the cost of debt during non-crisis years. These 
results are, once more, consistent with the view that government ownership influences 
firm behavior through multiple channels, whose relative importance and net effect 
depend on environmental factors. Times of distress reveal the dominance of an implicit 
debt guarantee, especially valuable when default is more likely and stronger when the 
investor is a domestic government. Conversely, ownership by a foreign government 
entity creates a distortion of incentives (and possibly a monitoring gap as described by 
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Bortolotti, Fotak and Megginson, 2010) that proves particularly deleterious in non-crisis 
years.  
 
3.4.  Distressed Firms  
We further investigate the influence of government ownership on the cost of 
debt when firms are in financial distress. Noting that the value of debt guarantees is 
likely to increase as default becomes more likely, we have focused on testing whether 
government ownership affects the cost of debt differently during a financial crisis in 
section 3.2. Although an exogenous shock such as a financial crisis allows us to limit 
concerns of reverse causality, it also presents a different set of challenges – during such 
an encompassing crisis, firm distress is often accompanied by a reduction in the supply 
of credit. Hence, a reduced cost of debt associated with government ownership could be 
because government shareholders ease access to capital markets, rather than because 
government shareholders are providing a debt guarantee. To check for such debt-supply 
effects, we further analyze the impact of government shareholding on the cost of debt 
around firm-years of firm-specific distress, during which we have no reason to suspect a 
systemic debt-supply shock. Accordingly, to identify a sample for which distress is 
more likely, we focus on firms that issue non-investment-grade bonds.  
Moreover, we investigate whether the influence of government ownership on the 
cost of debt of distressed firms differs during the economy-wide financial crisis and 
according to whether the government is foreign or domestic. Therefore, besides 
analyzing the influence of government ownership on the cost of debt of firms that are in 
distress over our full 1990-2010 period, we also examine that influence for the 2008-
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2010 financial crisis period and the pre-crisis period of 1990-2007.  This allows us to 
evaluate whether the implicit government guarantee influences the cost of capital for 
distressed firms in general and also during economy-wide distress. Finally, we also 
break down government owners of firms that issue junk bonds into foreign and 
domestic entities.   
Results for the effect of government ownership on the cost of debt of firms that 
issue non-investment-grade bonds are presented in Table 26. Our main explanatory 
variable of interest – government ownership – is expressed as presence (binary variable) 
in Panel A and as a stake (percentage) in Panel B. In Model 1, we present results for 
domestic government ownership over the full 1990-2010 period; in Model 2, for foreign 
government ownership over 1990-2010; in Model 3, for domestic government 
ownership over 1990-2007; in Model 4, for foreign government ownership over 1990-
2007; in Model 5 for domestic government ownership over 2008-2010 and in Model 6 
for foreign government ownership over 2008-2010.   
Table 26, Panel A shows that the cost of debt is a function of the presence of 
domestic government ownership for the overall 1990-2010 period and also for the 2008-
2010 crisis period. Domestic government presence lowers the cost of debt by 
approximately 73 bp over the overall 1990-2010 time period and even more so, by 
approximately 133 bp, over the 2008-2010 crisis period. On the other hand, the cost of 
debt is positively and significantly associated with the presence of the foreign 
government ownership in all models. The presence of foreign government ownership in 
firms that issue non-investment-grade bonds is associated with an approximately 143 bp 
increase in the cost of debt during the overall 1990-2010 period and during the 2008 
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financial crisis. Furthermore, foreign government ownership is associated with even 
higher spreads during the ‘pre-crisis’ period, as compared to the crisis period.  Spreads 
for firms with non-investment-grade bonds that have foreign government ownership are 
about 210 bp higher during the 1990-2007 period. 
Table 26, Panel B results echo those of Panel A as domestic government stake 
ownership is associated with a lower cost of debt for firms with non-investment-grade 
bonds during the 2008 crisis. Results imply that a 1 percentage point increase in 
domestic government ownership leads to about a 7 bp reduction in the cost of debt for 
firms with non-investment-grade bonds during the crisis and to about a 2 bp reduction 
over the whole 1990-2010 period. Panel B also shows that foreign government 
ownership increases the cost of debt for firms that issue non-investment-grade bonds, 
but the significant relation is present only for the pre-crisis 1990-2007 period. 
Nevertheless, while foreign government presence leads to a significantly higher cost of 
debt for non-investment-grade bond issuers overall, the stake that a foreign government 
owns matters as well prior to the onset of the crisis. Further, the increase in the cost of 
debt is economically significant – a 1 percentage point increase in foreign government 
ownership leads to about a 4 bp increase in the cost of debt of non-investment-grade 
bond issuers over the 1990-2007 period. 
Overall, the results in Table 26 for non-investment-grade bond issuers support 
our results in Table 26 for all firms and are even stronger in showing the distinct 
influence of foreign and domestic government ownership, especially during the 
financial crisis. The domestic government’s implicit guarantee matters for distressed 
firms (that issue non-investment-grade bonds) and is significantly associated with a 
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lower cost of debt over the full 1990-2007 period and over the 2008-2010 financial 
crisis.  On the other hand, foreign government ownership is associated with a higher 
cost of debt for firms with j non-investment-grade bonds, especially in the pre-crisis 
1990-2007 period. Our interpretation of these results is that the implicit government 
guarantee is important for the cost of capital during a variety of distress periods—
whether economy-wide or firm-specific. Also, this implicit government guarantee is 
provided mainly by the domestic, rather than foreign, government ownership of 
distressed firms, which is also similar to the results for the full sample in section 3.3.  
 
4. Robustness and Extensions 
4.1. Alternative Model Specifications 
In this section we carry out checks of the robustness of our results to alternative 
specifications.  We check for the influence of government ownership on the cost of debt 
using an alternative economy-wide distress specification. We also group all categories 
of government acquirers into one regression and analyze the results over three periods – 
the full 1990-2010 period, the pre-crisis period of 1990-2007, and the financial crisis 
period of 2008-2010. These alternative models are presented in Table 27. In Model 1 
we present the results for the influence of the presence of government ownership on the 
cost of debt during various banking crises for the full 1990-2010. Model 2 examines 
debt pricing for highly-levered firms that have strong direct government ownership. 
Models 3-8 evaluate the simultaneous impact of different government investor type 
categories on the cost of debt.  Our main explanatory variable of interest, government 
ownership by different acquirer types, is expressed as presence (dummy) in Models 3, 
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5, and 7 and as a stake (percentage) in Models 4, 6, and 8. Results are also presented for 
three time periods: the full 1990-2010 period in Models 3 and 4; the 1990-2007 period 
in Models 5 and 6; the financial crisis 2008-2010 period in Models 7 and 8.   
In Table 27, Model 1 we adopt a broader definition of the “crisis” by focusing 
on a wide sample of banking crises identified by Laeven and Valencia (2010) and show 
that our results still hold.
67
 In this analysis, we find that government shareholding is 
associated with an increase in the cost of debt of 39 bp in non-banking-crisis years. 
During a banking crisis, the cost of debt of non-government owned firms in our sample 
increases by 68 bp, but the estimated coefficient associated with the interaction between 
government ownership and banking crises indicates that the increase in the cost of debt 
for government-owned firms during a banking crisis is much lower (below 14 bp). 
Accordingly, during a banking crisis the cost of debt of government-owned firms is 
about 15 bp lower. This robustness test confirms our general findings that government 
ownership is associated with a higher cost of debt during normal economic periods, but 
with a lower cost of debt during periods of distress, consistent with the creation of 
implicit debt guarantees. 
As a robustness check for our distressed firm models in section 3.4, Model 2 of 
Table 27 features an interaction between firm leverage and the existence of a strong 
government presence, proxied by shareholdings by central governments, during the 
1990-2007 pre-crisis period. Although we show previously that central government 
                                               
67 We thank Luc Laeven for making a dataset identifying banking crises available at 
http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm. The authors identify banking crises based on two conditions: “(1) 
Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses 
in the banking system, and bank liquidations); and (2) Significant banking policy intervention measures 
in response to significant losses in the banking system” (Laeven and Valencia, 2010). The dataset lists 
country-years in which banking crises occur across the world from 1970 to 2009. 
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presence can help lower the cost of debt during the crisis, it could also aid highly-
levered firms facing debt problems that are more firm-specific than macroeconomic. 
Model 2 shows no significant link between central government ownership and debt 
pricing for the full sample of firms but also displays that the cost of debt drops for more 
highly-levered firms with national government ownership. This result complies with our 
earlier analysis of junk-bond issuers by showing how government guarantees are more 
valuable to firms facing distress.  
In Table 27, Models 3-8 group the ownership from different government entities 
into one regression, and our results are similar to those of Table 24. These models allow 
us to compare firm-years with ownership of each government entity to non-government 
owned firm-years, while controlling for the effects of other government owners. We 
document that during the 2008-2010 crisis the cost of debt is a significant negative 
function of government ownership by central governments and mixed SOEs. Models 7 
and 8 show that during the crisis the reduction in the cost of debt for firms with 
ownership by central governments is 75 bp, and a 1 percentage point increase in central 
government ownership is associated with a 1.2 bp reduction. Also, mixed SOE 
ownership is associated with a 90 bp reduction in the cost of debt of the targets, where a 
1 percentage point increase in mixed SOE ownership leads to a 2.23 bp reduction in the 
cost of debt. Finally, outside of the crisis and during the overall 1990-2010 period, the 
cost of debt is significantly and positively linked to government ownership by 
government financial institutions and SWFs. 
Models 7 and 8 also comply with the pattern noted in Table 24, where the 
implicit government guarantee is the strongest during the crisis for the types of 
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government acquirers that have a “protector” function, rather than an “investor” 
function. Lower cost of debt for firms during the 2008 crisis is associated with central 
government ownership, as well as full and mixed SOE ownership, while the higher cost 
of debt during this period is associated with the government “investor” group—
government financial institutions and pension funds. These results on the influence of 
different types of government investors according to their “protector” or “investor” 
functions support the notion that different state actors operate with diverse objectives. 
Further investigation along these lines could provide more insight into the channels 
through which government entities affect the cost of debt. 
 
4.2. Two-Stage Selection Models 
As a more formal method of accounting for endogeneity, Heckman treatment 
effect models are also used (Heckman, 1979). In these two-stage models, an initial 
selection equation is fit using a probit model describing the characteristics associated 
with firm-years where government ownership is present. The probit model includes 
firm-specific variables present in the second-stage outcome equation, as well as 
variables that predict the presence of government ownership and are exogenous to the 
credit spread outcome we intend to model. Results from the selection equation are 
presented in Table 28 and are used to calculate a selectivity correction – the inverse 
Mills Ratio (Lambda) – included in our credit spread models to account for unobserved 
factors related to the government's presence in a firm and potentially to the cost of debt. 
Second-stage results are presented in Table 29.  
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The results presented in Table 29 indicate that our main findings are robust to 
the inclusion of controls for sample selection bias. While overall government ownership 
is associated with a higher cost of debt, government ownership is associated with a 
lower cost of debt during financial or banking crises. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 Our research examines how government ownership affects firms’ cost of debt. 
As documented by Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) and Brown and Dinç 
(2005), governments are generally reluctant to allow state-owned firms to default. 
Accordingly, government ownership might provide an implicit debt guarantee reducing 
the chance of default and, hence, the cost of corporate debt. On the other hand, the 
implicit debt guarantee might induce moral hazard for managers, by reducing the 
probability of disciplinary replacement, by eliminating takeover threats, and by 
minimizing the risk of bankruptcy. Such an increase in moral hazard is thus likely to 
lead to higher risk taking and, thus, to a higher cost of debt. Also, government 
ownership could increase the cost of debt by imposing social and political goals that 
reduce corporate profitability and thus increase default risk. Given these two conflicting 
effects of government ownership on the cost of debt, we note that the resulting impact is 
a matter deserving empirical investigation.  
In panel regressions, we analyze yield spreads on a sample of 1,279 bonds 
issued by 215 publicly-traded firms subject to changes in government share ownership 
from 43 countries over 1990-2010. We note that a government guarantee on the debt of 
investment targets is likely to be more valuable during times of economic hardship as 
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defaults are, all else equal, more likely during recessions. Focusing on the recent 
financial crisis, we find that government ownership affects the cost of debt differently in 
crisis versus non-crisis years. During non-crisis years, firms with the government as a 
shareholder display an increase of 52 bp in bond spreads. On the other hand, during the 
recent financial crisis, government presence is associated with a 24 bp decrease in 
spreads. We find similar results when adopting a broader definition of “financial crisis” 
(from Laeven and Valencia, 2010) in robustness tests.  
Different government-owned entities vary in terms of objectives and modus 
operandi – and we conjecture these varying goals could differentially impact the cost of 
debt. When not isolating the recent crisis period, we find that the increase in cost of debt 
during the non-crisis years is generally due to ownership by government-owned 
financial institutions, SWFs and pension funds. On the other hand, firms with central, 
local, and SOE government ownership are mostly responsible for the decrease in the 
cost of debt during the crisis. We further find that large stakes owned by central 
governments and by mixed SOEs lead to lower cost of debt, while large stakes owned 
by SWFs and other government-owned financial institutions increase the cost of debt. 
Overall, our evidence is consistent with the idea that certain government investors act as 
protectors, favoring political goals (typically inconsistent with firm default) and 
providing the strongest implicit debt guarantees. On the other hand, the increase in the 
cost of debt is mostly specific to financial arms of the government, whose objectives are 
more similar to those of other institutional investors (i.e., often commercial) and, as 
such, do not lead to a similar implied debt guarantee.  
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We further note that implicit government guarantees are likely to be strongest 
for domestic targets. Correspondingly, we find that the implicit debt guarantee 
documented during the recent financial crisis is specific to domestic government 
presence. Conversely, foreign government ownership is associated with an increase in 
the cost of debt during the non-crisis years, equal to about 1 bp for each percentage 
point of stake owned.  
We finally note that the value of a debt guarantee is greater the higher the 
likelihood of default. Mindful of the distinction between the impact of domestic and 
foreign government ownership, we focus on a sample of non-investment-grade bonds 
and find domestic (foreign) government ownership during crisis (non-crisis) years to be 
associated with a lower (higher) cost of debt. The results are economically strong: for 
non-investment-grade bonds, domestic government presence leads to a discount of 72 
bp over the entire period and of 133 bp during the crisis years. Foreign government 
presence is associated with an increase in the cost of debt of 143 bp during the crisis 
and 209 bp in non-crisis years. 
On balance, these results suggest that stock ownership by domestic governments 
improves the perceived creditworthiness of corporate bond issuers by providing an 
implicit bond payment guarantee. This guarantee becomes especially valuable during a 
financial crisis or in the presence of firm-specific distress factors. On the other hand, 
during non-crisis years, government ownership is associated with higher spreads – and 
the result is mostly due to shareholding by foreign governments and by government-
owned financial institutions.  
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Table 1. Variable Definitions, Chapter 1 
Table 1 includes a list, definitions and sources of the main variables used in the analysis in Chapter 1. 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Government Presence     
Lender All Gov Binary variable, equal to one if one or more lenders are majority-owned, directly or 
indirectly, by a sovereign entity. 
DealScan, Monitor-FEEM SWF database, 
Bocconi Sovereign Investments Lab data, firm 
disclosures 
Lender Domestic Gov Binary variable, equal to one if one or more lenders are majority-owned, directly or 
indirectly, by a sovereign entity from the borrower's headquarters country. 
DealScan, Monitor-FEEM SWF database, 
Bocconi Sovereign Investments Lab data, firm 
disclosures 
Lender Foreign Gov Binary variable, equal to one if one or more lenders are majority-owned, directly or 
indirectly, by a sovereign entity not from the borrower's headquarters country. 
DealScan, Monitor-FEEM SWF database, 
Bocconi Sovereign Investments Lab data, firm 
disclosures 
Arranger 
(ALL/Domestic/Foreign) Gov 
Binary variable, equal to one, if the lead arranger of the loan is government owned. DealScan, Monitor-FEEM SWF database, 
Bocconi Sovereign Investments Lab data, firm 
disclosures 
Syn (ALL/Domestic/Foreign) 
Gov 
Binary variable, equal to one if one or more of the syndicate members (excluding the lead 
arranger) are government owned. 
DealScan, Monitor-FEEM SWF database, 
Bocconi Sovereign Investments Lab data, firm 
disclosures 
Sole Lender 
(ALL/Domestic/Foreign) Gov 
Binary variable, equal to one if the loan is provided by one lender and if that lender is 
majority owned, directly or indirectly, by a sovereign entity. 
DealScan, Monitor-FEEM SWF database, 
Bocconi Sovereign Investments Lab data, firm 
disclosures 
Share 
(ALL/Domestic/Foreign) Gov 
Proportion of the loan retained by lenders that are majority owned, directly or indirectly, 
by a sovereign entity, coded 1-100. 
DealScan 
Loan Characteristics     
Loan Size/Log Loan Size Total value of the loan, in 2011 USD (adjusted using CPI). DealScan 
Maturity Loan duration at inception, in months. DealScan 
Number of Lenders Number of lenders participating in a loan syndicate DealScan 
Spread The amount the borrower pays (in basis points) over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down, 
including bother the spread of the loan and any annual or facility fee paid. 
DealScan 
Securitized Binary variable, equal to one if the loan is securitized. DealScan 
Senior Binary variable, equal to one if the loan is senior. DealScan 
Covenant Binary variable, equal to one if the loan contract includes financial covenants. DealScan 
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Table 1 – Variable Definitions, Chapter 1, Continued 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Country Characteristics     
Size of the Government Index measuring the government role in the economy, coded on a 1-10 scale, where 
higher values indicate a weaker role.  
Economic Freedom of the World, index for 
'Size of Government: expenditures, Taxes, and 
Enterprises' (A1) 
Property Rights Index measuring the strength of the legal environment and the security of property rights, 
coded on a 1-10 scale, where higher values indicate stronger protection.  
Economic Freedom of the World, index for 
'Legal Structure and Security of Property 
Rights' (A2) 
Investment Profile An index measuring factors affecting the risk to investment, based on the subcomponents: 
'Contract Viability/Expropriation', 'Pofits Repatriation' and 'Payment Delays'.  
International Country Risk Guide 
GDP Growth Percentage change in gross domestic product, yearly.  World Bank 
Common Law Binary variable, equal to one if the country of borrower headquarters is of common law 
origin. 
La Porta et al. (2002) 
Crisis Binary variable, equal to one if the country of the borrower headquarters is undergoing a 
banking crisis in the year of loan initiation.  
Laeven and Valencia (2010) 
Borrower Characteristics     
Gov Borrower Binary variable, equal to one if the borrower is owned, or partially owned (min 5%) by a sovereign 
entity. 
DealScan, Monitor-FEEM SWF database, firm 
disclosures 
Previous Private Loan N The number of private-sector loans to the borrower over the previous five years. DealScan 
Previous Gov Loan N The number of government loans to the borrower over the previous five years. DealScan 
Financial Borrower Borrowers with primary SIC code 6000-6500. DealScan 
Regulated Borrower Borrowers with primary SIC code 4000-5000. DealScan 
Publicly Traded Borrower Binary variable, equal to one if the borrower is publicly traded. Worldscope 
TA/Log TA Total Assets, in 2011 USD (adjusted using CPI). Worldscope 
DTOA Debt to Assets. Worldscope 
ROA Return on Assets. Worldscope 
QR Quick Ratio: (Cash and Cash Equivalents+Marketable Securities+Accounts Receivable)/(Current 
Liabilities) 
Worldscope 
TQ Tobin's Q: (Market Value of Equity+Book Value of Debt)/(Book Value of Equity+Book Value of 
Debt) 
Worldscope 
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Table 2. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the main sample of loans. Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
Panel A includes binary variables. Count is the number of observations for which the binary variable is 
equal to one. Proportion of Total is the proportion of non-missing observations for which the binary 
variable is equal to one. Total Non-Missing Obs is the total number of loans with non-missing data for the 
variable of interest. Panel B includes all other variables, for which it reports mean, 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 
99th percentiles, standard deviation, and total number of observations.  
 
Panel A – Binary Variables 
Variable Count 
Proportion 
of Total 
Total Non-
Missing Obs 
        
Government Presence       
Lender All Gov 10,560 7.11% 148,511 
Lender Domestic Gov 4,819 3.24% 148,511 
Lender Foreign Gov 6,455 4.35% 148,511 
Arranger Gov 3,572 2.41% 148,511 
Arranger Domestic Gov 2,248 1.51% 148,511 
Arranger Foreign Gov 1,468 0.99% 148,511 
Syn Gov 6,375 4.29% 148,511 
Syn Domestic Gov 2,413 1.62% 148,511 
Syn Foreign Gov 4,532 3.05% 148,511 
Single lender Gov 613 0.41% 148,300 
Single lender Domestic Gov 158 0.11% 148,300 
Single lender Foreign Gov 455 0.31% 148,300 
        
Loan       
Single lender 13,839 9.33% 148,300 
Collateralized 13,029 8.77% 148,511 
Covenant 27,185 18.31% 148,511 
Senior 146,924 98.93% 148,510 
        
Borrower       
Foreign Lender 87,165 58.69% 148,511 
Financial Borrower 11,700 8.37% 139,799 
Regulate Borrower 21,894 15.66% 139,799 
Gov Borrower 3,254 2.19% 148,511 
Publicly Traded Borrower 37,421 25.20% 148,511 
        
Country       
Crisis 18,628 12.54% 148,511 
Common Law 103,102 71.37% 144,467 
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Panel B – Continuous Variables 
Variable Mean Std Dev 1st Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 99th Pctl N 
Share Gov Lender 1.02% 0.08 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 30.00% 143,022 
Share Domestic Gov Lender 0.50% 0.05 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 13.33% 146,298 
Share Foreign Gov Lender 0.50% 0.06 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.33% 144,801 
                  
Government Size (1-10) 6.56 0.97 3.15 6.18 6.88 7.13 9.11 147,369 
Property Rights (1-10) 7.83 1.07 3.90 7.51 7.90 8.66 9.23 147,369 
Investment Profile (1-12) 10.25 2.02 5.75 9.00 11.50 11.75 12.00 147,591 
Maturity (months) 53.38 82.70 5.00 24.00 54.00 66.00 205.00 137,081 
Loan Size (USD) 282,230,387 848,304,310 54,224 17,315,193 74,723,240 237,068,928 3,273,263,161 148,200 
Previous Gov Loan N 0.13 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 148,506 
Previous Private Loan N 1.74 2.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 13.00 148,506 
GDP Growth 2.95% 0.03 -6.29% 1.93% 2.87% 4.15% 11.30% 148,156 
                  
TA 9,709,326 42,126,635 19,358 403,472 1,405,455 5,085,716 135,273,981 37,421 
DtoA 0.66 0.52 0.13 0.50 0.64 0.78 1.55 37,086 
QR 1.86 22.72 0.09 0.59 0.89 1.31 22.35 32,414 
ROA 4.19% 68.28% -44.12% 1.42% 4.59% 7.91% 27.52% 35,078 
TQ 1.65 24.51 0.30 0.88 1.16 1.58 6.15 35,551 
Spread (bps) 210.86 152.72 15.00 90.00 200.00 300.00 750.00 100,056 
Number of Lenders 6.96 7.55 1.00 2.00 4.00 9.00 36.00 148,511 
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Table 3. Univariate Analysis of Loans by State-Owned Lenders 
Table 3 reports means of the listed variables, defined as in Table 1. The overall sample (148,511 loans) is divided into subsets: the first column includes all loans 
not involving government lenders (137,951 loans), the second all loans involving government lenders (10,560 loans), the third all loans involving domestic 
government lender (4,819 loans) and the fourth fall loans involving foreign government lenders (6,455 loans). Reported p-values (in gray, italicized) for binary 
variables are based on Pearson’s Chi-Square tests for differences in frequencies between each of the government subsets and the set of loans with no government 
presence; standard errors are clustered at the loan package level. Reported p-values for non-binary variables are based on two-sample t-tests for differences in 
means; standard errors are clustered at the loan package level and levels of significance are two-sided.   
    No Gov All Gov Domestic Gov Foreign Gov 
Loan Characteristics               
  Spread 213.55 138.28 <0.0001 127.47 <0.0001 142.81 <0.0001 
  Number of Lenders 6.40 12.86 <0.0001 11.17 <0.0001 14.65 <0.0001 
  Collateral 8.47% 12.71% <0.0001 11.37% <0.0001 13.37% <0.0001 
  Covenants 18.86% 11.10% <0.0001 10.33% <0.0001 11.12% <0.0001 
  Senior 98.92% 99.03% 0.3624 98.59% 0.1003 99.41% <0.0001 
  Sole Lender 9.60% 5.81% <0.0001 3.28% <0.0001 7.06% <0.0001 
  Maturity 51.27 65.94 <0.0001 73.61 <0.0001 60.55 <0.0001 
  Foreign Lender 56.86% 82.66% <0.0001 62.00% 0.0006 100.00% NA 
  Loan Size (USD) 246,706,874 307,484,248 <0.0001 208,700,967 <0.0001 397,967,096 <0.0001 
Country Characteristics               
  Government Size 6.56 6.62 0.0002 6.57 0.68 6.69 <0.0001 
  Property Rights 7.92 6.68 <0.0001 6.58 <0.0001 6.75 <0.0001 
  Investment Profile 10.30 9.73 <0.0001 9.83 <0.0001 9.65 <0.0001 
  Common Law 73.14% 44.18% <0.0001 34.83% <0.0001 50.98% <0.0001 
  Crisis 12.68% 10.81% <0.0001 9.79% <0.0001 10.98% 0.0031 
  GDP Growth 2.75% 5.19% <0.0001 6.13% <0.0001 4.48% <0.0001 
Borrower               
  TA (USD) 7,546,534 14,120,081 <0.0001 9,415,248 0.1968 18,032,275 <0.0001 
  DtoA 0.64 0.66 0.0031 0.62 0.0083 0.68 <0.0001 
  QR 1.41 1.49 0.4975 1.64 0.2005 1.36 0.6318 
  ROA 3.61% 4.71% <0.0001 4.77% 0.0029 5.11% <0.0001 
  TQ 1.40 1.13 <0.0001 1.07 <0.0001 1.20 <0.0001 
  
Publicly Traded 
Borrower 25.53% 20.80% <0.0001 20.96% <0.0001 20.42% <0.0001 
  Previous Gov Loans 0.08 0.79 <0.0001 0.80 <0.0001 0.81 <0.0001 
  Previous Priv Loans 1.79 1.06 <0.0001 0.71 <0.0001 1.28 <0.0001 
  Financial Borrower 7.69% 17.18% <0.0001 6.95% 0.0007 24.36% <0.0001 
  Regulated Borrower 15.16% 22.13% <0.0001 24.22% <0.0001 20.66% <0.0001 
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Table 4. Determinants of State-Owned Lenders Participation 
Table 4 reports parameter estimates from probit models. Responses are binary variables, equal to one if a 
majority government controlled lender is involved. The first two columns refer to all government lenders, 
the third and fourth to domestic government lenders, the fifth and sixth to foreign government lenders. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1, except for ID Risk, a measure of idiosyncratic risk equal to the 
residual of a regression of loan spreads on firm, country, and loan characteristics. Models include fixed 
effects for loan purpose (unreported). Standard errors are clustered at the package level. p-values from 
two-sided tests of significance are reported in grey italics. Parameter estimates significant at the 10% 
level are bolded.  
  All Gov Domestic Gov Foreign Gov 
Intercept -0.5483 -4.4937 -0.9396 -3.8099 -1.1128 -5.1099 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Property Rights -0.214 -0.1443 -0.1809 -0.1818 -0.1942 -0.0926 
  <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 0.0009 <.0001 0.04 
Common Law -0.2281 -0.3524 -0.4175 -0.9435 -0.0181 -0.0145 
  <.0001 0.003 <.0001 <.0001 0.5764 0.91 
Crisis 0.139 0.1053 0.1812 0.1017 0.0425 0.088 
  <.0001 0.2724 <.0001 0.6135 0.1812 0.3911 
Government Size 0.048 0.1369 0.0325 0.1543 0.0683 0.1064 
  <.0001 0.002 0.0352 0.0048 <.0001 0.0481 
GDP Growth 0.0679 0.0764 0.0716 0.084 0.0451 0.062 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0039 <.0001 0.0041 
Financial Borrower 0.272 -0.0811 -0.234 -3.2205 0.4202 -0.0445 
  <.0001 0.769 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8725 
Regulated Borrower 0.1149 -0.1191 0.1233 -0.0231 0.0879 -0.126 
  <.0001 0.1266 0.0002 0.8705 0.0015 0.1157 
Previous Gov Loan N 0.2238 0.1587 0.1671 0.1368 0.1785 0.1664 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001 
Previous Priv Loan N -0.0414 -0.0628 -0.0855 -0.146 -0.0251 -0.0456 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Gov Borrower 0.3488   0.2735   0.401   
  <.0001   <.0001   <.0001   
Publicly Traded Borrower 0.0081   -0.039   0.0233   
  0.7008   0.2164   0.298   
Log TA   0.2342   0.1632   0.2429 
    <.0001   <.0001   <.0001 
DtoA   -0.0056   0.3504   -0.1568 
    0.9663   0.1599   0.2772 
ROA   0.0026   0.0060   0.0033 
    0.5272   0.4371   0.4736 
QR   0.0059   0.0082   0.0022 
    0.6111   0.5942   0.8571 
TQ   -0.1894   -0.1225   -0.1915 
    0.0002   0.2730   0.0003 
ID Risk   0.0002   0.0014   -0.0002 
    0.4562   0.0006   0.4981 
N Obs 135,492 18,911 135,492 18,911 135,492 18,911 
Response = 1 8,293 751 3,230 220 5,610 582 
Percent Concordant 84% 85% 89% 94% 81% 83% 
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Table 5. Determinants of the Role of State-Owned Lenders 
Table 5 reports parameter estimates from multinomial logit models. The first two columns refer to all 
government lenders, the third and fourth to domestic government lenders, the fifth and sixth to foreign 
government lenders. In each model, the response is a categorical variable equal to ‘1’ if the government 
lender is a single lender, ‘2’ if the government lender is a loan arranger, ‘3’ if the government lender is a 
syndicate member (but not arranger). Results reported are for comparisons between group 1 (sole lenders) 
and group 3 (syndicate members) and between group 2 (arrangers) and group 3 (syndicate members). All 
variables are as defined in Table 1, except for ID Risk, a measure of idiosyncratic risk equal to the 
residual of a regression of loan spreads on firm, country and loan characteristics. All models include loan 
purpose fixed effects (unreported). Standard errors are clustered at the loan package level. p-values from 
two-sided tests of significance are reported under the parameter estimates, in grey italics. Parameter 
estimates significant at the 10% level are bolded.  
 
  All Government Domestic Government Foreign Government 
  
Arranger 
Sole 
Lender 
Arranger 
Sole 
Lender 
Arranger 
Sole 
Lender 
Intercept -0.4956 0.0737 -2.2844 -2.0034 -1.1505 -0.5216 
  0.1912 0.9146 0.0027 0.2152 0.0243 0.5048 
Property Rights -0.1354 -0.3944 0.0248 -0.0822 -0.1131 -0.3132 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.7543 0.5776 0.0102 <.0001 
Common Law -0.3475 -0.4227 -0.5281 -0.7671 -0.184 -0.3882 
  0.0011 0.0092 0.0034 0.0441 0.2008 0.095 
Crisis 0.7373 0.1152 1.0641 0.7204 0.6678 -0.1344 
  <.0001 0.5212 <.0001 0.0343 <.0001 0.5668 
Government Size 0.1055 0.0758 0.345 0.1984 0.0869 0.0274 
  0.0026 0.1957 <.0001 0.1304 0.075 0.6675 
GDP Growth 0.0323 -0.0613 0.0682 -0.0646 -0.00517 -0.0509 
  0.0135 0.0051 0.0071 0.1216 0.7614 0.0678 
Financial Borrower -0.7104 -0.8042 -0.571 -1.1536 -0.3915 -0.5999 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.0017 0.0075 0.0014 0.0057 
Regulated Borrower 0.1185 -0.1496 0.1257 0.1678 0.0509 -0.3272 
  0.2226 0.3072 0.3876 0.508 0.7233 0.0976 
Gov Borrower 0.3585 0.3047 0.2678 0.0541 0.3386 0.1403 
  0.0009 0.0849 0.1789 0.9017 0.0129 0.5751 
Previous Gov Loan N 0.1333 0.0693 0.105 -0.0233 0.1198 0.0528 
  <.0001 0.0509 0.0051 0.6755 <.0001 0.4314 
Previous Priv Loan N -0.1241 -0.0251 -0.072 0.1363 -0.1123 -0.0465 
  <.0001 0.3417 0.0946 0.0051 <.0001 0.2237 
Publicly Traded 
Borrower -0.3008 -0.2005 0.0213 -0.1395 -0.4977 -0.00184 
  0.0008 0.1827 0.8867 0.617 <.0001 0.9921 
N Syndicate Member 5,226 5,226 1,554 1,554 4,133 4,133 
N Arranger 2,566 2,566 1,534 1,534 1,118 1,118 
N Sole Lender 501 501 142 142 359 359 
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Table 6. Determinants of the Share of the Loan Retained by State-Owned Lenders 
Table 6 reports parameter estimates from two-stage models for the proportion of the loan retained by 
government lenders. The first stage includes probit models for government participation, akin to those 
presented in Table 4. Reported parameter estimates are for the second stage of the models, in which 
responses are the proportions of loans (coded on a 0-100 scale) retained by government lenders. The first 
two columns refer to all government lenders, the third and fourth to domestic government lenders, the 
fifth and sixth to foreign government lenders. All variables are as defined in Table 1, except for ID Risk, a 
measure of idiosyncratic risk equal to the residual of a regression of loan spreads on firm, country and 
loan characteristics. All models include loan purpose fixed effects in the first stage and inverse Mill’s 
ratios in the second stage (unreported). Standard errors are clustered at the loan package level. p-values 
from two-sided tests of significance are reported under the parameter estimates, in grey italics. Parameter 
estimates significant at the 10% level are bolded.  
  All Gov Domestic Gov Foreign Gov 
Intercept 26.6708 50.6338 -49.2008 30.6167 5.7900 9.4391 
  0.6252 <.0001 0.3959 <.0001 0.7931 0.0127 
Property Rights -31.3098 -1.9861 -12.1041 -1.5773 -13.3905 0.0612 
  <.0001 0.0005 0.0405 <.0001 <.0001 0.8248 
Common Law -2.8051 -2.4411 24.7537 2.2089 -0.1014 -1.2720 
  0.8326 0.1116 0.0052 0.0188 0.9890 0.0849 
Crisis 0.6401 -3.8779 31.8019 -2.2496 -0.4267 0.5448 
  0.9627 0.1318 <.0001 0.5789 0.9640 0.5095 
Government Size -13.9550 1.1385 -7.8538 -0.6119 -3.9853 0.7398 
  0.0012 0.0161 0.0415 0.0596 0.0452 0.0001 
GDP Growth 3.6513 0.1441 1.1874 -0.0989 -0.5129 0.0824 
  0.0273 0.4301 0.4733 0.2872 0.5364 0.2990 
Financial Borrower -6.9027 NA -19.1034 NA 0.3281 NA 
  0.5676 NA 0.3183 NA 0.9645 NA 
Regulated Borrower 0.8438 -0.8434 -7.0202 -0.9322 0.0110 1.0414 
  0.9524 0.5342 0.5825 0.2662 0.9989 0.0337 
Previous Gov Loan N 5.9204 0.0090 1.1433 0.5093 2.1055 -0.0801 
  0.0437 0.9801 0.6546 0.0085 0.1997 0.5717 
Previous Priv Loan N -5.1373 -0.4813 -0.8629 -0.0509 -0.6879 -0.2095 
  0.0029 0.0410 0.7769 0.8864 0.4740 0.0050 
Gov Borrower -1.4306   -6.3960   1.2579   
  0.9279   0.7436   0.8748   
Publicly Traded Borrower -4.0855   -39.5053   -1.6012   
  0.7508   0.0002   0.8163   
Log TA   -2.3572   -0.3957   -0.6406 
    <.0001   0.1578   <.0001 
DtoA   6.5143   2.1980   0.3346 
    0.0309   0.3482   0.7690 
ROA   -0.0110   0.2173   0.0357 
    0.9499   0.0789   0.6431 
QR   -0.1058   -0.0579   0.0477 
    0.1458   0.4624   0.0651 
TQ   -2.3001   -1.0300   -0.6441 
    0.0008   0.0124   0.0088 
ID Risk   0.0344   -0.0001   0.0090 
    <.0001   0.9747   0.0169 
N Obs 40,077 7,960 40,077 7,964 40,077 7,960 
R-squared 9.90% 62.49% 6.84% 71.24% 3.53% 52.75% 
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Table 7. Characteristics of Loans by State-Owned Lenders, Propensity Score Matching 
Table 7 compares mean characteristics of loans with government lenders to propensity-score matched 
loans involving only private lenders. Tests for significance of mean differences are implemented as paired 
t-tests with standard errors clustered at the package level; reported p-values are two-sided. All variables 
are as defined in Table 1. Differences statistically significant at the 10% level or lower are bolded. Panel 
A includes all government loans. Panel B includes only loans by domestic governments, while Panel C 
includes only loans by foreign governments. Panel D includes only government loans given to borrowers 
from a country with Property Rights scores below the median (during the year of loan initiation). Panel E 
includes only government loans given to borrowers from a country with Property Rights scores above the 
median (during the year of loan initiation). 
 
 
 
Panel A – All Government Loans 
  
Mean 
Matched 
Sample Mean 
Difference p-value N Obs 
Number of Lenders 15.66 9.21 6.45 <.0001 1,216 
Maturity (months) 53.97 49.93 4.04 0.0032 1,134 
Loan Size (USD) 586,984,649 579,109,309 7,875,340 0.858 1,203 
Covenants 26.07% 25.66% 0.41% 0.8459 1,216 
Senior 99.01% 99.34% -0.33% 0.3932 1,216 
Collateralized 17.19% 22.70% -5.51% 0.0023 1,216 
Spread (bps) 128.03 148.94 -20.91 0.0291 482 
Foreign Lender 92.19% 80.92% 11.27% <.0001 1,216 
 
 
Panel B – Domestic Government Loans 
  
Mean 
Matched 
Sample Mean 
Difference p-value N Obs 
Number of Lenders 13.09 8.75 4.34 <.0001 472 
Maturity (months) 59.40 51.46 7.94 0.0016 436 
Loan Size (USD) 438,552,677 579,917,212 -141,364,535 0.0765 462 
Covenants 7.20% 18.01% -10.81% 0.0001 472 
Senior 97.67% 98.52% -0.85% 0.3696 472 
Collateralized 11.44% 23.73% -12.29% <.0001 472 
Spread (bps) 146.74 137.05 9.69 0.6425 137 
Foreign Lender 79.87% 86.65% -6.78% 0.0094 472 
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Table 7 (Continued). Characteristics of Loans by State-Owned Lenders, Propensity Score 
Matching 
 
 
 
Panel C – Foreign Government Loans 
  
Mean 
Matched 
Sample Mean 
Difference p-value N Obs 
Number of Lenders 17.43 9.29 8.14 <.0001 829 
Maturity (months) 50.73 49.39 1.34 0.3716 781 
Loan Size (USD) 685,315,385 566,675,771 118,639,614 0.0217 826 
Covenants 35.34% 28.95% 6.39% 0.0193 829 
Senior 99.88% 99.88% 0.00% 1.0000 829 
Collateralized 19.30% 23.04% -3.74% <.0001 829 
Spread (bps) 119.53 152.69 -33.15 0.0008 374 
Foreign Lender 100.00% 79.01% 20.99% <.0001 829 
 
 
Panel D – Weak Property Rights 
  
Mean 
Matched 
Sample Mean 
Difference p-value N Obs 
Number of Lenders 14.82 9.04 5.78 <.0001 905 
Maturity (months) 56.48 50.55 5.93 0.0003 839 
Loan Size (USD) 492,903,065 564,109,828 -71,206,763 0.1491 896 
Covenants 26.30% 22.32% 3.98% 0.0957 905 
Senior 99.12% 98.90% 0.22% 0.6703 905 
Collateralized 18.12% 21.88% -3.76% 0.0684 905 
Spread (bps) 122.99 159.91 -36.92 0.0013 310 
Foreign Lender 89.83% 80.99% 8.84% <.0001 905 
 
 
Panel E – Strong Property Rights 
  
Mean 
Matched 
Sample Mean 
Difference p-value N Obs 
Number of Lenders 18.22 10.26 7.95 <.0001 285 
Maturity (months) 47.97 43.20 4.77 0.0433 257 
Loan Size (USD) 866,057,395 800,473,453 65,583,943 0.5182 285 
Covenants 23.86% 27.37% -3.51% 0.3685 285 
Senior 98.60% 99.65% -1.05% 0.2552 285 
Collateralized 13.68% 17.89% -4.21% 0.2277 285 
Spread (bps) 128.23 132.95 -4.72 0.7763 142 
Foreign Lender 98.95% 84.56% 14.39% <.0001 285 
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Table 8. Characteristics of Loans by State-Owned Lenders, Same Borrower and Year 
Table 8 compares mean characteristics of loans with government involvement to loans given during the 
same year to the same borrower by private entities. Tests for significance of mean differences are 
implemented as paired t-tests with standard errors clustered at the package level; reported p-values are 
two-sided. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Differences statistically significant at the 10% level or 
lower are bolded. Panel A includes all government loans. Panel B includes only domestic government 
loans, while Panel C includes only foreign government loans.  
 
 
Panel A – All Government Loans 
  
Mean 
Matched 
Sample Mean 
Difference p-value N Obs 
Number of Lenders 12.89 7.34 5.55 <.0001 1,505 
Maturity (months) 63.30 57.81 5.49 <.0001 1,306 
Loan Size (USD) 374,686,221 327,320,599 47,365,622 0.0042 1,495 
Covenants 10.30% 8.24% 2.06% 0.001 1,505 
Senior 98.80% 98.07% 0.73% 0.109 1,504 
Collateralized 16.81% 17.14% -0.33% 0.7162 1,505 
Spread (bps) 138.33 138.66 -0.33 0.9241 537 
Foreign Lender 88.11% 85.65% 2.46% 0.0149 1,505 
 
 
Panel B – Domestic Government Loans 
  
Mean 
Matched 
Sample Mean 
Difference p-value N Obs 
Number of Lenders 10.55 5.52 5.02 <.0001 497 
Maturity (months) 70.44 64.43 6.01 0.0041 432 
Loan Size (USD) 273,556,079 238,270,403 35,285,676 0.1373 494 
Covenants 6.04% 4.23% 1.81% 0.0388 497 
Senior 97.79% 97.38% 0.40% 0.6554 497 
Collateralized 19.11% 21.13% -2.01% 0.15 497 
Spread (bps) 133.00 116.86 16.14 0.1501 123 
Foreign Lender 63.98% 73.24% -9.26% 0.0001 497 
 
 
Panel C – Foreign Government Loans 
  
Mean 
Matched 
Sample Mean 
Difference p-value N Obs 
Number of Lenders 14.21 8.18 6.03 <.0001 1,061 
Maturity (months) 59.34 54.72 4.62 <.0001 918 
Loan Size (USD) 433,141,253 376,363,710 56,777,544 0.0073 1,054 
Covenants 11.78% 9.80% 1.98% 0.0126 1,061 
Senior 99.34% 98.40% 0.94% 0.0591 1,060 
Collateralized 16.02% 15.55% 0.47% 0.6843 1,061 
Spread (bps) 139.53 144.70 -5.17 0.0799 433 
Foreign Lender 100.00% 91.89% 8.11% <.0001 1,061 
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Table 9. Predictions of SWF Impact on Publicly-Traded Firms 
This table lists our predicted hypothesis and the testable implications of those. For the event study, we 
indicate whether the hypothesis predicts positive or negative abnormal returns. For the cross-sectional 
analysis, we report whether the hypothesis predicts a positive, negative or null impact of the relevant 
explanatory variable in cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns.  
 
 
 
Active 
Monitoring 
Reduced 
Financial 
Constraints 
Political 
Interference 
Constrained 
Foreign 
State 
Investor 
Stock 
Picking 
            
Event Study           
Abnormal 
Returns 
(+) (+) (-) (-) ? 
            
Cross-Section           
SWF Government 
Involvement 
0 0 (-) 0 0 
SWF Passive 
Stance 
(-) 0 0 (-) 0 
Norway 0 0 (+) (+) 0 
OECD (-) (-) (+) (-) 0 
Strategic Target 0 0 (-) 0 0 
SWF Age 0 0 0 0 (+) 
Capital Infusion 0 (+) 0 0 0 
Stake Owned (+) 0 (-) (-) 0 
Foreign (-) 0 (+) (-) 0 
Market Value 0 (-) (+) (-) 0 
Leverage (-) (+) (+) 0 0 
Liquidity (+) (-) (-) 0 0 
BoD (+) 0 (-) (-) 0 
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Table 10. SWF Descriptive Data 
This table lists the 33 funds that meet the Monitor-FEEM definition of a SWF, and offers information 
regarding country of origin; fund name; the estimated fund size in USD billion as of March 23, 2010 and 
the year in which the fund was established. 
 
Country Fund Name 
AUM  
(USD billion) 
Launch 
Year 
Source of 
Funds 
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global 560.50 1990 Oil 
UAE/Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 395.00 1976 Oil 
China China Investment Corporation 332.40 2007 Trade Surplus 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 296.00 1953 Oil 
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 220.00 1981 Trade Surplus 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 133.00 1974 SOEs 
Russia National Wealth Fund 94.30 2008 Oil 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 80.00 2003 Oil 
Australia Australian Future Fund 77.20 2006 
Various 
Commodities 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 53.30 2006 Oil 
UAE-Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Investment Company 49.70 1984 Oil 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 41.90 2000 Oil 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 39.30 1983 Oil 
Republic of  
Korea 
Korea Investment Corporation 37.60 2005 Trade Surplus 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional Berhard 36.50 1993 SOEs 
UAE-Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development Company PJSC 27.60 2002 Oil 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan
 
 25.80 1999 Oil 
UAE-Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai 19.60 2006 SOEs 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 13.70 2006 SOEs 
UAE-Dubai Istithmar World 11.50 2003 SOEs 
UAE-Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Council 10.00 2007 Oil 
UAE-Federal Emirates Investment Authority 10.00 2007 Oil 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 8.20 1980 Oil & Gas 
East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 5.30 2005 Oil & Gas 
UAE-Ras 
Khaimah 
Ras Al Khaimah (RAK) Investment Authority 2.00 2005 Oil 
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 0.60 2005 Trade Surplus 
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 0.39 1956 Phosphates 
São Tomé & 
Principe 
National Oil Account 0.01 2004 Oil 
Oman Oman Investment Fund N/A 2006  Oil & Gas 
UAE-Dubai DIFC Investments (Company) LLC N/A 2006 SOEs 
Angola Fundo Soberano Angolano N/A 2009 Oil 
Equatorial Guinea Fund for Future Generations N/A N/A Oil 
Gabon Fund for Future Generations N/A 1998 Oil 
  Total Oil & Gas Related 1,618.91      
  Total Other 805.291     
  TOTAL 2,424.20      
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Table 11. Characteristics of the Sample of SWF Investments in Publicly-Traded Firms 
This table characterizes the sample of 802 sovereign wealth fund investments in listed companies 
between 1985 and November 2009. Panel A describes the number, total value, and average size of 
investments each year from 1985 through 2009. Panel B describes the funds for which investments are 
recorded and the total number, total value, and average value (both in USD millions) made by each fund. 
Panel C describes the industrial distribution of SWF investments in listed companies, and Panel D 
describes the geographic distribution of these investments. 
 
Panel A. Annual distribution of SWF Investments in Listed firm stocks 
Year Number of 
Investments 
Total Value 
(USD mil) 
Average Value 
(USD mil) 
1985 1 24 24 
1987 1 -- -- 
1988 3 1,952 1,952 
1990 1 24 24 
1991 2 112 58 
1992 2 65 33 
1993 3 713 357 
1994 9 373 41 
1996 4 75 24.9 
1997 2 100 100 
1998 1 -- -- 
1999 4 116 39 
2000 7 360 72 
2001 13 850 95 
2002 17 978 109 
2003 20 5,641 313 
2004 32 2,621 175 
2005 42 4,337 181 
2006 49 11,492 328 
2007 198 61,162 336 
2008 340 61,306 191 
2009 50 29,306 733 
1985-
2009 802 181,606 266 
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Table 11 (Continued). Characteristics of the Sample of SWF Investments in Publicly-Traded Firms 
 
Panel B. Investments by Individual Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Fund Name Country 
Number of 
Investments 
Total Value 
(USD mil) 
Average value 
(USD mil) 
Government Pension Fund – 
Global 
Norway 403 4,762 12 
Temasek Holdings Singapore 132 42,375 441 
Government Investment 
Corporation (GIC) 
Singapore 79 22,571 364 
Khazanah Nasional Berhard Malaysia 32 3,240 154 
Qatar Investment Authority 
(QIA) 
Qatar 31 15,297 1,177 
Kuwait Investment Authority 
(KIA) 
Kuwait 19 13,235 1,018 
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC) 
China 18 38,933 2,781 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) 
UAE-Abu Dhabi 18 8,518 710 
Libyan Investment Authority Libya 17 1,519 127 
Istithmar World UAE-Dubai 16 2,788 232 
Mubadala Development 
Company PJSC 
UAE-Abu Dhabi 11 2,618 436 
International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
UAE-Abu Dhabi 10 14,651 1,628 
Dubai International Financial 
Center 
UAE-Dubai 6 2,386 477 
Investment Corporation of 
Dubai 
UAE-Dubai 4 6,430 1,607 
Brunei Investment Agency Brunei 2 112 112 
Oman Investment Fund Oman 2 2 2 
Korea Investment 
Corporation 
Korea 1 2,000 2,000 
Mumtalakat Holding 
Company 
Bahrain 1 170 170 
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Table 11 (Continued). Characteristics of the Sample of SWF Investments in Publicly-traded Firms 
 
Panel C. Industrial distribution of SWF investments in listed firm stocks 
Industry 
Number of 
Investments 
Total Value 
(USD mil) 
Average value 
(USD mil) 
Banking 77 55,243 1,228 
Real estate development and 
services 
46 49,782 1,158 
Financial services 59 43,322 850 
Oil and gas producers 33 6,918 239 
General industrials 10 5,850 585 
Chemicals 24 5,807 264 
Technology hardware and 
equipment 
29 4,434 153 
Construction and materials 17 3,740 249 
Automobiles and parts 22 3,048 160 
Electricity 20 2,609 137 
Mining 10 2,424 269 
General retailers 22 2,376 113 
Industrial transportation 30 2,025 78 
Real estate investment trusts (REIT) 20 1,791 90 
Fixed line telecommunications 19 1,753 117 
Unclassified 11 25, 308 48 
Others (23 industries) 376 11,275 35 
 
Panel D. Geographic distribution of SWF investments in listed firm stocks 
Country of Target Firm 
Number of 
Investments 
Total Value 
(USD mil) 
Average value 
(USD mil) 
United States 426 58,336 140 
China 43 32,049 916 
Singapore 39 10,936 377 
Malaysia 38 2,195 100 
India 34 1,386 53 
United Kingdom 28 20,883 906 
Canada 19 5,517 307 
Indonesia 16 3,758 470 
Italy 15 1,092 135 
Thailand 10 2,458 351 
France 10 2,376 396 
Australia 9 1,026 128 
Qatar 7 1,085 362 
Sweden 6 5,238 1,310 
United Arab Emirates 6 2,810 937 
Switzerland 5 12,839 3,210 
OECD countries 560 120,207 232 
Non-OECD countries 242 61,399 372 
BRIC countries 85 34,166 502 
Foreign (cross-border) investments 723 141,252 224 
Domestic (home country) investments 79 40,351 761 
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Table 12. SWF Target-Firm Abnormal Stock Price Performance, Pre-Investment 
This table reports cumulative abnormal stock returns for target firms preceding the announcement of investment by a SWF. Interval indicates the length of the 
time interval of interest ending on the day prior to the date of the announcement of the SWF investment. N reports the number of observations. Mean 
Compounded Abnormal Return and Median Compounded Abnormal Returns report, respectively, average and median abnormal compounded returns. Positive 
and Negative report, respectively, the number of positive and negative cumulative abnormal returns for the period of interest. Bootstrapped, Skewness Adjusted t 
presents the p-value associated with the bootstrapped, skewness adjusted t-statistic employed by Hall (1992). Generalized Sign Z reports the p-values of a 
generalized nonparametric sign test, and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test reports the p-values associated with this alternative non-parametric test of significance. The 
significance levels are denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the 0.10 level; “**” indicates significance at the 0.05 level; “***” indicates significance at 
the 0.01 level. Panel A includes all announcements of SWF investments in publicly traded companies, Panel B reports the same values for all investments 
announcements, excluding those made by Norway’s SWF.  
 
Panel A: All Observations 
Interval N 
Mean Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Median Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative 
Bootstrapped, 
Skewness Adjusted t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
1 Year 638 17.09% 1.35% 329 309 < 0.01 *** 0.32   0.19   
6 Months 638 3.83% -2.14% 300 338 < 0.01 *** 0.52   0.48   
3 Months 635 2.11% -1.29% 306 329 0.01 ** 0.42   0.84   
1 Month 635 1.31% 0.44% 329 306 < 0.01 *** 0.24   0.67   
1 Week 635 -0.05% -0.17% 307 328 0.43   0.02   0.21   
1 Day 634 -0.20% -0.09% 307 326 0.13   0.11   0.23   
 
Panel B: Excluding Norway 
Interval N 
Mean Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Median Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative 
Bootstrapped, 
Skewness Adjusted t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
1 Year 277 20.99% -0.85% 137 140 < 0.01 *** 0.32   0.19   
6 Months 277 6.67% -1.46% 134 143 < 0.01 *** 0.52   0.48   
3 Months 274 2.58% -0.92% 134 140 0.03 ** 0.42   0.88   
1 Month 274 2.26% 0.02% 137 137 0.01 ** 0.24   0.67   
1 Week 274 0.46% 0.36% 147 127 0.10   0.02 **  0.21   
1 Day 273 0.41% 0.15% 140 132 0.03 ** 0.11   0.23   
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Table 13. Variable Definitions, Chapter 3 
We report the source of the each variable we use (and, where appropriate, the name or identifying code of 
the variable in the original database) and a brief definition of each variable employed in our study. 
Definitions of Worldscope variables are included in the Worldscope Database Datatype Definitions 
Guide (www.thomson.com/financial). 
Variable Source Definition 
BoD (Board of Directors) Monitor - FEEM SWF 
Database 
Binary variable  set equal to one if the SWF acquires one or more 
seats on the board of directors of the investment target 
Book Value of Equity Worldscope, WC03501 Common shareholders' investment in a company 
Capital Infusion 
Monitor - FEEM SWF 
Database 
If the transaction is a capital infusion, this variable is set equal to the 
size of the stake acquired; if the transaction is not a capital infusion, 
it is set to zero 
Cash Over Total Assets Worldscope, WC08111 Cash and Equivalents as a percentage of total assets 
Dividend Yield Worldscope, WC09404 Annual divideds per share divided by price per share 
Foreign 
Monitor - FEEM SWF 
Database 
Binary variable, set equal to one if the target firm headquarters are 
in a different country than the country of origin of the investing 
SWF 
Leverage (Debt over 
Assets) 
Worldscope, (WC02999-
WC03501)/WC02999 
Debt over total assets 
Liquidity (Quick Ratio) 
Worldscope, WC08101 
Cash and Equivalents plus net receivables, divided by total current 
liabilities 
Market Value 
Worldscope, WC08001 
Aggregate market capitalization of the firm, including all common 
and/or ordinary shares 
Market to Book Ratio 
(Firm) Worldscope, WC09704 Market capitalization of the firm divided by common equity 
Marke to Book Ratio 
(Security) Datastream, MTBV 
Market value of the individual security, divided by adjusted 
common equity 
Norway Monitor - FEEM SWF 
Database 
Binary variable, set equal to one if the acquiring SWF is the 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global 
OECD Monitor - FEEM SWF 
Database 
Binary variable, set equal to one if the target firm headquarters are 
in an OECD-member country 
Return - daily Datastream, RI Daily percentage change in the total return index (RI), in USD 
Return - monthly 
Datastream, RI Monthly percentage change in the total return index (RI), in USD 
ROA 
Worldscope, WC08326 
Te exact definition varies by industry; please refer to the 
Worldscope Database Datatype Definitions Guide, available at 
www.thomson.com/financial 
ROE 
Worldscope, WC08301 
Te exact definition varies by industry; please refer to the 
Worldscope Database Datatype Definitions Guide, available at 
www.thomson.com/financial 
Stake Owned Monitor - FEEM SWF 
Database 
Size of the stake owned by the SWF in the investment target after 
the transaction 
Strategic Target 
Monitor - FEEM SWF 
Database 
Binary variable, set equal to one if the target firm's primary 
industrial sector is either Aerospace and Defense, Energy, Utilities, 
Telecom, or Information Technology 
SWF Age Monitor - FEEM SWF 
Database 
Years since SWF inception, at the time of the investment 
SWF Government 
Involvement Truman (2008) 
One minus the score given by Truman (2008) to question (10): "Are 
decisions on specific investments made by the managers?" 
SWF Passive Stance 
Truman (2008) 
The sum of the scores given by Tuman (2008) to question (29): 
"Does the SWF have limits on the size of its stakes?" and question 
(30): "Does the SWF not take controlling stakes?" 
Tobin's Q Worldscope, 
(WC08001+WC02999-
WC03501)/WC02999 
Market Value of Common Equity plus Total Assets minus Book 
Value of Common Equity, divided by Total Assets 
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Table 14. SWF Target Firm Characteristics, Pre-Investment 
The variables of interest are as defined in Table 13. N reports the number of observations, Mean and Median report, respectively, the mean and median value of 
the variable of interest as of Dec. 31 of the year preceding the SWF investment. % Above Industry Median reports the proportion of SWF investment targets for 
which the value of the variable of interest exceeds the median value of the same variable for all firms from the same country (same Market) and with the same 
primary industrial sector (same FTSE level 3 industrial sector classification) on the same date. WSR p-value reports the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis that % Above Industry Median is equal to .5 based on a Wilcoxon sign rank test. Significance is denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the 
0.10 level; “**” indicates significance at the 0.05 level; “***” indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Variable N Mean Median 
% Above Industry 
Median 
WSR p-value 
Book Value of Equity (USD mil) 744 4,021 890 86.73% 20.30 *** < 0.01 
Market Cap (USD mil) 636 7,898 2,270 89.59% 19.80 *** < 0.01 
Total Assets (USD mil) 743 53,000 2,795 87.93% 20.39 *** < 0.01 
Market to Book Ratio 652 3.47 2.26 65.54% 10.73 *** < 0.01 
Debt over Assets 743 63.07% 61.65% 55.51% 3.50 *** < 0.01 
Cash Over Total Assets 561 36.72% 29.81% 48.12% 2.80 *** < 0.01 
Quick Ratio 566 1.55 1.03 47.95% 2.55 ** 0.01 
ROA 698 5.43% 6.10% 69.37% 11.94 *** < 0.01 
ROE 705 6.56% 15.32% 65.16% 10.23 *** < 0.01 
Tobin's Q 636 1.96 1.40 50.31% 2.94 *** < 0.01 
Dividend Yield 648 1.71% 0.87% 49.41% 8.58 *** < 0.01 
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Table 15. Short-term Market Reaction to Announcements of SWF Investments 
This table reports cumulative abnormal stock returns for target firms on the days surrounding the announcement of investment by a SWF. Interval indicates the 
time interval of interest relative to the date of the announcement of the SWF investment (day 0).  N reports the number of observations. Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal Return and Median Cumulative Abnormal Return report, respectively, average and median abnormal cumulative returns. Positive and Negative report, 
respectively, the number of positive and negative cumulative abnormal returns for the period of interest, Patell z reports p-values of Patell’s z-scores computed to 
test the statistical significance of the mean cumulative abnormal return relative to the period of interest, and CDA t the p-value associated with a t-test based on 
the portfolio time-series standard error computed with the 'crude dependency adjustment' proposed by Brown and Warner (1985). Generalized Sign z reports the 
p-value of a generalized nonparametric sign test, and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test reports the p-values associated with this alternative nonparametric test of 
significance. The significance levels are denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the 0.10 level; “**” indicates significance at the 0.05 level; “***” 
indicates significance at the 0.01 level. Panel A includes all announcements of SWF investments in publicly traded companies, Panel B reports the same values 
for all investments announcements, excluding those made by Norway’s SWF, while Panel C presents only investment announcements associated with the 
Norwegian fund.  
Panel A. All Observations 
Interval N 
Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Median Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative Patell Z CDA t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
(-1,+1) 688 1.25% 0.17% 368 320 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.05 ** 
(0,0) 688 1.10% 0.00% 342 344 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.10   0.19   
(0,+1) 688 1.29% 0.15% 358 329 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.04 ** 
 
Panel B: Excluding Norway 
Interval N 
Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Median Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative Patell Z CDA t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
(-1,+1) 293 2.91% 0.37% 168 125 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 
(0,0) 293 2.14% 0.01% 148 143 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.07 * 0.08 * 
(0,+1) 293 2.70% 0.56% 163 129 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 
 
Panel B: Norway Only 
Interval N 
Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Median Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative Patell Z CDA t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
(-1,+1) 395 0.02% 2.00% 200 195 0.66   0.97   0.23   0.90   
(0,0) 395 0.32% -1.00% 194 201 0.01 ** 0.24   0.56   0.83   
(0,+1) 395 0.25% -2.00% 195 200 0.28   0.52   0.49   0.76   
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Table 16. Long-Term Impact of SWF Investments, Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
Interval indicates the time interval of interest, starting on the day following the SWF investment. N reports the number of observations. Mean Compounded 
Abnormal Return and Median Compounded Abnormal Returns report, respectively, average and median abnormal compounded returns. Positive and Negative 
report, respectively, the number of positive and negative cumulative abnormal returns for the period of interest. Bootstrapped, Skewness Adjusted t presents the 
p-value associated with the bootstrapped, skewness adjusted t-statistic employed by Hall (1992). Generalized Sign Z reports the p-values of a generalized 
nonparametric sign test, and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test reports the p-values associated with this alternative non-parametric test. In Panel A, abnormal returns are 
market-adjusted against a local-market total return index. Panel B and C reports the same values for all investments announcements, with abnormal returns 
computed versus matching firms; in Panel B, matching is on country, exchange, size and book-to-market ratios. In Panel C, matching is on country, exchange, 
industry, and pre-event performance. Panels D, E, and F present similar analysis excluding observations for Norway’s sovereign fund. The significance levels are 
denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the 0.10 level; “**” indicates significance at the 0.05 level; “***” indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Panel A. Local Index 
  
Interval N 
Mean Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Median Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative 
Bootstrapped, 
Skewness Adjusted t 
Generalized 
Sign z 
Wilcoxon Sign 
Rank Test  
6 months 631 -1.36% -3.13% 276 355 0.20   0.13 
 
< 0.01 *** 
1 year 617 -1.32% -6.00% 275 342 0.25  0.27  < 0.01 *** 
2 years 366 -4.50% -8.51% 153 213 0.19  0.11   < 0.01 *** 
3 years 165 -4.61% -12.75% 71 94 0.32  0.88   0.02 **  
 
Panel B. Matched Firms, Country, Exchange, Size and Market-to-Book 
Interval N 
Mean Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Median Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative 
Bootstrapped, 
Skewness Adjusted t 
Generalized 
Sign z  
Wilcoxon Sign 
Rank Test  
6 months 584 -1.86% -2.75% 275 313 0.19   0.39   0.20   
1 year 576 -3.68% -2.02% 281 293 0.05 * 0.84   0.10 
 2 years 294 -6.37% -11.82% 148 197 0.17   0.05 ** < 0.01 *** 
3 years 128 -21.88% -16.73% 61 97 0.04 **  0.02  ** 0.03 **  
            Panel C. Matched Firms, Country, Exchange, Industry and Pre-event Performance
 
Interval N 
Mean Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Median Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative 
Bootstrapped, 
Skewness Adjusted t 
Generalized 
Sign z  
Wilcoxon Sign 
Rank Test  
6 months 546 -3.74% -2.40% 262 284 0.05 ** 0.85   0.13   
1 year 532 -8.39% -2.50% 249 283  < 0.01 *** 0.51   0.08 *  
2 years 325 -5.10% -6.68% 145 180 0.26   0.22   0.06 * 
3 years 149 -12.13% -0.96% 74 75 0.16   0.71   0.74   
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Table 16 (Continued). Long-Term Impact of SWF Investments, Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel D: Local Index, Excluding Norway 
Interval N 
Mean Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Median Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative 
Bootstrapped, 
Skewness Adjusted t 
Generalized 
Sign z 
Wilcoxon Sign 
Rank Test  
6 months 236 -2.94% -4.17% 98 138 0.09 *  0.22   < 0.01 *** 
1 year 222 -3.67% -10.09% 91 131 0.15   0.18    0.01 **  
2 years 201 -5.65% -13.85% 80 121 0.26   0.11   < 0.01 *** 
3 years 157 -4.22% -12.04% 68 89 0.31   0.47   0.03 **  
            Panel E: Matched Firms, Country, Exchange, Size and Market-to-Book, Excluding Norway 
 
Interval N 
Mean Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Median Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative 
Bootstrapped, 
Skewness Adjusted t 
Generalized 
Sign z 
Wilcoxon Sign 
Rank Test  
6 months 227 -0.83% -4.09% 101 126 0.37   0.31   0.30   
1 year 213 -1.58% -5.43% 97 116 0.32   0.52 
 
0.39   
2 years 190 -4.37% -16.07% 79 111 0.36   0.09 * 0.03 ** 
3 years 150 -22.19% -16.73% 59 91 0.06 *  0.03 **  0.04 ** 
            Panel F: Matched Firms, Country, Exchange, Industry and Pre-event Performance, Excluding Norway 
 
Interval N 
Mean Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Median Compounded 
Abnormal Return 
Positive Negative 
Bootstrapped, 
Skewness Adjusted t 
Generalized 
Sign z  
Wilcoxon Sign 
Rank Test 
6 months 213 -2.43% -1.78% 103 110 0.18   0.99   0.61   
1 year 199 -7.98% -2.34% 96 103 0.07 * 0.99   0.33   
2 years 177 -3.96% -5.32% 83 64 0.42   0.75   0.27   
3 years 141 -10.07% -0.96% 70 71 0.23   0.73   0.88   
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Table 17. Long-Term Impact of SWF Investments, Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns 
Interval indicates the time interval of interest, starting on the day following the SWF investment. N reports the number of observations. Mean Compounded 
Abnormal Return and Median Compounded Abnormal Returns report, respectively, average and median abnormal compounded returns. Calendar Time Abnormal 
Returns and the related Calendar Time t are computed using the calendar-time methodology presented in Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974). Positive and Negative report, 
respectively, the number of positive and negative cumulative abnormal returns for the period of interest, and CDA t the p-value associated with a t-test based on 
the portfolio time-series standard error computed with the 'crude dependency adjustment' proposed by Brown and Warner (1985). Generalized Sign Z reports the 
p-values of a generalized nonparametric sign test, and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test reports the p-values associated with this alternative nonparametric test of 
significance. Panel A reports mean and median cumulative abnormal monthly returns following SWF investments, where abnormal returns are market adjusted 
against a local-market total return index. Panel B reports the same values for all investments announcements, with abnormal returns computed versus matching 
firms where matches are made based on country, exchange, size and book-to-market ratios. Panel C presents similar values computed versus a matching set of 
firms matched on country, exchange, industry, and pre-event performance. Panels D, E, and F present measures corresponding to Panels A, B, and C, 
respectively, but excluding observations for Norway’s sovereign fund. The significance levels are denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the 0.10 level; 
“**” indicates significance at the 0.05 level; “***” indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Panel A. Local Index, Market Adjusted 
Interval N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Calendar 
Time AR 
Positive Negative CDA t 
Calendar 
Time t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
6 months 563 -1.35% -1.27% -1.80% 273 290 0.49   0.39   0.14   0.58   
1 year 472 -2.24% 3.92% -7.29% 247 223 0.34   0.05 * 0.68   0.97   
2 years 282 7.82% 11.19% 0.72% 170 112 0.06 * 0.57   < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 
3 years 121 -2.06% 9.97% -0.65% 69 52 0.81   0.29   0.18   0.91   
 
Panel B. Local Index, Market Model 
Interval N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Calendar 
Time AR 
Positive Negative CDA t 
Calendar 
Time t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
6 months 563 -7.99% -3.97% -11.05% 251 312 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.22   < 0.01 *** 
1 year 472 -8.98% -5.59% -23.08% 212 260 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.31   0.01 ** 
2 years 282 -17.46% -16.02% -35.18% 116 166 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.05 * < 0.01 *** 
3 years 121 -56.39% -40.35% -59.62% 41 80 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.01 ** < 0.01 *** 
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Table 17 (Continued). Long-Term Impact of SWF Investments, Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel C. Matched Firms, Country, Exchange, Size, and Market-to-Book 
Interval N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Calendar 
Time AR 
Positive Negative CDA t 
Calendar 
Time t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
6 months 540 -1.59% -2.96% -1.67% 252 288 0.46   0.34   0.01 ** 0.26   
1 year 453 -6.82% -5.00% -7.06% 206 247 0.02 ** 0.02 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 
2 years 270 -6.93% -7.62% -2.46% 121 149 0.21   0.05 ** 0.03 * 0.04 ** 
3 years 113 0.11% -3.63% -4.08% 53 60 0.99   0.19   0.51   0.62   
 
Panel D. Matched Firms, Country, Exchange, Industry, and Pre-event Performance 
Interval N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Calendar 
Time AR 
Positive Negative CDA t 
Calendar 
Time t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
6 months 544 -5.54% -2.40% -2.43% 256 288 0.02 ** 0.35   0.05 * 0.11   
1 year 462 -8.83% -2.17% -7.90% 227 235 0.01 *** 0.06 * 0.42   0.04 * 
2 years 275 -6.95% -6.32% -3.74% 126 149 0.28   0.34   0.06 * 0.20   
3 years 121 2.78% -7.83% 2.42% 56 65 0.16   0.97   0.21   0.83   
 
Panel E. Local Index, Market Adjusted, Excluding Norway 
Interval N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Calendar 
Time AR 
Positive Negative CDA t 
Calendar 
Time t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
6 months 210 -4.62% -6.03% -2.59% 89 121 0.16   0.33   0.05 ** 0.03 ** 
1 year 202 -9.45% -7.17% -7.20% 89 113 0.02 ** 0.03 ** 0.15   0.01 ** 
2 years 169 -1.03% 2.16% 0.19% 91 78 0.86   0.29   0.31   0.80   
3 years 121 -2.06% 9.97% -0.65% 69 52 0.81   0.29   0.18   0.91   
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Table 17 (Continued). Long-Term Impact of SWF Investments, Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel F. Local Index, Market Model, Excluding Norway 
Interval N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Calendar 
Time AR 
Positive Negative CDA t 
Calendar 
Time t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
6 months 210 -12.28% -6.53% -11.99% 86 124 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.17   < 0.01 *** 
1 year 202 -22.74% -14.78% -23.45% 70 132 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 
2 years 169 -37.53% -28.38% -36.84% 51 118 < 0.00 *** < 0.00 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.00 *** 
3 years 121 -56.39% -40.35% -59.62% 41 80 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.01 ** < 0.01 *** 
 
Panel G. Matched Firms, Country, Exchange, Size, and Market-to-Book, Excluding Norway 
Interval N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Calendar 
Time AR 
Positive Negative CDA t 
Calendar 
Time t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
6 months 210 -12.28% -6.53% -11.99% 86 124 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.17   < 0.01 *** 
1 year 202 -22.74% -14.78% -23.45% 70 132 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 
2 years 169 -37.53% -28.38% -36.84% 51 118 < 0.00 *** < 0.00 *** < 0.01 *** < 0.00 *** 
3 years 121 -56.39% -40.35% -59.62% 41 80 < 0.01 *** < 0.01 *** 0.01 ** < 0.01 *** 
 
Panel H. Matched Firms, Country, Exchange, Industry, and Pre-event Performance, Excluding Norway 
Interval N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Median 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Calendar 
Time AR 
Positive Negative CDA t 
Calendar 
Time t 
Generalized 
Sign Z  
WSR  
6 months 209 -4.51% -2.95% -2.29% 93 116 0.35   0.63   0.05   0.22   
1 year 199 -11.31% -2.26% -8.37% 97 102 0.09 * 0.11   0.47   0.06 * 
2 years 166 -5.41% -3.98% -4.22% 80 86 0.59   0.82   0.38   0.40   
3 years 121 2.78% -7.83% 2.42% 56 65 0.16   0.97   0.21   0.83   
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Table 18. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Long-Term Abnormal Returns of SWF Investment Targets 
This table reports results from OLS regressions; the response variable is a market-adjusted abnormal 
return, with local total return indices as benchmarks, over the indicated post-investment event window. 
Variables are as defined in Table 13, with the exception of the Pre-Event BHAR 1 Year, which are buy-
and-hold market adjusted abnormal returns computed over one year prior to the day on which the SWF 
investment was announced. N reports the number of observations and R-sq the R squared statistic. All 
regressions are estimated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by target firm and year 
fixed effects. The table included parameter estimates and, in grey italicized font, related p-values. 
Significance is denoted as follows: “*” indicates significance at the 0.10 level “**” indicates significance 
at the 0.05 level; “***” indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
  6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 
SWF Government Involvement -0.6348 -0.7802 -2.9666 ** -3.5149 
  0.17 0.25 0.03 0.29 
SWF Passive Stance -1.0152 *** -0.8160 * -2.0815 ** -3.6491 ** 
  < 0.01 0.07 < 0.01 0.04 
Norway 1.8663 *** 1.3386 * 2.8404 *** 6.0818 ** 
  < 0.01 0.07 < 0.01 0.01 
OECD -0.3975 *** -0.2651 -0.4014 -1.2880 * 
  < 0.01 0.35 0.18 0.06 
Strategic Target 0.0489 0.0170 0.0400 0.2317 
  0.39 0.77 0.75 0.54 
SWF Age -0.0202 -0.0249 -0.1060 ** -0.1346 
  0.19 0.32 0.02 0.22 
Capital Infusion -0.2636 -1.1607 0.6369 2.1505 
  0.81 0.42 0.66 0.60 
Stake Owned 0.2014 -0.3595 -1.4052 ** -1.9523 
  0.84 0.69 0.01 0.39 
Foreign 0.0258 -0.3470 * -0.7295 *** -1.2867 
  0.88 0.08 < 0.01 0.11 
Market Value (*1000) -0.0061 -0.0035 -0.0109 ** -0.0364 
  0.15 0.35 0.02 0.35 
Leverage -0.1689 0.1111 -0.2385 1.0468 
  0.29 0.45 0.27 0.71 
Liquidity 0.0098 0.0116 -0.0015 0.1637 
  0.18 0.26 0.97 0.54 
BoD Dummy -0.2133 -0.1105 -0.3535 ** -1.2034 * 
  0.20 0.40 0.03 0.08 
Pre-Event BHAR, 1 year 0.0020 -0.0534 ** -0.0571 *** -0.1570 
  0.91 0.01 < 0.01 0.37 
Intercept 0.9741 *** 1.2707 *** 4.4350 *** 5.4758 * 
  < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.08 
N 294 293 144 23 
R-Squared 4.91% 4.37% 23.95% 73.13% 
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Table 19. Board of Director Seats Acquired by SWFs 
This table presents details about how frequently individual SWFs assume seats on board of directors of target firms, with detail on domestic vs. foreign 
investment and with specific information concerning investments in OECD target firms.  
 
 
      Acquired Seats Did not Acquire Seats 
SWF Country Obs Total Domestic Foreign OECD Total Domestic Foreign OECD 
International Petroleum Investment 
Company (IPIC) 
Abu Dhabi 6 3 1 2 2 3 0 3 3 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) Abu Dhabi 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 3 
Temasek Holdings Singapore 69 19 9 10 2 50 9 41 19 
Brunei Investment Agency Brunei 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
China Investment Corporation (CIC) China 5 1 1 0 0 4 1 3 3 
Dubai International Financial Centre 
(DIFC) 
Dubai 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 
Khazanah Nasional Bhd Malaysia 18 11 9 2 0 7 4 3 0 
Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation (GIC) 
Singapore 36 3 0 3 1 33 0 33 12 
Investment Corporation of Dubai Dubai 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Istithmar Dubai 9 4 0 4 2 5 0 5 3 
Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) Korea 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) Kuwait 10 1 0 1 1 9 1 8 6 
Libyan Investment Authority Libya 10 2 0 2 2 8 0 8 6 
Mubadala Development Company Abu Dhabi 9 5 2 3 3 4 0 4 4 
Mumtalakat Holding Company Bahrain 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Oman Investment Fund Oman 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) Qatar 14 2 0 2 1 12 1 11 8 
Government Pension Fund-Global Norway 157 0 0 0 0 157 0 157 157 
Grand Total   355 53 22 31 15 302 17 285 229 
Total Excluding Norway   198 53 22 31 15 145 17 128 72 
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Table 20. Government Investments, Descriptive Statistics 
The table details government investments from 293 transactions. It shows the number of deals, value of 
deals and percentage of deal value invested. The sample covers transactions from the period 1980-2010. 
Government investment is broken down by the year of transaction announcement in Panel A, by the 
percentage of government ownership in Panel B, by the country of the government acquirer in Panel C, 
by the country of the target in Panel D and by the target SIC in Panel E.   
 
Panel A. Government Investment by Transaction Year (Announced) 
Year 
Deal 
Count 
Deal Value 
USD (mil) 
Proportion of 
Total (count) 
Proportion of 
Total (value) 
prior to 1990 20 6,138 7% 2% 
1990 9 6,629 3% 2% 
1991 13 1,387 4% <1% 
1992 5 1,094 2% <1% 
1993 10 820 3% <1% 
1994 5 11 2% <1% 
1995 9 23 3% <1% 
1996 9 860 3% <1% 
1997 9 4,495 3% <1% 
1998 11 17,012 4% 5% 
1999 9 8,570 3% 3% 
2000 6 4,708 2% 1% 
2001 10 11,590 3% 3% 
2002 13 2,846 4% 1% 
2003 12 1,928 4% 1% 
2004 14 1,486 5% <1% 
2005 14 34,365 5% 10% 
2006 10 10,669 3% 3% 
2007 23 36,230 8% 11% 
2008 40 153,132 14% 46% 
2009 32 28,027 11% 8% 
2010 6 2,341 2% 1% 
Totals 289 334,361 100% 100% 
 
Panel B.  Government Investment by Stake 
Stake Owned 
Deal 
Count 
Deal Value 
USD (mil) 
Proportion of 
Total (count) 
Proportion of 
Total (value) 
0%-10% 120 73,959 42% 22% 
10%-25% 72 46,242 25% 14% 
25%-50% 38 54,407 13% 16% 
51%-75% 21 76,937 7% 23% 
75%-99% 13 31,965 4% 10% 
100% 25 50,851 9% 15% 
Totals 289 334,361 100% 100% 
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Table 20 (Continued). Government Investments, Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel C. Government Investment by Acquirer Nation 
Rank 
Acquirer 
Nation 
Deal 
Count 
Deal Value USD 
(mil) 
Proportion of 
Total (count) 
Proportion of 
Total (value) 
1 UK 13 98,724 4% 30% 
2 Singapore 28 35,509 10% 11% 
3 UAE 21 29,133 7% 9% 
4 Russian Fed 13 24,385 4% 7% 
5 Germany 9 23,438 3% 7% 
6 Netherlands 8 18,433 3% 6% 
7 France 31 17,381 11% 5% 
8 China 7 13,831 2% 4% 
9 Italy 10 12,655 3% 4% 
10 Belgium 8 10,560 3% 3% 
  OTHER 141 50,314 49% 15% 
  Totals 289 334,361 100% 100% 
 
Panel D.  Government Investment by Target Nation 
Rank 
Target 
Nation 
Deal 
Count 
Deal Value USD 
(mil) 
Proportion of 
Total (count) 
Proportion of 
Total (value) 
1 UK 23 120,120 8% 36% 
2 United States 43 42,301 15% 13% 
3 Germany 13 26,781 4% 8% 
4 Russian Fed 15 23,331 5% 7% 
5 Netherlands 5 18,691 2% 6% 
6 Switzerland 3 15,045 1% 4% 
7 Belgium 7 14,774 2% 4% 
8 Italy 6 12,655 2% 4% 
9 Australia 9 10,086 3% 3% 
10 Sweden 8 9,103 3% 3% 
  OTHER 157 41,474 54% 12% 
  Totals 289 334,361 100% 100% 
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Table 20 (Continued). Government Investments, Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel E.  Government Investment by Target SIC Group 
Target 
SIC 
Description of Target 
SIC 
Deal 
Count 
Deal Value 
USD (mil) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(count) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(value) 
0 
Agriculture, forestry, and 
fishing 
3 2,250 1% 1% 
1 Mining, construction 22 23,758 8% 7% 
2 
Manufacturing (food, 
fabric, wood, chemical) 
23 19,661 8% 6% 
3 
Manufacturing (rubber, 
plastic, glass, metal; boat, 
rail, air equipment) 
31 12,960 11% 4% 
4 
Transportation, 
communications, electric, 
gas, and sanitary service 
86 96,658 30% 29% 
5 Trade (wholesale, retail) 12 2,181 4% 1% 
6 
Finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
98 174,249 34% 52% 
7 
Services (hotel, beauty, 
funeral, computer, car 
rental & repair, movie) 
10 2,564 3% 1% 
8 
Services (doctor's offices, 
legal, schools, religious, 
accounting) 
3 80 1% 0% 
  Totals 289 334,361 100% 100% 
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Table 21. Variable Definitions, Chapter 4 
Ownership data are from SDC Platinum (and integrated with information from available financial 
disclosures and news reports). Bond data are obtained from Bloomberg and DataStream. Financial data 
are obtained from the Worldscope database. 
 
Variable Definition 
Govt presence Takes a value of 1 if the company currently has some government 
ownership, and 0 otherwise. 
Govt ownership 
(%) 
Percentage of the company owned by the government. Obtained from 
Thomson ONE Banker ownership module, company financial reports, and 
press releases. 
Fin. crisis Takes a value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, and 0 otherwise.  
Rating The natural log of Standard and Poor’s bond rating, after conversion to an 
ordinal scale. (AAA = 22, AA+ = 21, etc.)  
Age The time since the issue date, in days. 
Maturity The time till maturity, in days. 
Euro Takes a value of 1 if the bond issue is euro-denominated, and 0 otherwise.  
Leverage (Total assets – Stockholders equity) / Stockholders equity 
Market-to-book (Total shares * Closing share price) / Stockholders equity 
Size The natural log of total assets. 
ROE  Net income / Stockholders equity  
Bank Takes a value of 1 if the target company is a bank, and 0 otherwise. 
Central govt Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a central government, and 0 
otherwise. 
Govt financial 
institution 
Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is government-owned financial 
institution (e.g. Central Bank), and 0 otherwise. 
Local/regional 
govt 
Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a local or regional government, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Pension fund Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a government-owned public 
pension fund, and 0 otherwise. 
SOE mixed Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a government-controlled 
enterprise that is now at least partially owned by non-government investors, 
and 0 otherwise. 
SOE full Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a 100% state-owned enterprise, 
and 0 otherwise. 
SWF Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a sovereign wealth fund, and 0 
otherwise. 
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Table 22. Sample Descriptive Statistics, Government Ownership and Cost of Debt 
The table describes the number, mean, standard deviation, 25th, and 75th percentiles of the variables used 
in the analysis. Variable definitions are provided in Table 21. The sample covers the period 1990-2010. 
Credit spreads in the top and bottom 1% of all observations are dropped. Panel A reports descriptive 
statistics for continuous variables, while Panel B contains descriptive statistics for binary variables. Bond-
years can be associated with more than one state investment vehicle type listed in Panel B. 
 
Panel A. Continuous Variables 
Continuous Variables Count Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
25
th
 
percentile 
75
th
 
percentile 
              
Credit spread 5,126 214.39 133.9 236.63 67.8 271.3 
              
Government Variables             
   Govt ownership 5,126 13.67 2.29 22.47 0 15.29 
   Govt ownership > 0 3,148 22.26 10.74 25.12 3.66 31.9 
              
 Bond Variables             
   Rating 5,126 15.87 16 3.18 14 18 
   Age (days) 5,126 1,644 1,310 1,371 604 2,309 
   Maturity (days) 5,126 2,809 1,857 3,188 968 3,248 
              
Firm Variables             
   Leverage 5,126 11.39 3.81 13.42 1.62 19.69 
   M_B 5,126 1.86 1.63 1.34 1.09 2.24 
   Size 5,126 10.96 10.64 2.44 9.25 13.16 
   ROE 5,126 7.47% 0.11 34.18% 5.49% 16.96% 
 
Panel B. Binary Variables 
Binary Variables Count Yes (1) No (0) 
        
Government Variables       
   Govt presence 5,126 3,148 1,978 
      Central govt   581   
      Govt fin. institution   212   
      Local/regional govt   77   
      Pension fund   784   
      SOE mixed   1,649   
      SOE full   913   
      SWF   897   
   Bailed out 5,126 479 4,647 
   Fin. crisis 5,126 1,834 3,292 
   Foreign govt investor 5,126 1,358 3,768 
        
Firm Variables       
   Bank 5,126 1,300 3,826 
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Table 23. Credit Spreads and Government Ownership, Mean Difference Tests 
The following table presents two-tailed tests of differences in means for companies with and without 
government ownership for the dependent variable (Credit spread) and the major independent variables. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 21. For the comparison of foreign and domestic government 
ownership, firms are grouped based on whether the majority of their government ownership is held by a 
domestic state entity or a foreign one. The sample covers the period 1990–2010. The p-value shows the 
significance level of the two-tailed difference in means test, with standard errors clustered at the firm 
level (as in Skinner, Holt and Smith, 1989).  
 
Sample All Firms 
Gov 
Presence 
No Gov 
Presence 
p-
value 
Count 
Entire Period 214.39 225.14 197.27 0.359 5,126 
1990-2007 146.07 167.25 117.94 0.017 3,292 
2008-2010 337.02 310.76 396.15 0.084 1,834 
            
2008-2010, Excluding 
Bailouts 
356.95 340.68 399.33 0.358 1,530 
            
  Gov Presence 
Majority 
Foreign 
Gov 
Majority 
Domestic Gov   
Entire Period 225.14 293.51 200.38 0.03 3,148 
1990-2007 167.25 270.38 147.17 0.033 1,878 
2008-2010 310.76 306.85 313.57 0.913 1,270 
            
  All Firms Banks Non-Banks 
  
Credit spread (with govt 
presence) 
225.14 163.63 244.69 0.009 3,148 
Credit spread (without govt 
presence) 
197.27 184.77 201.97 0.603 1,978 
            
Credit spread (1990-2007, 
without govt presence) 
117.94 79.93 130.87 0.005 1,414 
Credit spread (2008-2010, 
without govt presence) 
396.15 391.56 398.33 0.927 564 
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Table 24. Government Ownership, Credit Spreads, and the 2008 Financial Crisis 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ ˆ it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, credit 
spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of the 
government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error term. 
Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating (ˆ it), 
are used. The explanatory variables included in Xit are described in Table 2. Bank * Leverage is an 
interaction of the variables described in Table 21, and Fin. Crisis is interacted with each of the 
government owner types. The data are annual and cover the period 1990-2010. Panel A looks at 
government presence, and Panel B uses government ownership stakes. The models control for bond 
collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and issuer country. Coefficients are listed below, with t-
statistics in gray italics. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% 
level. 
 
Panel A. Government Ownership Presence 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Govt presence 51.82***               
3.436               
Govt presence * Fin. 
crisis 
-76.24**               
-2.195               
SWF   72.37             
  1.577             
SWF * Fin. crisis   -24.2             
  -0.552             
Central govt     0.555           
    0.017           
Central govt * Fin. 
crisis 
    -95.33           
    -1.58           
Local/regional govt       86.92***         
      2.609         
Local/regional govt * 
Fin. crisis 
      -134.4**         
      -2.049         
SOE full         18.36       
        1.043       
SOE full * Fin. crisis         -48.18       
        -1.563       
SOE mixed           38.87**     
          2.165     
SOE mixed * Fin. 
crisis 
          -85.58***     
          -2.896     
Pension fund             71.38***   
            4.589   
Pension fund * Fin. 
crisis 
            -0.57   
            -0.017   
Govt financial 
institution 
              131.7*** 
              2.795 
Govt financial 
institution * Fin. 
crisis 
              -117.7** 
              -2.417 
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Table 24 (Continued).  Government Ownership, Credit Spreads, and the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
 
Panel A (Continued). Government Ownership Presence 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Fin. crisis 424.8*** 383.1*** 417.3*** 413.5*** 422.5*** 410.5*** 417.6*** 414.5*** 
10.979 11.302 14.184 13.934 13.252 12.709 13.604 13.767 
Rating -420.3*** -417.3*** -418.5*** -420.5*** -419.8*** -416.4*** -417.1*** -418.8*** 
-6.626 -6.542 -6.436 -6.468 -6.462 -6.474 -6.504 -6.464 
Maturity 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
4.982 4.977 4.753 4.921 4.965 5.015 4.741 4.968 
Age 0.0013 0.0028 0.0024 0.0022 0.0022 0.0014 0.0032 0.0028 
0.405 0.887 0.762 0.702 0.716 0.470 0.969 0.892 
Leverage 1.338** 0.848 0.897 0.912 0.948 1.073* 1.016 1.008 
2.054 1.310 1.400 1.407 1.459 1.675 1.610 1.544 
Bank * 
Leverage 
-2.541** -1.317 -1.598 -1.487 -1.681 -2.094** -1.583 -1.708 
-2.338 -1.153 -1.502 -1.361 -1.545 -1.995 -1.512 -1.527 
Bank 25.56 4.294 8.901 7.456 13.11 18 9.47 11.26 
1.198 0.183 0.391 0.324 0.576 0.831 0.437 0.482 
Market-to-
book 
-16.91*** -15.91*** -15.46*** -15.30*** -15.37*** -15.69*** -14.30*** -15.53*** 
-3.470 -3.287 -3.155 -3.127 -3.123 -3.226 -2.936 -3.125 
Size -11.70*** -13.32*** -12.51*** -12.22** -12.27*** -13.12*** -12.12*** -13.18*** 
-2.684 -2.788 -2.679 -2.595 -2.628 -3.104 -2.680 -2.798 
ROE -34.23* -32.8 -40.56** -40.82** -39.06* -34.85* -40.37** -39.63** 
-1.666 -1.568 -2.055 -2.070 -1.947 -1.718 -2.012 -2.025 
Constant 229.7*** 273.0*** 238.3*** 225.5*** 225.4*** 254.3*** 213.5*** 241.1*** 
3.556 3.717 3.523 3.321 3.334 3.996 3.198 3.517 
Observations 4647 4647 4647 4647 4647 4647 4647 4647 
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
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Table 24 (Continued).  Government Ownership, Credit Spreads, and the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
 
Panel B. Government Ownership Stake 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
 3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model  
8 
Govt stake (%) -0.136               
-0.370               
Govt stake (%) * 
Fin. crisis 
-1.063*               
-1.801               
SWF   4.803*             
  1.844             
SWF * Fin. crisis   -0.728             
  -0.389             
Central govt     -0.243           
    -0.359           
Central govt * 
Fin. crisis 
    -1.828*           
    -1.826           
Local/regional 
govt 
      2.446         
      1.524         
Local/regional 
govt * Fin. crisis 
      -2.732         
      -1.636         
SOE full         -0.917       
        -1.303       
SOE full * Fin. 
crisis 
        -2.805       
        -1.587       
SOE mixed           -0.180     
          -0.300     
SOE mixed * Fin. 
crisis 
          -1.827**     
          -2.496     
Pension fund             1.312   
            0.532   
Pension fund * 
Fin. crisis 
            3.329   
            1.457   
Govt financial 
institution 
              13.72*** 
              4.744 
Govt financial 
institution * Fin. 
crisis 
              -1.808 
              -0.416 
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Table 24 (Continued).  Government Ownership, Credit Spreads, and the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
 
Panel B (Continued). Government Ownership Stake 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Fin. crisis 428.2*** 404.6*** 415.1*** 412.7*** 416.3*** 422.4*** 407.5*** 412.7*** 
13.341 13.509 14.110 13.871 13.860 13.792 13.743 13.679 
Rating -417.3*** -417.4*** -418.0*** -420.8*** -419.1*** -418.0*** -418.6*** -419.0*** 
-6.418 -6.469 -6.428 -6.482 -6.453 -6.423 -6.457 -6.475 
Maturity 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
5.215 4.567 4.776 4.872 4.997 5.003 4.721 5.274 
Age 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0023 0.0026 0.0022 0.0025 0.0027 
-0.846 -0.832 -0.810 -0.724 -0.835 -0.698 -0.773 -0.897 
Leverage 0.938 1.011 0.977 0.924 0.93 0.934 0.925 0.958 
1.457 1.548 1.510 1.423 1.449 1.442 1.420 1.460 
Bank * 
Leverage 
-1.481 -1.461 -1.626 -1.512 -1.544 -1.381 -1.485 -1.612 
-1.390 -1.338 -1.547 -1.378 -1.428 -1.264 -1.359 -1.473 
Bank 11.29 8.365 9.908 7.986 11.36 10.44 7.884 8.15 
0.498 0.366 0.437 0.346 0.502 0.456 0.346 0.352 
Market-to-
book 
-14.36*** -17.39*** -15.50*** -15.57*** -15.59*** -14.24*** -15.29*** -15.51*** 
-2.959 -3.573 -3.162 -3.176 -3.176 -2.872 -3.107 -3.121 
Size -13.51*** -14.03*** -13.24*** -12.27*** -11.67** -13.95*** -12.42*** -13.26*** 
-2.926 -2.930 -2.784 -2.615 -2.536 -3.199 -2.660 -2.826 
ROE -41.85** -31.31 -40.64** -40.79** -40.42** -40.28** -41.72** -40.09** 
-2.090 -1.526 -2.053 -2.070 -2.016 -2.001 -2.120 -2.059 
Constant 245.0*** 253.1*** 246.3*** 232.4*** 226.0*** 246.8*** 232.8*** 243.6*** 
3.640 3.715 3.594 3.426 3.316 3.767 3.444 3.558 
Observations 4647 4647 4647 4647 4647 4647 4647 4647 
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
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Table 25. Domestic and Foreign Government Ownership and Credit Spreads 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ ˆ it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, credit 
spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of the 
government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error term. 
Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating (ˆ it), 
are used. The explanatory variables included in Xit are described in Table 2. Bank * Leverage is an 
interaction of the variables described in Table 21, and Leverage is interacted with each of the government 
owner types. The data are annual and cover the period 1990-2010. The models control for bond 
collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and issuer country. Panel A looks at government presence, and 
Panel B uses government ownership stakes. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in gray italics. 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes 
significance at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A.  Domestic and Foreign Government Ownership Presence 
  1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2007 1990-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
Domestic govt 
presence 
8.404   5.267   -55.77**   
0.626   0.540   2.043   
Foreign govt 
presence  
  16.65   37.01   16.33 
  1.046   1.533   0.824 
Rating -432.1*** -431.2*** -361.7*** -358.2*** -533.1*** -536.9*** 
-6.794 -6.794 -4.797 -4.853 -5.680 -5.649 
Maturity 0.00348*** 0.00344*** 0.00733*** 0.00731*** -0.00181 -0.0017 
4.019 4.031 8.306 8.221 -1.078 -0.954 
Age 0.00254 0.00265 0.00316 0.00308 -0.00186 -0.00105 
0.834 0.882 0.831 0.834 -0.488 -0.273 
Leverage 1.195* 1.137* 1.018* 0.981* 5.925** 5.994** 
1.824 1.721 1.749 1.656 2.167 2.141 
Bank * 
Leverage 
-3.304*** -3.207*** -0.549 -0.383 -12.60*** -13.46*** 
-2.977 -2.794 -0.585 -0.382 -3.308 -3.438 
Bank 52.32** 51.04** -9.241 -14.11 204.1*** 209.6*** 
-2.113 -2.050 0.465 0.655 -3.460 -3.572 
Market-to-
book 
-17.25*** -17.30*** -8.642* -8.213 -25.95** -26.68** 
-3.460 -3.481 -1.728 -1.627 -2.165 -2.179 
Size -15.40*** -15.86*** -10.80*** -10.65*** -18.44* -13.3 
-3.411 -3.467 -3.071 -3.086 -1.955 -1.261 
ROE -47.24** -44.88** -100.9** -103.2** 68.78 72.07 
2.171 2.024 2.540 2.552 -1.560 -1.590 
Constant 271.3*** 283.9*** 267.2*** 280.4*** 363.2** 260.3 
4.219 4.275 5.418 5.370 2.143 1.462 
Observations 5126 5126 3292 3292 1362 1362 
R-squared 0.551 0.551 0.469 0.47 0.53 0.527 
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Table 25 (Continued). Domestic and Foreign Government Ownership and Credit Spreads 
 
Panel B.  Domestic and Foreign Government Ownership Stake 
  1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2007 1990-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
Domestic govt 
stake (%) 
-0.432   -0.338   -1.086**   
-1.219   -0.818   -2.464   
Foreign govt 
stake (%) 
  0.444   1.249*   -0.503 
  -0.551   -1.730   -0.595 
Rating -431.0*** -432.1*** -360.1*** -359.9*** -533.0*** -538.1*** 
-6.760 -6.766 -4.785 -4.793 -5.591 -5.676 
Maturity 0.00351*** 0.00344*** 0.00737*** 0.00726*** -0.00147 -0.00171 
4.106 4.033 8.179 8.255 0.850 0.961 
Age 0.00287 0.00256 0.00342 0.00296 -0.000144 -0.00155 
0.947 0.860 0.922 0.802 -0.038 -0.401 
Leverage 1.194* 1.142* 1.008* 0.912 5.784** 5.931** 
1.796 1.735 1.722 1.546 2.078 2.130 
Bank * 
Leverage 
-3.151*** -3.194*** -0.346 -0.351 -12.69*** -13.28*** 
-2.798 -2.800 -0.376 -0.360 -3.230 -3.390 
Bank 51.63** 50.48** -11.82 -14.09 206.1*** 210.4*** 
2.074 2.031 -0.581 -0.678 3.542 3.591 
Market-to-
book 
-17.31*** -17.47*** -8.813* -8.657* -26.12** -25.29** 
-3.455 -3.503 -1.757 -1.729 -2.148 -2.075 
Size -16.25*** -15.65*** -11.00*** -10.29*** -16.05 -12.28 
-3.552 -3.465 -3.051 -2.924 -1.550 -1.175 
ROE -47.65** -46.55** -101.4** -101.5** 63.64 65.76 
-2.204 -2.117 -2.533 -2.517 1.394 1.433 
Constant 280.8*** 275.8*** 270.3*** 263.2*** 332.1* 242.4 
4.307 4.265 5.285 5.354 1.842 1.372 
Observations 5126 5126 3292 3292 1362 1362 
R-squared 0.551 0.551 0.469 0.47 0.528 0.527 
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Table 26. Non-Investment-Grade Bonds, Domestic and Foreign Government Ownership, and 
Credit Spreads 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ ˆ it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, credit 
spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of the 
government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error term. 
Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating (ˆ it), 
are used. The explanatory variables included in Xit are described in Table 2. Bank * Leverage is an 
interaction of the variables described in Table 21, and Leverage is interacted with each of the government 
owner types. The data are annual and cover the period 1990-2010. The models control for bond 
collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and issuer country. Only observations using non-investment 
grade bonds are used in this table. Panel A looks at government presence, and Panel B uses government 
ownership stakes. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in gray italics. *** denotes significance at 
the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A.  Junk Bonds--Domestic and Foreign Government Ownership Presence 
  
1990-
2010 
1990-
2010 
1990-
2007 
1990-
2007 
2008-
2010 
2008-
2010 
Domestic govt 
presence  
-72.50*   -46.04   -133.0*   
-1.937   -1.010   -2.001   
Foreign govt 
presence  
  143.2***   209.5***   143.1** 
  2.787   3.554   2.364 
Rating -280.6** -264.9** -320.4*** -293.2*** -565.4*** -550.6*** 
-2.599 -2.551 -2.833 -2.667 -3.496 -3.684 
Maturity -0.00146 0.000164 -0.00247 -0.00178 0.00786 0.0107 
-0.303 -0.035 -0.374 -0.270 -0.958 -1.320 
Age 0.00507 0.0101 0.0124 0.0145 -0.00741 0.00147 
0.480 0.937 0.926 1.064 0.487 0.105 
Leverage 9.644*** 7.750** 11.42*** 7.934*** 11.75 8.711 
2.723 2.463 3.109 2.802 0.649 0.540 
Bank * Leverage 6.326 1.198 7.512 -0.704 -119.8*** -117.7*** 
0.948 0.194 1.096 0.097 -2.729 -2.793 
Bank -290.4*** -174.8** -280.6** -135.6 875.5*** 1009*** 
-2.869 -1.998 -2.008 -1.392 3.000 3.315 
Market-to-book -53.30*** -47.66*** -69.40*** -59.55*** -38.55 -31.85 
-2.761 -2.823 -3.399 -3.407 -0.681 -0.645 
Size -19.88 -29.46* -7.366 -16.33 -53.42 -65.63 
-1.182 -1.720 -0.432 -0.940 -1.362 -1.633 
ROE -50.57 -59.5 -107.4 -104.8* 185.8 155.5 
-0.968 -1.268 -1.527 -1.696 0.817 0.746 
Constant 1568*** 1740*** 747.0*** 864.8*** 2229*** 1949*** 
9.405 9.481 3.017 3.765 3.699 3.162 
Observations 732 732 450 450 255 255 
R-squared 0.468 0.479 0.459 0.492 0.443 0.448 
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Table 26 (Continued). Non-Investment-Grade Bonds, Domestic and Foreign Government 
Ownership, and Credit Spreads 
 
Panel B.  Junk Bonds--Domestic and Foreign Government Ownership Stake 
  
1990-
2010 
1990-
2010 
1990-
2007 
1990-
2007 
2008-
2010 
2008-
2010 
Domestic govt stake 
(%) 
-2.080***   -0.906   -7.019***   
-2.703   -0.864   -5.520   
Foreign govt stake 
(%) 
  1.417   4.242**   -2.981 
  1.106   2.433   -1.278 
Rating -276.8** -287.8** -325.6*** -318.7*** -344.4** -580.0*** 
-2.542 -2.599 -2.866 -2.816 -2.349 -3.418 
Maturity -0.00002 0.00054 -0.00173 -0.00134 0.01010 0.00915 
-0.004 0.115 -0.244 -0.197 1.304 1.106 
Age 0.00569 0.00631 0.0124 0.0103 0.00759 -0.00762 
0.536 0.612 0.956 0.810 0.522 -0.514 
Leverage 9.679*** 9.694*** 11.63*** 11.54*** 6.568 5.474 
2.718 2.761 3.040 3.094 0.426 0.314 
Bank * Leverage 6.49 4.614 5.178 5.59 -115.5*** -108.2** 
1.025 0.703 0.748 0.783 -2.758 -2.577 
Bank -300.3*** -255.8** -249.6* -258.1** 637.8** 917.8*** 
-3.056 -2.556 -1.991 -2.042 2.164 3.108 
Market-to-book -52.09*** -51.66*** -69.25*** -69.47*** -57.74 -8.757 
-2.707 -2.699 -3.325 -3.417 -1.111 -0.169 
Size -19.79 -26.04 -6.358 -8.482 -38.2 -53.86 
-1.188 -1.523 -0.370 -0.491 -1.152 -1.314 
ROE -46.28 -47.35 -103.9 -100.5 141.5 154.2 
-0.916 -0.925 -1.520 -1.484 0.680 0.701 
Constant 1564*** 1644*** 718.2*** 783.4*** 2010*** 2750*** 
9.597 9.547 2.869 3.131 3.900 3.933 
Observations 732 732 450 450 255 255 
R-squared 0.47 0.465 0.46 0.466 0.465 0.446 
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Table 27. Government Ownership and Credit Spreads: Robustness Tests 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ
ˆ
it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, credit spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of the government bond 
most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an 
ordinal scale, Rating (ˆ it), are used. The explanatory variables included in Xit are described in Table 21. Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the variables 
described in Table 2, and Leverage is interacted with each of the government owner types. The data are annual and cover the period 1990-2010. The models 
control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and issuer country. Model 1 uses a banking crisis indicator based on Laeven and Valencia (2010). 
Model 2 interacts the presence of central government ownership with leverage. Models 3-8 compare the effects of government ownership presence and amounts 
among different state entities over during periods. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in gray italics. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  1990-2010 1990-2007 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2007 1990-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
  
Presence 
Binary 
Presence 
Binary 
Presence 
Binary 
Stake % 
Presence 
Binary 
Stake % 
Presence 
Binary 
Stake % 
Govt presence 39.34***               
3.168               
Govt * Banking Crisis -54.66*               
-1.966               
Banking crisis 68.43***               
2.843               
Central govt presence   17.71             
  0.656             
Central govt * 
Leverage 
  -1.904**             
  -2.358             
SWF     14.95 2.718* 71.67 4.111 32.49 1.461 
    0.667 1.939 1.378 1.586 1.439 0.627 
Central govt     -1.876 -0.745 -7.609 -0.689 -75.66** -1.211** 
    -0.105 -1.471 -0.283 -1.112 -2.349 -2.473 
Local/regional govt     27.44 -0.0128 9.541 -0.189 -38.91 -0.35 
    -1.509 -0.036 0.347 -0.317 -1.301 -0.654 
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Table 27 (Continued). Government Ownership and Cost of Debt: Robustness 
  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  1990-2010 1990-2007 1990-2010 1990-2010 1990-2007 1990-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
  
Presence 
Binary 
Presence 
Binary 
Presence 
Binary 
Stake % 
Presence 
Binary 
Stake % 
Presence 
Binary 
Stake % 
SOE full     7.918 -0.0353 19.06 0.977 18.59 -2.531** 
    0.487 -0.041 1.094 0.891 0.873 -2.086 
SOE mixed     10.3 -0.894* 36.37** -0.0416 -90.39*** -2.231** 
    0.533 -1.835 2.272 -0.092 -2.755 -2.466 
Pension fund     67.49*** 2.588 22.15 -6.470* 54.87 4.770*** 
    4.304 1.086 1.276 -1.854 1.571 2.994 
Govt financial 
institution 
    21.71 9.171*** 90.41 9.108* 86.04** 16.54*** 
    0.744 2.666 1.644 1.915 2.363 3.187 
Rating -434.4*** -369.9*** -428.3*** -426.4*** -356.4*** -356.4*** -530.0*** -535.0*** 
-6.880 -4.850 -6.812 -6.686 -4.922 -4.720 -5.322 -5.157 
Maturity 0.0036*** 0.0073*** 0.003*** 0.0034*** 0.0071*** 0.0072*** -0.0007 -0.0009 
4.109 8.417 3.766 3.922 7.712 8.102 -0.375 -0.515 
Age 0.0033 0.0035 0.0037 0.0038 0.0032 0.0031 0.0018 0.0007 
1.037 0.958 1.189 1.273 0.837 0.857 0.458 0.182 
Leverage 1.258* 1.221** 1.257* 1.316* 1.210** 1.043* 4.550* 5.616* 
1.935 2.085 1.924 1.920 2.115 1.775 1.657 1.957 
Bank * Leverage -3.628*** -0.107 -3.143*** -3.572*** -0.929 -0.165 -11.89*** -12.87*** 
-3.173 -0.132 -2.749 -3.281 -0.951 -0.179 -3.091 -3.291 
Bank 50.34** -10.66 55.05** 56.91** -4.899 -13.71 187.0*** 225.1*** 
1.978 -0.540 2.181 2.391 -0.239 -0.650 3.213 3.809 
Market-to-book -17.27*** -9.126* -18.51*** -16.53*** -8.453* -9.031* -25.10** -23.94* 
-3.713 -1.801 -3.670 -3.295 -1.677 -1.789 -2.087 -1.825 
Size -14.33*** -11.77*** -18.64*** -15.43*** -11.39*** -13.07*** -20.47* -19.81* 
-3.299 -3.411 -4.158 -3.544 -3.264 -3.444 -1.952 -1.860 
ROE -39.07* -102.9** -42.03* -44.39** -97.56** -98.09** 55.54 62.79 
-1.848 -2.575 -1.872 -1.985 -2.578 -2.441 1.257 1.337 
Constant 263.8*** 271.5*** 302.5*** 261.5*** 298.0*** 298.6*** 403.3** 366.0* 
4.192 5.310 4.589 3.957 4.830 5.529 2.196 1.937 
Observations 5126 3292 5126 5126 3292 3292 1362 1362 
R-squared 0.558 0.477 0.553 0.553 0.48 0.474 0.536 0.536 
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Table 28. Factors Associated with Government Ownership 
The following table shows probit regression results from a model describing factors associated with the 
presence of government ownership in a given firm-year. The dependent variable is Govt presence, as 
defined in Table 21. This probit model serves as the first-stage regression for the treatment effects models 
used in Table 29. The first seven firm-level variables are linked to the bond-issuing target firms in our 
sample. The final three country-level factors are drawn from the nation of the investing government with 
the largest ownership percentage in the sample firm-year. For firm-years without government ownership, 
these country-level factors represent the home nation of the bond-issuing firm. The right-hand side 
variables are described in Table 21. Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the variables described in Table 
21. The data are annual and cover the period 1990-2010. Political leadership left takes a value of 1 if the 
chief executive of a nation is part of a left-wing political party, and 0 otherwise; the variable is based on 
the Beck et al. (2001) database updated December 2010. Privatized target firm takes a value of 1 if the 
target company is a formerly state-owned company, and 0 otherwise. Civil law takes the value of 1 if the 
legal origin of the target country is ‘civil law’, and 0 otherwise; the variable is based on data by Djankov 
et al. (2008), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset. 
 
 
Leverage -0.0246*** 
  -8.979 
Bank -0.434*** 
  -4.326 
Bank * Leverage 0.0530*** 
  11.964 
Market-to-book 0.107*** 
  5.500 
Size -0.181*** 
  -13.249 
ROE -0.831*** 
  -12.327 
Privatized target firm 0.474*** 
  9.080 
Political leadership left 0.841*** 
  18.819 
Civil law 1.329*** 
  25.399 
GDP per capita growth 0.0131** 
  2.011 
Constant 1.382*** 
  10.074 
Observations 5124 
Pseudo R-squared 0.291 
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Table 29. Government Ownership and Credit Spreads: Two-Stage Models 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ ˆ it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, credit 
spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of the 
government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error term. 
Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating (ˆ it), 
are used. The variables included in Xit are described in Table 21. Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the 
variables described in Table 21. The data are annual and cover the period 1990-2010. The table reports 
second-stage results of a treatment effects regression, where Lambda represents the Inverse Mills Ratio 
(the first-stage results are presented in Table 28). Model 3 use a banking crisis indicator based on Laeven 
and Valencia (2010). The models control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and issuer 
country. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in gray italics. *** denotes significance at the 1% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Govt presence 44.98*** 66.36*** 27.85* 
3.247 4.689 1.865 
Govt ownership * Fin. crisis   -81.73***   
  -7.98   
Govt ownership * Banking crisis     -53.60*** 
    -5.176 
Fin. crisis   152.1   
  1.422   
Banking crisis     68.66*** 
    6.299 
Rating -425.3*** -423.3*** -429.1*** 
-36.168 -36.145 -36.673 
Age 0.0026 0.0016 0.0030* 
1.466 0.919 1.702 
Maturity 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 
4.506 4.497 4.553 
Leverage 1.336*** 1.690*** 1.145*** 
3.807 4.823 3.212 
Bank 57.60*** 61.94*** 47.82*** 
4.537 4.893 3.742 
Bank * Leverage -3.793*** -4.294*** -3.358*** 
-5.991 -6.767 -5.224 
Market-to-book -17.58*** -18.10*** -15.93*** 
-8.045 -8.189 -7.195 
Size -13.68*** -14.49*** -14.77*** 
-7.13 -7.541 -7.624 
ROE -40.54*** -39.53*** -43.68*** 
-5.183 -5.119 -5.653 
Lambda -10.24 -5.189 7.545 
-1.174 -0.593 0.825 
Constant 367.0*** 379.5*** 393.9*** 
3.228 3.356 3.476 
Observations 5124 5124 5124 
 
